State v. Hunsberger

• Decision Date: 12 October 2016
• Docket Number: Opinion No. 27671,Appellate Case No. 2015–000083
• Citation: 794 S.E.2d 368,418 S.C. 335
• Parties: The State, Respondent, v. Alexander L. Hunsberger, Petitioner.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

418 S.C. 335

794 S.E.2d 368

The State, Respondent,

v.Alexander L. Hunsberger, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015–000083

Opinion No. 27671

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard December 2, 2015

Filed October 12, 2016

Rehearing Denied December 16, 2016

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of Columbia, and Solicitor Donald V. Myers, of Lexington, all for Respondent.

CHIEF JUSTICE PLEICONES:

Petitioner Alexander L. Hunsberger (Alex) was sentenced to thirty-three years' incarceration for his part in the murder of Samuel Sturrup. Alex argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in denying his speedy trial motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Hunsberger , Op. No. 2014–UP–381, 2014 WL 5772563 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 2014). We granted Alex's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision, and now reverse.

The acts that led to Alex's prosecution for murder are heinous. Sturrup allegedly stole money from Steven Barnes,¹ the purported head of a robbery and prostitution ring in Georgia. In an effort to force Sturrup to divulge where the stolen money was located, Barnes allegedly beat, and caused others to beat, Sturrup at a location in Augusta, Georgia. Sturrup was then placed in the trunk of a vehicle and brought from Georgia to South Carolina by Alex and his brother Julio Hunsberger.² Sturrup was taken into a field and shot by several individuals including the Hunsberger brothers. Barnes is alleged to have fired the fatal shot.

In January 2002, Alex was arrested in South Carolina and in March 2002, he was indicted for the murder of Sturrup. In June 2002, Alex's request for bail was denied and his renewed request was denied in April 2004. In November 2004, Alex moved for an order requiring the State to try him during the next two terms of court, or if no trial were held, that he be released on bail, citing S.C. Code Ann. § 17–23–90 (2014)³ and the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process and speedy trial. While this motion was denied in December 2004, the circuit court judge found the delay "clearly bordering on the excessive" and admonished the State to either try Alex or release him to Georgia which had placed a hold on him.

In an effort to resolve the case, Judge Keesley offered to seek a special February 2005 term of court to allow the State to try Alex then, but the solicitor declined. Following notification that the State would not go forward with Alex's trial, in January 2005 Judge Keesley granted Alex bail but ordered him held unless Georgia released its hold. Alex was subsequently extradited to Georgia, and in September 2006, he was convicted there of kidnapping with bodily injury of Sturrup, and sentenced to life imprisonment. While imprisoned in Georgia, Alex repeatedly declined to be a witness against Steven Barnes in Barnes' South Carolina death penalty case. Barnes was tried and convicted in November 2010.

In early 2011, Alex was extradited to South Carolina. In January 2012, the State called Alex's case for trial and Alex moved for dismissal of his charges, claiming his state and federal rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion was denied, as was his renewed request made at mid-trial.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's denial of Alex's motion to dismiss his charges under both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions due to a violation of his right to a speedy trial?

ANALYSIS

Alex argues that his right to a speedy trial under both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions was violated, and therefore, his murder charge should be dismissed. We analyze the issue under the Sixth Amendment, and agree.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Similarly, the South Carolina Constitution provides that "Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." S.C. Const. art. I, § 14. A speedy trial means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary delay. State v. Langford , 400 S.C. 421, 441, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 (2012) (quoting Wheeler v. State , 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966) ).

The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges. Langford , 400 S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation omitted). The trial court's ruling on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that are without evidentiary support. Id. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (internal citation omitted).

An accused's speedy trial right begins when he is "indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused." Langford , 400 S.C. at 442, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (citing United States v. MacDonald , 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) ). To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a "speedy" trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. Doggett v. U.S. , 505 U.S. 647, 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Presumptively prejudicial delay exists when an accused is not prosecuted with ordinary promptness. See Doggett , 505 U.S. at 651–52, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992). Once the accused has met this initial burden, a court must look to four factors, among the totality of the circumstances, to decide whether the defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530–31, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ; see also Langford , 400 S.C. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at 482. These factors are: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the accused. Barker at 531–32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. A speedy trial claim must be "analyzed in terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the conduct of the prosecution and the defense." State v. Pittman , 373 S.C. 527, 549, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2008) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

Because the timeline is essential to determining whether Alex was denied a speedy trial, the important dates are outlined below:

• January 25, 2002: Arrest.

• March 2002: Indictment

• November 17, 2004: Alex makes first Speedy Trial motion.

• December 2, 2004: Judge Keesley declines to release Alex on bail but admonishes the State to be prepared to try Alex in February 2005 unless the solicitor notifies the court he will allow Georgia to take custody. Court order acknowledges problems arising from multiple defendants and different jurisdictions in addition to the possibility that South Carolina will seek the death penalty against Alex. Judge Keesley then writes: "However, Georgia has disposed of the cases involving the co-defendants over a year ago, and the court has instructed the Solicitor's office on at least two prior occasions that it must make a decision about whether to serve the death penalty notice."

• January 28, 2005: The State declines Judge Keesley's offer to try Alex during a special February 2005 term of Court; Judge Keesley grants Alex bail, subject to hold placed on him by Georgia.

• Early 2005: Alex is extradited to Georgia.

• September 12, 2006: Alex is convicted in Georgia of kidnapping Sturrup with bodily injury and sentenced to life imprisonment. Alex appeals.

• November 2010: Barnes is convicted and sentenced to death in South Carolina.

• September 2011: Alex is made aware South Carolina is seeking his extradition.

• October 2011: Alex is extradited to South Carolina.

• January 3, 2012: Alex's murder case is called in South Carolina, and he makes a motion for dismissal based on the denial of his right to a speedy trial. He renews this motion after the State rests.

In this case appellate review of the trial court's ruling is complicated by the court's failure to make specific findings, relying instead on general statements about the complexity of the cases, problems involving multiple jurisdictions, and Alex's failure to show actual prejudice.⁴

A. Triggering Factor and Length of Delay

The Court of Appeals held that the three-year period between Alex's arrest in 2002, and his release to Georgia in 2005, was sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis. State v. Hunsberger , Op. No. 2014–UP–381, 2014 WL 5772563 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Nov. 5, 2014). We agree.

The Court of Appeals held that the three-year period between Alex's arrest⁵ and extradition to Georgia from South Carolina was sufficient to trigger further review.⁶ Alex argues that using three years instead of ten years is an error of law that affects the entire Court of Appeals' analysis. We hold, whether three years or ten years, the delay between Alex's arrest and trial meets the threshold requirement for a speedy trial claim, and requires an analysis of the four Barker factors. See Langford , 400 S.C. at 442–443, 735 S.E.2d at 482 (holding a twenty-three month delay was presumptively prejudicial) (internal citation omitted); State v. Cooper , 386 S.C. 210, 687 S.E.2d 62 (Ct. App. 2009) (reaching the Barker factors when there was a forty-four month delay); State v. Waites , 270 S.C. 104, 240 S.E.2d 651 (1978) (holding a twenty-eight month delay triggered speedy trial analysis). Having found that Alex satisfied the threshold standard, we turn now to a review of the four Barker factors we consider when analyzing a speedy trial claim: (1)...