State v. Huffman

Citation69 W.Va. 770,73 S.E. 292
CourtSupreme Court of West Virginia
Decision Date21 November 1911
PartiesSTATE. v. HUFFMAN.

73 S.E. 292
(69 W.Va. 770)

STATE.
v.
HUFFMAN.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Nov. 21, 1911.


Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Arson (§ 20*) — Indictment — Value of Property.

It is unnecessary in an indictment for arson, under section 6, chapter 145, Code 1906, to charge the value of the building and the property therein separately; and an indictment charging the value of the building and contents as a whole is good on demurrer.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Arson, Cent. Dig. §§ 41-44; Dec. Dig. § 20.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 309*)—Evidence—Similar Offenses.

On the trial of an indictment for arson evidence of numerous other fires and depredations suffered by the owner of the property burned, covering a series of years immediately preceding the burning of the building charged in the indictment, though not traced to defendant, is admissible on the issue whether such fire was accidental, or the work of an incendiary.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 822-824; Dec. Dig. § 369.*]

3. Criminal Law (§ 344*)—Evidence—Opportunity.

The evidence showing that most of such other fires and depredations occurred on Sunday, when the owner of the property and his family were absent at church, evidence of defendant's general habit of absenting himself from church on that day was not incompetent, on the question of opportunity of defendant to commit the other offences occurring on that day, and as tending to connect him therewith, and, under an exception to the general rule, as tending to show intent, malice and the like, and bearing on the question of his guilt or innocence of the offence charged in the indictment.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 795; Dec. Dig. § 344.*]

[73 S.E. 293]

4. Criminal Law (§ 7892-*)—Trial—Instructions—Reasonable Doubt.

Though it is the better practice to combine them in one comprehensive instruction, it is not error on the trial of an indictment for arson, to state to the jury the law of reasonable doubt applicable to the whole case, in several distinct instructions or legal propositions to the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1906, 1907; Dec. Dig. § 789.*]

5. Criminal Law (§ 829*)—Trial—Instructions Already Given.

As many times decided, it is unnecessary to repeat instructions which have already been given to the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829.*]

6. Criminal Law (§ 847*)— Trial—Instructions— Requests—Objection to Modification—Waiver.

Though, by the statute of 1907 (Acts 1907, c. 38 [Code Supp. 1909, c. 131, §§ 9al-9a5]) the right is given a party to object to the modification of a proposed instruction to the jury, and if modified over his objection, to have the same as modified given as the court's instruction, and read in the order prescribed by the statute, yet, if without objection, the court is permitted to read such modified instruction as the instruction of the proponent thereof, such right will be regarded as having been waived.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 847.*]

7. Criminal Law (§ 939*)—New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence—Diligence.

The rule applicable to motions for new trial based on after-discovered evidence, stated in Jacobs v. Williams, 67 W. Va. 377, 67 S. E. 1113, applied to the facts in this case, and justifying the court below in denying the motion.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2318-2323; Dec. Dig. § 939.*]

Error to Circuit Court, Nicholas County. C. B. Huffman was convicted of arson, and brings error. Affirmed.

Corley & Duff and Osenton & Horan, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. G. Conley, Atty. Gen., and J. O. Henson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

MILLER, J. [1] The indictment, on which defendant was found guilty, and by the judgment below, sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, charged, substantially in the language of the statute, section 6, chapter 145, Code 1906, that the defendant "on the ——day of March, 1910, in said County of Nicholas, feloniously and maliciously did burn a certain building, to-wit, a granary, the property of J. J. Reynolds, situate in the said county, which said building and the property therein was then and there of the value of two hundred dollars."

The first point of error is, that the demurrer should have been sustained. The statute reads: "If a person maliciously burn any building, the burning whereof is not punishable under any other section of this chapter, he shall, if the building with property therein be of the value of one hundred dollars or more, be confined in the penitentiary not less than three nor more than ten years; and if it be of less value, be so confined not less than two nor more than five years, or in the discretion of the court, in jail not more than one year, and be fined not exceeding five hundred dollars."

It is insisted that under this statute, the indictment should have charged separately, the value of the building and the property therein, so as to give the prisoner notice. The indictment does charge the value of the building and contents. This is all the statute requires. It is generally sufficient to charge a statutory crime in the language of the statute. State v. Gould, 26 W. Va. 258, 262; People v. Murray, 57 Mich. 396, 24 N. W. 118, 6 Amer. Cr. Rep. 31; 1 Bishop's New Cr. Pro. (4th Ed.) section 611. In Wolf v. Com., 30 Grat. (Va.) 833, the demurrer to an indictment under the same statute, was grounded on the proposition that the...

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