State v. Hull
| Decision Date | 20 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 477-E,477-E |
| Citation | 106 R.I. 285,258 A.2d 791 |
| Parties | STATE v. George HULL. x. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
George Hull was tried and convicted before a judge and jury in the Superior Court on an indictment which charged him with breaking and entering a building in the nighttime with intent to commit larceny. Before us the only exceptions he presses are to instructions given to the jury.
It appears that a break occurred at Colton's Pharmacy in the city of Providence sometime between 10 and 11:45 o'clock on the night of December 16, 1966. Two police officers, each patrolling in a cruiser, received radio calls advising that the break had occurred and were ordered to investigate. One testified that upon arrival he saw a man whom he identified as defendant jump out of the pharmacy window to the sidewalk with his arms cradled, as if he were carrying something; and that the man immediately took flight and was not apprehended until two days later. The testimony of the other was substantially the same, except that, when this police officer arrived at the scene, the man was standing in front of the window rather than jumping out of it. The defendant offered an alibi. His story was that he had been at his mother's home from about eight o'clock on the night of the break, until the following morning. This alibi was substantially corroborated by his mother and sister. The sister, however, was unable to state unequivocally that defendant had remained continuously throughout the night at the mother's home, or that at the time of the break he was in fact asleep in a room off the kitchen as he had testified.
The defendant's first assignment of error is to that portion of the charge where the trial justice told the jury that 'You are not concerned with where George Hull was at eight o'clock in the evening; you are concerned with where he was at eleven-thirty p.m.' That instruction, defendant argues, directed the jury's attention to the possibility that he might have left his mother's home without the knowledge of his mother and sister. If that were its principal effect, then perhaps the charge would be argumentative, and thereby violate the requirement that a trial justice be impartial in his instructions to the jury. But this is not the case.
Here what was decisive was not where defendant was some hours before the break, but where he was at the time when the two police officers identified him as having been at the scene. That, after all, was the principal issue in the case, and it was the one on which the jury were required to concentrate their attention in order to resolve the conflict between the state's testimony and defendant's alibi. To remind the jury of these considerations was merely to point to the issue in the case. This was the trial justice's duty, State v. Sliney, 101 R.I. 423, 224 A.2d 603, and in performing it he did not overemphasize the possibility that defendant's alibi might not be airtight, but instead said only what was germane to a proper consideration of the issue. See State v. Smith, 70 R.I. 500, 514, 41 A.2d 153, 160.
The defendant's remaining exception is to an instruction which was given when the jury, after deliberating for approximately an hour and a half, returned to the courtroom and advised the trial justice that they had not reached an agreement. Thereupon the trial justice stated that he would be derelict in his duty if he were to accept a disagreement from a jury which had deliberated for so short a period of time, and he suggested that they return to the jury room and carefully reassess the evidence. Then, in his only direct reference to any of the testimony, he charged in the following language:
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State v. Rogers
...influenced the jury's deliberations to his prejudice. In added support of his claim, defendant refers us to the cases of State v. Hull, 106 R.I. 285, 258 A.2d 791 (1969) and State v. Harris, 89 R.I. 202, 152 A.2d 106 (1959), where we stated that a trial justice invades the province of the j......
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State v. Carillo, 1820-E
...was required. State v. Contrearas, supra; see State v. Bruyere, 110 R.I. 426, 428, 293 A.2d 311, 312-313 (1972); State v. Hull, 106 R.I. 285, 288, 258 A.2d 791, 793 (1969); State v. Reid, 101 R.I. 363, 366, 223 A.2d 444, 446-447 The defendant's exceptions are overruled, and the case is remi......
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State v. McKee
... ... It is unquestioned that a trial justice has a duty to ensure that the jury is not influenced in its factfinding by what it believes to be the opinion of the court. State v. DeMasi, R.I., 413 A.2d 99, 100 (1980); State v. Holland, R.I., 405 A.2d 1211, 1216 (1979); State v. Hull, 106 R.I. 285, 288, 258 ... A.2d 791, 792-93 (1969); State v. Pella, 101 R.I. 62, 70, 220 A.2d 226, 231 (1966). This does not mean, however, that every critical comment by a trial justice creates prejudice in the minds of the jurors. State v. Mancino, 115 R.I. 54, 57, 340 A.2d 128, 131 (1975) ... ...
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State v. Aptt
...would have understood it, as they listened to it within the context of the whole charge at the close of the trial." State v. Hull, 106 R.I. 285, 288, 258 A.2d 791, 793 (1969). See State v. Goff, 107 R.I. at 339, 267 A.2d at 690; State v. Reid, 101 R.I. 363, 366, 223 A.2d 444, 446-47 We have......