State v. Huisman, 94-1655

• Decision Date: 14 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-1655,94-1655
• Citation: 544 N.W.2d 433
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Tammy Jean HUISMAN, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 433

544 N.W.2d 433

STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Tammy Jean HUISMAN, Appellee.

No. 94-1655.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 14, 1996.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 1996.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Mullin, County Attorney, and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Paul M. Bengford and Stanley E. Munger of Munger & Reinschmidt, Sioux City, for appellee.

Before McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, NEUMAN, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

TERNUS, Justice.

The State charged appellant, Tammy Jean Huisman, with possession of a controlled substance and failure to affix a drug tax stamp after the police discovered methamphetamines during an inventory search of her car. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c)(6), 453B.12 (1993). The district court granted Huisman's motion to suppress the evidence found during the vehicle search. The court concluded the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the impoundment of Huisman's car was improper. We granted the State's application for discretionary review.

We hold the Fourth Amendment demands the impoundment decision be made according to standardized criteria and an administrative or caretaking reason to impound exists. Because the impoundment here meets this test, it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

Early in the morning on March 22, 1994, police conducted a warranted search of Kenneth Frazier's motel room. They found methamphetamines, a firearm and a large amount of currency. Frazier was arrested.

Frazier's aunt, Carolyn Rouillard, learned of the arrest and wanted to pick up her nephew's belongings before his soon-to-be ex-wife arrived at the scene. Rouillard asked her friend Tammy Huisman to drive; Rouillard had not renewed her driver's license because she had a bad knee.

Huisman drove Rouillard and Rouillard's nineteen-year-old niece, Jeanna Denny, to the motel. Upon arriving, Rouillard asked the manager to let her into Frazier's room to retrieve his property. The manager refused. She had received several phone calls from people claiming to be relatives of Frazier and she wanted to check with the police before letting anyone in the room. The manager directed Rouillard to park and wait in front of Frazier's room. ¹

Uniformed police officer O'Connoll was the first officer on the scene. The manager walked over, gave him Frazier's room key and returned to her office. Uniformed officer McBride then arrived to assist O'Connoll. Finally, plain-clothed drug enforcement agents Young and Reilly appeared on the scene "to find out who these people were and to identify these people for intelligence information and to run warrant checks on them."

Young and Reilly, wearing badges, asked Huisman for identification. Huisman presented her driver's license. After seeing Huisman's name on her license Reilly remembered finding a gun in her purse during a prior search. Young asked for Huisman's purse; he was concerned for his safety. Reilly dumped the contents of the purse on the car's hood and then left to run a warrant check.

Meanwhile, Young asked Huisman if they could "look around in her car." He told her he wanted to look for drugs. Huisman admits giving consent, but claims she was afraid. Young searched the passenger compartment and found no contraband.

While Young searched the vehicle, Reilly discovered an outstanding warrant for Huisman's arrest for failing to appear on a failure to maintain control charge. See Iowa Code § 321.288 (1993). The police then arrested Huisman and placed her in O'Connoll's car. Huisman claims that she changed her mind about the search at that point and told the officers to stop searching her car. Reilly denied hearing the request.

The officers asked Rouillard and Denny if either had a driver's license so they could drive the car out of the motel parking lot; neither did. The officers then decided to impound the vehicle and inventory its contents. Young and Reilly conducted the inventory search in the parking lot. While Reilly searched the trunk, Young looked in the passenger compartment and listed the items they discovered on the department's impoundment form. Reilly's search of the trunk uncovered two containers of methamphetamine in the pocket of a jacket and two syringes.

Huisman was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and failure to affix a tax stamp. She moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of her car. The State resisted, arguing the search was lawful under exceptions to the warrant requirement for consent and inventory searches. The district court sustained Huisman's motion, concluding her consent to the search of her car was limited to the passenger compartment. The court also rejected the State's argument that the search was a valid inventory search incident to a lawful impoundment, relying on our decision in State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1984), which required "a showing that some reasonable necessity prompted the impoundment."

We review the district court's ruling on this Fourth Amendment issue de novo. State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1995). Because we conclude the officers conducted a valid inventory search of Huisman's vehicle, we do not address the consent issue.

II. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Inventory Searches.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1973). There is a consensus in construing this directive that, except for a few carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without valid consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a warrant issued upon probable cause. Id.; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381-82, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3103, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1012 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 935 (1967).

One well-recognized exception to the warrant clause is a vehicle inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739, 745 (1987); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369-71, 96 S.Ct. at 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005-06. This exception responds to the practical problems arising when police remove a vehicle's operator and are then left to care for that vehicle. In such circumstances, police act in a caretaking capacity rather than as criminal investigators. State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Iowa 1996); see Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005.

The legality of an inventory search depends on two overlapping inquiries: the validity of the impoundment and the scope of the inventory. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d at 845. If either is unreasonable, the search violates the Fourth Amendment and evidence discovered in the search must be suppressed. Id.

III. Lawful Impoundment.

The threshold question is whether the impoundment itself was proper. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. at 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1007-08; Jackson, 542 N.W.2d at 845. An impoundment is proper if it is reasonable. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S.Ct. at 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d at 718. The fighting issue is how to define what is reasonable.

A. Reasonableness of impoundment. Huisman contends the police must have reasonable cause to impound a vehicle. She relies on our decision in Kuster that the State must show "some reasonable necessity" to justify the impoundment. See Kuster, 353 N.W.2d at 433. In Kuster, we found the police lacked reasonable cause to impound the defendant's legally parked car because the vehicle and its contents were in no danger of vandalism or theft and impoundment was unnecessary for police protection because the location of the car was remote from the site of the defendant's arrest.

This analysis flowed from the policy reasons justifying the warrantless seizure of automobiles: (1) safety of the traveling public, Cady, 413 U.S. at 443, 93 S.Ct. at 2529, 37 L.Ed.2d at 715-16; (2) the creation of a nuisance by an abandoned vehicle, id. at 447, 93 S.Ct. at 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d at 718; and (3) protection of the car from theft or vandalism, United States v. Ramos-Morales, 981 F.2d 625, 626 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 2384, 124 L.Ed.2d 287 (1993). See Kuster, 353 N.W.2d at 431-32. Thus, in Kuster, we looked at whether impoundment was reasonably necessary to achieve these objectives in deciding whether impoundment was constitutionally permissible.

Since our decision in Kuster, the United States Supreme Court has clarified the test for lawful impoundments. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743, 93 L.Ed.2d at 748. In Bertine, the analysis shifted from the reasonableness of the officer's decision to the existence of reasonable standardized policies. Id. The Supreme Court held that police may lawfully choose to impound a vehicle so long as that decision is made "according to standardized criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Id. Therefore, we no longer examine the reasonableness of the officer's decision to impound; we look for the existence of reasonable standardized procedures and a purpose other than the investigation of criminal activity.

This approach prevents courts from "second-guess[ing] a police officer's exercise of professional judgment regarding impoundment of an automobile when the judgment was exercised in accordance with otherwise reasonable police department regulations." People v. Toohey, 438 Mich. 265, 475 N.W.2d 16, 23 (1991). It also recognizes the practical realities faced by busy police officers making impoundment decisions: " '[A] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual...