State v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 05 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | A164857 |
| Citation | 488 P.3d 795,311 Or.App. 123 |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph Martin HUGHES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Sarah Laidlaw, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before DeHoog, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
Defendant appeals a judgment convicting him of misdemeanor driving while suspended or revoked, ORS 811.182,1 arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that an officer had obtained after stopping him for a traffic violation. Defendant argues that the officer did not have probable cause to initiate a traffic stop for failure to properly display registration plates when defendant drove with a single dealer plate displayed on the rear of his car. Defendant specifically contends that the officer's subjective probable cause was not objectively reasonable, because dealer vehicles may lawfully display only a single plate. The state responds that defendant invited the error that he now challenges on appeal, because he argued to the trial court that the applicable standard for a traffic stop was reasonable suspicion; that is, he did not contend that the officer was required to have probable cause to make the stop. The state alternatively argues that the officer had probable cause to justify the traffic stop.2 We conclude that the officer lacked probable cause to detain defendant when he initiated the traffic stop and, therefore, that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress for legal error, and we are bound by the court's express and implicit findings of fact, if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them." State v. Lawson , 300 Or. App. 292, 295, 454 P.3d 20 (2019) (citing State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993) ). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. one morning, Officer DeLong of the Portland Police Bureau saw defendant driving towards him in a car with no front plate of any kind. DeLong believed that defendant's failure to display a front license plate provided a lawful basis to stop defendant to investigate a potential traffic violation. DeLong initiated the stop by activating his patrol car's overhead lights and making a U-turn behind defendant. Upon completing the turn, DeLong observed a "dealer" plate displayed on the rear of defendant's car. See ORS 822.040 (). In regard to the applicable standard for a traffic stop, DeLong agreed with defense counsel's characterization at the suppression hearing that, at the time DeLong had initiated the stop, he had possessed " ‘reasonable suspicion because [there was] no front plate.’ " (Emphasis added.)
On direct examination, DeLong testified that, due to the early morning hour and because, in his experience, dealer plates are sometimes used to conceal the fact that a vehicle is stolen, he had run the dealer plate through his onboard computer system. He learned from the resulting report that the vehicle had not been reported stolen and that the plate was assigned to an "actual dealer."
DeLong believed, however, that two plates were required on the vehicle, one on the front and one on the rear. DeLong explained at the hearing that, although there may be exceptions, "having only one plate on the vehicle is normally a traffic infraction."
Upon stopping defendant, DeLong told him that he had been stopped because his car did not have a front license plate. In the course of the stop, defendant admitted to DeLong that he did not have insurance and that "he was suspended at the felony level." The state later charged defendant by information with misdemeanor driving while suspended or revoked, ORS 811.182.
Defendant submitted a written motion to suppress the evidence that DeLong had obtained during the traffic stop; the trial court also received testimony and heard oral argument on that motion at the suppression hearing. Defendant's written and oral arguments were not entirely consistent with each other as to the applicable legal standard. Defendant contended in his written motion that the traffic stop required probable cause. At the suppression hearing, on the other hand, defendant's questioning of DeLong and his argument to the court focused on whether DeLong's subjective belief and the objective circumstances satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard. For its part, the state also discussed the stop in terms of reasonable suspicion, though at one point the state more generally argued that DeLong had had "sufficient cause to initiate the stop." Seemingly following the parties’ lead, the trial court also discussed its ruling in terms of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.
In disputing whether DeLong had reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop, defendant asserted that DeLong's subjective suspicion was not objectively reasonable, because the law only requires dealer vehicles to display a single plate to the rear of a vehicle, as his car displayed here. Defendant acknowledged that no statute specifically stated that rule, but he referred the court to the "Vehicle License Plate Manual published by the Oregon Department of Transportation," which, he contended, explained that the motor vehicle division (DMV) issues only one dealer plate for each dealer vehicle. However, despite having identified DMV's license-plate manual as being appropriate for judicial notice, defendant does not appear to have actually asked the trial court to take judicial notice, and there is no indication in the record that the court did so. Nonetheless, relying on the manual as legal authority, defendant argued to the trial court that there had been no lawful basis for DeLong's suspicion that defendant had committed a traffic offense. Without that basis for the stop, defendant contended, DeLong had only a general suspicion in light of the early morning hour, and, because that fact was not particularized to defendant, it was insufficient to justify the traffic stop.
In response, the state emphasized that the early-morning hour was an unconventional time for a person to be legitimately driving a dealer vehicle; the state implied that the time of the encounter gave DeLong reason to question whether defendant was, in fact, an authorized driver of the vehicle.3 The state further argued that, at least as of the time that he first encountered defendant's car, DeLong's observation that it had no front plate gave rise to reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle because, "[u]nder the proper circumstances, that is a traffic infraction." According to the state, DeLong's recognition of the dealer plate before he had effectuated the stop created "a separate issue," but it did not invalidate the stop. At the suppression hearing, the state reasoned that, once DeLong had recognized the dealer plate as such, he was permitted to consider existing restrictions on the use of those plates and whether such restrictions appeared inconsistent with driving at "2:30 in the morning in an area that is far removed from other dealers."
The state also emphasized DeLong's awareness that dealer plates "are often used to hide criminal activity," such as concealing stolen vehicles and the identities of persons who drive them. In the state's view, there were multiple justifications for the stop:
"Whether there was a single plate, whether there were geographic [or] temporal restrictions on the use of the plate, whether there was a traffic violation related to the front of the plate, none of those things matter to the extent that once he has reasonable suspicion to stop that car to investigate the violation of those ORSs, he has to complete the stop."
The trial court agreed with the state that defendant had committed a traffic offense and concluded that there "certainly was, and I don't think there's argument there wasn't, reasonable suspicion at the time the officer signaled for the vehicle to stop." The court further reasoned that, "[u]nder Oregon law, vehicles operated on public roads must be registered and two plates are required for a vehicle that must be registered with inapplicable exceptions here." The court later clarified that it was "relying upon *** the reasonable improbability of there being an exception that would be applicable here for the operation of a vehicle on a public road with only one plate." As a result, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress and, following a bench trial, found him guilty of driving while suspended or revoked, ORS 811.182. Defendant appeals the resulting judgment of conviction.
We begin with the state's contention that defendant invited or waived any error as to the existence of probable cause by arguing his motion in terms of reasonable suspicion. Although the state argues on appeal that the standard for traffic stops should be reasonable suspicion, it is undisputed that, at the suppression hearing, both the parties and the trial court were misguided in discussing defendant's motion in terms of reasonable suspicion. Defendant argues, however, that, notwithstanding that shared misunderstanding, he sufficiently preserved his probable-cause argument by raising it in his written motion; in defendant's view, we may review the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard because the record is sufficient to determine whether DeLong had probable cause. The state reasons that defendant effectively abandoned his...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Sullivan
...including whether there was sufficient probable cause to conduct a stop for a traffic violation, for legal error. State v. Hughes , 311 Or App 123, 124, 488 P.3d 795 (2021). In so doing, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact, provided that there is constitutionally s......
-
State v. Jacoby
...and implicit findings of fact, if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them." State v. Hughes , 311 Or. App. 123, 124-25, 488 P.3d 795 (2021). Consistent with that standard, we "draw the following facts from the testimony presented at the suppression hearin......