State v. Hughes, 22261

• Decision Date: 12 August 1997
• Docket Number: No. 22261,22261
• Citation: 130 Idaho 698,946 P.2d 1338
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph R. HUGHES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1338

946 P.2d 1338

130 Idaho 698

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Joseph R. HUGHES, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22261.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Aug. 12, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1997.

Jennifer L.K. Haemmerle, Butte County Public Defender, Hailey, for defendant-appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Catherine O. Derden, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Substitute Opinion

The Court's Prior Opinion Dated July 14, 1997 is Hereby Withdrawn.

LANSING, Chief Judge.

After a jury trial, Joseph R. Hughes was found guilty of felony malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001 and the trial court entered an order withholding judgment and placing Hughes on probation. On appeal, Hughes asserts that the district court erred in allowing the State to impeach its own photographic evidence and in denying Hughes's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case because there was insufficient evidence to identify him as the perpetrator and insufficient evidence to establish that the value of the property damage exceeded $1,000. Because we conclude that the State did not present evidence to prove that property destroyed by Hughes was of a value exceeding $1,000, which valuation was necessary to render the offense a felony rather than a misdemeanor, we hold the charge on which the withheld judgment is based must be reduced to a misdemeanor.

I. FACTS

On May 22, 1994, at about 3 a.m., Deputy Sanders of the Butte County Sheriff's Office observed a red Chevrolet pickup repeatedly backing up and ramming the garage door of Clair's Diesel, an auto repair shop in Arco, Idaho. The deputy, who was on foot some distance away from the repair shop, ran to his nearby patrol car and drove to the repair shop. He estimated that he arrived at the shop within thirty seconds after observing the red pickup damaging the door. Seeing that the pickup was gone, Sanders drove on, and in another thirty seconds spotted a red Chevrolet pickup that looked like the one he had just observed at the repair shop. Sanders did not see any other traffic on the streets at the time.

The deputy stopped the pickup and asked the driver, Hughes, to accompany him back to Clair's Diesel. Hughes complied. At the repair shop Sanders and other officers who had responded to his call for assistance examined the damaged garage door and Hughes' vehicle. They took measurements of the height of the dents and red paint on the door and the height of marks on the pickup, photographing both. They also examined a white paint-like substance on the trailer hitch mounted on the rear of Hughes' pickup. Hughes was charged with felony malicious injury to property, and was found guilty by a jury. The district court withheld judgment and placed Hughes on probation for three years.

On appeal, Hughes contends that the district court incorrectly allowed the State to impeach its own photographic evidence and that the court should have granted Hughes' motion for a judgment of acquittal due to insufficiency of the State's evidence.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Testimony Regarding the Quality of the Photographic Evidence

The State introduced into evidence Polaroid photos of Hughes' pickup and the damaged garage door. On cross-examination of Deputy Sanders, counsel for Hughes attempted to discredit Deputy Sanders' testimony regarding paint transfers that were not visible in these photos. On redirect examination, Sanders testified that, although the photos were accurate within the limits of a Polaroid photograph, they did not show all of the details that could be seen on first hand observation. Counsel for Hughes objected to this testimony on the ground that the State was impeaching its own evidence, but the district court overruled the objection.

Hughes cites no apposite authority supporting his objection to this testimony, and we know of no rule of law that precludes a party from acknowledging the limitations of its photographic evidence. The testimony given by Deputy Sanders on redirect examination merely acknowledged that the quality of the Polaroid photographs was such that they did not reproduce all of the details that could be seen from direct observation of the photographed objects. Even if this could be characterized as "impeachment" of the deputy's prior testimony that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the pickup and garage door, it would not be objectionable, for I.R.E. 607 permits a party to impeach its own witness. We perceive no error in the admission of this evidence.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

At the close of the State's evidence, Hughes moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29. The district court denied the motion, and Hughes presented evidence on his own behalf. Hughes now maintains that the court's denial of the motion for a judgment of acquittal was erroneous.

Because Hughes elected to introduce evidence rather than to stand on his Rule 29 motion, he waived any right to limit the appellate court's review to the sufficiency of the evidence as of the close of the State's case. State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 698, 587 P.2d 835, 839 (1978); State v. Brooks, 103 Idaho 892, 903, 655 P.2d 99, 110 (Ct.App.1982). On review, therefore, the appellate court must consider all of the evidence, including that offered by the defense, to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Watson, supra, citing State v. Gardner, 231 Or. 193, 372 P.2d 783, 784 (1962).

A jury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785-86, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 P.2d 938, 943 (1980); State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-696, 889 P.2d 723, 724-25 (Ct.App.1994). On appellate review, the facts and inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. Whiteley, 124 Idaho 261, 270, 858 P.2d 800, 809 (Ct.App.1993). A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 554 P.2d 684 (1976); State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 671, 862 P.2d 1089, 1093 (Ct.App.1993); Whiteley, supra.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence on identification of Hughes

Hughes first argues that the evidence is insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of the offense. He points out that Deputy Sanders acknowledged at trial that he could not identify Hughes as the person who was driving the pickup when Sanders saw it ramming the garage door.

Hughes' argument is without merit. The identity of the perpetrator of a crime may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 320, 859 P.2d 353, 356 (Ct.App.1993). In this case, there was ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Hughes was the offender. The incident occurred at 3 a.m., in a small town, and Deputy Sanders testified that he saw no other traffic on the streets at the time. Sanders estimated that less than one minute passed from the moment he saw the pickup backing into the repair shop door to the moment he spotted Hughes' pickup on the street. Hughes' vehicle was the same make and color that Sanders had just seen at the repair shop. In investigating the crime, officers found that a large dent low on the garage door was the same height as the trailer hitch on Hughes' pickup. They also found red spots on the white garage door that matched the red color of Hughes' pickup and white flecks on the trailer hitch that looked like paint from the garage door. As evidence of motive, the State also showed that Hughes and the owner of the repair shop had been involved in a civil dispute which had resulted in the issuance of a small claims court judgment against Hughes. This evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably infer that the pickup that Hughes was driving when stopped by Deputy Sanders is the one that inflicted the damage on the repair shop door and that Hughes was operating the pickup at the time.

Hughes complains that the State did not obtain a laboratory analysis of the white flecks on the pickup to determine whether they matched the paint on the garage door. However, the absence of such forensic evidence is of no consequence here. Although scientific tests might have provided the most compelling evidence, the law does not require the State to conduct scientific testing in every case where it could be done.

Hughes also asserts that the photographs in evidence show that Hughes' pickup could not have caused the damage to the door because the height of some of the dents or paint scuffs on the door were inches higher than the part of Hughes' pickup which would have impacted the garage door. We find this argument unpersuasive. Hughes' attorney drew these alleged discrepancies to the jury's attention during the cross-examination of the State's witnesses. The jurors had the photographs during deliberations and were free to draw their own conclusions. As the prosecutor argued, the alleged discrepancy could be explained by the bending of the garage door from the impact, which could result in the door and the pickup coming into contact in more than one place. This was a question of fact for the jury to determine.

Finally, Hughes contends that minor inconsistencies in Deputy Sanders' description of the pickup at the preliminary hearing and his description given at trial show that "the only eye-witness failed in his identification of the truck and driver." These minor discrepancies were used to impeach Deputy Sanders, and it was the jury's province to assess their impact upon the deputy's credibility. See State v. Huggins, 103 Idaho 422, 648 P.2d 1135 (Ct.App.1982). Hughes has not...