State v. Hughes
| Decision Date | 08 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 25548.,25548. |
| Citation | 134 Idaho 811,10 P.3d 760 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Tracy L. HUGHES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Ronaldo A. Coulter, State Appellate Public Defender; Molly J. Huskey, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, and Charles I. Wadams, Legal Intern, Boise, for appellant. Charles I. Wadams argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cude, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cude argued.
Tracy L. Hughes appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). Hughes challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
On February 22, 1998, at approximately 2:00 a.m., a Kootenai County sheriff's officer observed a pickup with a partially obstructed license plate. The officer conducted a traffic stop and made contact with the driver, who identified himself as Hughes. The officer explained to Hughes the reason for the stop and asked Hughes for his driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The pickup Hughes was driving had extra large tires, which placed the vehicle's window approximately at the height of the officer's collarbone.
During this initial contact, the officer observed that Hughes was acting extremely nervous and fidgety. Hughes was moving his hands about the interior of the vehicle, was reaching toward the bottom of the door, and was twisting back around the other way. Due to the height of Hughes' vehicle, the officer was unable to see inside the passenger compartment below Hughes' shoulders. The officer asked Hughes several times to stop moving, but Hughes failed to comply with the officer's requests. At this point, the officer requested that Hughes exit the vehicle. After removing Hughes from the vehicle, the officer frisked Hughes for weapons. During this frisk, the officer felt a round cylindrical object in Hughes' left front pants pocket. The officer did not remove the object, but instead continued the frisk. Hughes pushed the officer away, reached into his pocket, removed the cylindrical object, and threw it back over his head.
During a search of the area, a small glass jar with a metal lid was recovered. A field test revealed the contents of the jar to be amphetamine. Hughes was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Hughes unsuccessfully moved for the suppression of the evidence seized. Thereafter, Hughes pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion. Hughes appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996).
Hughes argues that the denial of his motion to suppress evidence should be overturned on appeal due to the illegality of the officer's frisk for weapons. The reasonableness of such an investigative frisk is a question of law. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559, 561, 661 P.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App.1983). While the trial court's conclusions should not be lightly disregarded, it is this Court's responsibility to measure the facts as found by the district court against the constitutional standard of reasonableness. Burgess, 104 Idaho at 561, 661 P.2d at 346. A frisk for weapons is permissible if the officer has a reasonable belief that the subject of the frisk poses a danger and has immediate control of a weapon. State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct.App.1999). In our analysis of a frisk, we look to the facts known to the officers on the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality of those specific circumstances. Id.
If an officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant a frisk for weapons, then such a frisk will not violate the Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that when analyzing such a frisk, a court must decide "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. As explained by the Terry Court, where a police officer reasonably concludes, based on his or her observations, that people with whom the officer is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serve to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for his or her or other's safety, the officer is entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer. Id. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911-12. See also State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 994 P.2d 633 (Ct.App.2000)
; State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 986 P.2d 1030 (Ct.App. 1999).
Initially, we note that Hughes does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop. Hughes' sole argument on appeal concerns the constitutionality of the frisk. Hughes argues that the circumstances surrounding the stop of his vehicle, and his resulting actions, did not amount to sufficient grounds for the officer to perform a frisk of Hughes' person pursuant to Terry.
Hughes argues that the officer had no evidence to suspect that Hughes was armed and dangerous, given the fact that the officer was only investigating a broken license plate trim. However, pursuant to Fleenor, a police officer need not possess reasonable suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity before the officer may conduct a Terry frisk for weapons. Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 556, 989 P.2d at 788. This is so because a "stop-and frisk under Terry constitutes two independent actions, each requiring separate justifications." United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163, 165 n. 2 (9th Cir.1991). Thus, each action must be analyzed separately and the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 556, 989 P.2d at 788. Accordingly, the purpose of the initial vehicle stop is not dispositive of the issue of whether the frisk was lawful.
Hughes also contends that the officer's characterization of Hughes' movements in the vehicle as being nervous and fidgety was "unwarranted" and "exaggerated." This assertion challenges the officer's credibility as a witness. At a suppression hearing the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999). The officer was the only witness who testified concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the frisk at either the...
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State v. Davenport
...246 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 617-18 (1972); State v. Hughes, 134 Idaho 811, 813, 10 P.3d 760, 762 (Ct.App.2000). As explained by the United States Supreme The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed;......
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