State v. Hunter

Decision Date04 September 1979
Docket NumberNo. 64047,64047
Citation375 So.2d 99
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. William C. HUNTER.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Frank E. Beeson, III, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

DENNIS, Justice.

Defendant, William C. Hunter, pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine, La.R.S. 40:967(C), and reserved the right to take this appeal from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976).

Two New Orleans Police officers on motor patrol in a residential neighborhood at approximately 11:30 p. m. saw the defendant with a set of keys about to open the trunk of an unmarked car bearing a police license plate and radio antennae. 1 Because the officers did not recognize the defendant as an undercover police officer, they stopped, approached the defendant, and asked him whether he was in fact a policeman. When the defendant replied "no" and nervously patted the upper breast pocket of his coat, the officers decided to frisk the defendant for weapons. The pat-down began at the suspect's waist and went upward to the area over his coat pocket where the officer felt a small vial and a miniature spoon through the garment. The officer testified that he immediately perceived by his sense of touch that the vial and spoon were of the kind that, in his experience, were employed only in connection with the use of cocaine. 2 At this point the officer informed the defendant that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine. A subsequent seizure and search of the vial did indeed yield cocaine.

Several questions arise in analyzing the merits of the defendant's motion to suppress: (1) Was the original investigatory stop lawful? (2) If so, did the circumstances also justify a search for weapons? (3) Finally, upon feeling the vial and spoon in the defendant's pocket, did the officer have probable cause to arrest the defendant?

The Investigatory Stop

Before a police officer may make an investigatory stop he must reasonably suspect that the subject has committed or is about to commit a criminal offense. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Davis, 359 So.2d 986 (La.1978); State v. Saia, 302 So.2d 869 (La.1974). Reasonable cause to suspect a detainee of criminal activity must be determined under the facts of each case by whether the officers had sufficient knowledge of particular circumstances to permit them to infringe upon the individual's right to be left alone free of governmental interference with his liberty. State v. Wilson, 366 So.2d 1326 (La.1978); State v. Cook, 332 So.2d 760 (La.1976).

In the present case it is undisputed that the police officers came upon the defendant, whom they did not recognize as a police officer, apparently trying to gain access to the trunk of what the officers had reason to believe was an unmarked police vehicle. We do not believe that the police officers acted unreasonably in making an investigatory stop of the defendant to determine whether he had been authorized to enter or take possession of the vehicle.

The Frisk for Weapons

While it is true that an officer is never justified in conducting a pat-down for weapons unless the original detention itself was justified, a lawful detention for questioning does not necessarily give the officer the authority to conduct a pat-down for weapons. Even after a lawful investigatory stop, a police officer is justified in frisking the subject only under circumstances where a "reasonably prudent man . . . would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. Further, the officer's belief is not reasonable unless the officer is "able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 64, 88 S.Ct. at 1903, 20 L.Ed.2d at 935. It is not necessary that the investigating officer establish that it was more probable than not that the detained individual was armed and dangerous; it is sufficient that he establish a "substantial possibility" of danger. See Comment, Terry Revisited: Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk Developments, 1977 Wis.L.Rev. 877, 896.

The officers in the instant case were unable to point to any particular facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that the defendant was armed and dangerous. The two armed and experienced New Orleans police officers encountered the defendant alone at the rear of an automobile parked in a residential area. One of the officers immediately positioned himself to the side of the defendant as the other officer questioned the suspect. Although there was reason to suspect the defendant of illegally entering the automobile trunk, there was no indication that he was or had been involved in the commission of a violent crime. There were no bulges in the defendant's clothing or other signs that he was armed, and he made no movement which could reasonably have been interpreted as intended to produce a weapon. While the defendant displayed nervousness and patted the breast pocket of his coat, the officer who made the weapons search did not indicate that this action precipitated the frisk. The officer gave his reasons for the frisk as follows:

"(T)he first thing I stated was, 'Are you a policeman?' And Mr. Hunter replied, 'No' in a shaky voice and he appeared to be quite nervous. And at the time I asked him if he was a police officer, he placed his right hand toward his left chest several times. Before questioning him any further I decided to frisk Mr. Hunter for any weapons for the possibility he had any...

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  • State v. Jones
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • June 21, 2000
    ...detained individual was armed and dangerous; it is sufficient that he establish a "substantial possibility" of danger. State v. Hunter, 375 So.2d 99, 101-02 (La. 1979) (final citation * * * We recognize that the police have the right to ensure their own safety in an encounter with a suspect......
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    ...detained individual was armed and dangerous; it is sufficient that he establish a "substantial possibility" of danger. State v. Hunter, 375 So.2d 99, 101-102 (La.1979) (final citation We recognize that the police have the right to ensure their own safety in an encounter with a suspected cri......
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    ...committing an offense and, for purposes of a search, that evidence or contraband may be found at the place to be searched. State v. Hunter, 375 So.2d 99 (La.1979); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); cf. State v. Ferranti, 664 So.2d 396 (La.1995). Nevertheless, "probable cause is a f......
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