State v. Hunt

• Decision Date: 23 December 1901
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. HUNT.

40 S.E. 216

129 N.C. 686

STATE

v.HUNT.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 23, 1901.

EMPLOYMENT AGENTS — TAX—POLICE REGULATION — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

1. Laws 1901, c. 9, § 84, providing a tax of $25 on every person engaged in procuring laborers to accept employment in another state, as a tax on such trade or business, is not in conflict with the state constitution (article 5, § 3), authorizing a tax on trades, professions, etc.

2. Laws 1901, c. 9, § 84, imposing a tax of $25 on persons engaging laborers to work in another state, is a proper exercise of the police power of the state.

3. The tax of $25 imposed by Laws 1901. c. 9, § 84, on persons engaging laborers to work in another state, is not unreasonable as to amount.

4. Laws 1901, c. 9, § 84, prescribes a tax of $25 on every person engaged in procuring laborers to accept employment in another state; and section 104 provides that such tax shall be paid for every separate location in which the business is conducted. Held, that the tax is required for each town, city, or village where the business is conducted as a separate business, requiring the personal attention of the agent or his subagent.

5. Laws 1901, c. 9, § 84, imposing a tax of $25 on every person engaged in procuring laborers to accept employment in another state, does not violate the constitution of the United States, or interfere with interstate commerce.

Purches, C. J., and Cook, J., dissenting.

Appeal from superior court Forsyth county; Starbuck, Judge.

Charles Hunt was convicted of carrying on the business of an emigrant agent without having first paid the license tax, and appeals. Affirmed.

Holton & Alexander, for appellant.

Brown Shepherd, for the State.

CLARK, J. The defendant is Indicted for acting as "emigrant agent in procuring la borers to accept employment in another state, " without having obtained a license as emigrant agent. The special verdict finds that "the defendant has been getting hands to work for the Norfolk & Western Railway Company in the states of Virginia and West Virginia, that he has been engaged in the business cf obtaining hands to accept employment in another state, " and that on demand he refused to pay said tax. The statute provides (Laws 1901, c. 9, § 84), "On every emigrant agent or person engaged in procuring laborers to accept employment in another state, a tax of $25;" section 104, same chapter, prescribes, "Every individual or firm carrying on or conducting either of the trades or business upon which a specific amount of license tax is levied, shall pay the required license tax for every separate location in which the trade or business is conducted, unless otherwise herein provided;" and section 102 authorizes the county to "levy the same tax and no more." The defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the act is in violation of the-federal constitution, because (1) it is contrary to the interstate commerce clause (article 1, § 8, cl. 3); (2) that it impairs the privileges of the citizens of one state in other states; (3) because it wrongfully affects the functions and operations of the federal government; (4) for "these and other reasons" the act is void. The points thus presented have been recently decided by the United States supreme court. Williams v. Fears (Dec. 10, 1900) 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct 128, 45 L Ed. 186. The Georgia statute there called in question imposed a tax "upon each emigrant agent or employer or employé of such agents, doing business in this state, the sum of five hundred dollars, for each county in which business is conducted." It is held in the opinion by Fuller, C. J.: That this tax "upon emigrant agents (meaning persons engaged in hiring laborers to be employed beyond the limits of the state) does not amount to such an interference with the freedom of transit or of contract as to violate the federal constitution; nor does it deny the equal protection of the laws because the business of hiring persons to labor within the state is not subjected to a like tax. That these labor contracts are not in themselves interstate commerce, nor is the tax upon such occupation a burden upon such commerce." The opinion further holds that "the business itself is of such nature and importance as to Justify the exercise of the police power in its regulation." The opinion is so full and complete as to render unnecessary any discussion by us.

The defendant also demurred to the indictment that it was in conflict with the state constitution, in that (1) it is not such a tax as is authorized to be levied by article 5. § 3, of the state constitution; (2) because it restricts a harmless occupation; (3) that it prescribes no supervision of the business, and is therefore not an exercise of the policepower; (4) because of the unreasonableness of the license fee. The tax, if regarded as a tax upon a trade or business, is within the terms of section 3, art. 5, of the constitution of North Carolina. It is not a restriction upon the business, any more than any other tax upon trades and professions. That it can also be upheld as an exercise of the police power is decided in the above-cited case in 179 U. S., 21 Sup. Ct., 45 L. Ed. The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the tax is a matter for the legislature, not for the courts. Tied. Lim. § 101, p. 277. It is only when the license fee is exacted solely as a police regulation that the court can consider whether it is so unreasonable as to amount to a prohibition, and that only as to vocations which cannot be prohibited. And in no aspect could we hold this tax to be an unreasonable one in amount. We understand the legislative imposition of "$25 for every separate location in which the trade or business Is conducted" to mean each town, city, or village where the business is conducted as a separate, distinct business, requiring the personal attention of the agent or his subagent. Only those counties in which such subagen-Cies are operated can levy a tax, and then only to duplicate the $25, levied by the state. It does' not appear that the defendant operated in more than one county and one town, and, indeed, the judgment only requires the defendant to pay $50,.—"the tax he should have paid" and the costs. It is also by section 103 of said chapter 9, Laws 1901, made the duty of the sheriff in all cases of conviction for failure to pay the license tax on any business, occupation, etc., to collect before a justice of the peace a penalty of $50...