State v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 19 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-97-0238-PR,CR-97-0238-PR |
| Citation | 193 Ariz. 72,969 P.2d 1184 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee. v. Alex Vidal HUGHES, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
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¶1 The jury rejected Defendant's insanity defense and convicted him of murder and other felonies. We reverse and remand because the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Defendant of a fair trial.
¶2 On August 25, 1991, Defendant, who had been drinking, argued with his sister's boyfriend and said he would shoot him. Defendant then went to his car, got a shotgun, chambered a shell, returned, and shot and killed the boyfriend. Defendant drove away and then came back a while later, after police had arrived. When Defendant saw the police, he did a U-turn and sped away. During the ensuing high-speed chase, Defendant fired shots at officers and others, and he collided with a police car before surrendering. These events gave rise to the thirteen charges on which Defendant was convicted. There was little doubt that Defendant had done what he was charged with doing; from day one in this case, the serious issues related to Defendant's state of mind and his mental health.
¶3 At all relevant times, the State was represented by Mr. Thomas J. Zawada of the Pima County Attorney's Office, and Defendant was represented by Mr. Creighton W. Cornell of the Pima County Public Defender's Office. We granted review on prosecutorial misconduct issues only. The main theme of Mr. Zawada's misconduct was repeated, groundless assertions and insinuations that defense counsel and expert witnesses were fabricating an insanity defense.
¶4 As the prosecutor told the jury in opening statement, the State's theory of the case was this: "Alex is nothin' but a mean drunk, ... there is no insanity in this case, and ... there is no mental illness in this case." When the prosecutor said there was no mental illness in the case, he knew that every one of the six mental health experts who examined Defendant between arrest and trial found him to be mentally ill. When the prosecutor said there was no insanity in the case, he knew that Defendant would present expert testimony that he was insane, and the State would present no expert testimony that Defendant was sane.
¶5 From the beginning, the State knew about the mental health issues in this case. Immediately after the shooting, Defendant's sister (the murder victim's girlfriend) told police that Defendant was mentally ill, that he would talk "off the wall" to the television and radio, that he believed doctors had implanted a monitoring device in his body, and that a doctor had said there was "something mentally wrong" with him. When Defendant was interrogated after his arrest, officers called in Dr. Kevin Gilmartin (at midnight on a Sunday) because he had given them some training in asking questions to rebut an insanity defense, and the officers wanted the doctor there to "review [Defendant's] capabilities" and to ask any questions the doctor wanted to ask. (The doctor did not testify at trial or in pretrial hearings.)
¶6 When police interviewed Defendant's mother and brother a few days after his arrest, they said he was mentally ill and that the family had tried to get help for him. The mother said that Defendant's personality changed regardless of whether he had been drinking. The brother said that Defendant
¶7 After Defendant was indicted, defense counsel notified the State that the defenses would include insanity and self-defense and that the witnesses would include anyone who could testify to Defendant's paranoid schizophrenic behavior. 1
¶8 In January 1992, Dr. Larry Morris, a clinical psychologist, evaluated Defendant and concluded that he was Defense counsel requested a competency determination pursuant to Rule 11, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The prosecutor accused Defendant of faking symptoms after being "primed" by the doctor. The court ordered a Rule 11 examination.
¶9 The State refused to nominate a mental health expert. The court then ordered an evaluation by the Court Clinic, which assigned the matter to Dr. Todd Flynn, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Flynn's March 26, 1992, report concluded, "[T]here is sufficient cause to believe that Mr. Hughes suffers from a Paranoid-Delusional Disorder or chronic Paranoid-Schizophrenia which includes grandiose delusions which might significantly detract from his ability to cooperate with counsel and meaningfully participate in a jury trial or other legal proceeding."
¶10 In April 1992, on the basis of reports from Dr. Morris and Dr. Flynn, the court found Defendant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed until his competency was restored. In July 1992, Dr. Jack Potts, Associate Medical Director of Psychiatric Services of the Maricopa County Department of Health Services, wrote to the court that Defendant was now competent. Dr. Potts also wrote, "[I]f at the time of the alleged offense [Defendant] was similarly paranoid as he was when he presented to us there may be an issue as to his intention and/or criminal culpability." The court found Defendant competent to stand trial.
¶11 In October 1992, defense counsel requested another evaluation based on his own belief that Defendant had degenerated and was no longer competent. The court ordered an evaluation. At a February 5, 1993, hearing, Defendant called three expert witnesses and the State called no witnesses. Dr. Potts testified that Defendant's mental condition had deteriorated because he was back in the Pima County Jail and was not receiving Navane. On questioning from the court, Dr. Potts said that Defendant should receive five milligrams a day of Navane or similar medication. Dr. Flynn testified that Defendant had delusions of persecution that included Dr. Flynn, the prosecutor, and defense counsel, who Defendant believed was part of the prosecutorial system. Dr. Flynn testified that Defendant's mental illness was chronic, it was "not something that just popped up yesterday or last week or last month," and it provided "reasonable grounds to question [Defendant's] ability to cooperate with counsel in formulating a defense and in participating in a trial." Dr. Morris testified that Defendant was a paranoid schizophrenic who, without medication, had regressed to the point of present incompetence.
¶12 The court made no finding of incompetence, but it ordered the Medical Director of the Pima County Jail to evaluate Defendant "for the administration of Navane at a dosage of five milligrams per day," and it ordered that the jail notify the court if it was unable or unwilling to so medicate Defendant.
¶13 On March 26, 1993, Dr. Catherine Boyer, a clinical psychologist at the Court Clinic, became the fourth expert to testify that Defendant was presently incompetent. She said that Defendant believed he could hear people's thoughts and he was very suspicious of defense counsel. She saw no evidence of malingering; to the contrary, she thought that Defendant "seemed very intent on showing that he was not mentally ill and that he was able to proceed with his case." The State called no witnesses.
While the defendant may appear to have some signs of mental illness, his behavior in relation to defense counsel is not uncommon among defendants, in general, and with defense attorneys who have personality traits similar to lead defense counsel's.
....
Much of the defendant's conduct amounts to malingering. The Court finds the defendant is competent to stand trial ¶p 15 Defendant filed a petition for special action in Division Two of the Court of Appeals. 2 On May 12, 1993, the court of appeals vacated the trial court's finding of competence because
The record before us contains no reasonable evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that [Defendant] was competent when the various experts last examined him. We recognize that in evaluating the evidence the trial court is not bound by the opinions of experts. However, there must be some basis for rejecting the testimony of experts, such as observations made by the court of the defendant or, perhaps, testimony of counsel. Here, the experts, including psychologist Catherine Boyer who testified on behalf of the court clinic, unanimously concluded that petitioner was unable to assist his counsel because of his paranoia. We can find no reasonable evidence to support a rejection of the opinions of four experts, the only experts who testified. There is no reasonable evidence to support the court's finding that petitioner is malingering. That defense counsel may have violated the court's orders in this matter or acted in an inappropriate, perhaps unethical manner, is not relevant to a determination under Rule 11.
(Citations omitted.) The court of appeals also noted that the State's response to the petition for special action "does not dispute petitioner's contention that the evidence unequivocally established petitioner's incompetency when last examined."
¶16 On remand, the trial court committed Defendan...
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