State v. Hunter., 3883.

• Citation: 37 N.M. 382,24 P.2d 251
• Decision Date: 01 August 1933
• Docket Number: No. 3883.,3883.
• Parties: STATEv.HUNTER.
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

37 N.M. 382
24 P.2d 251

STATE
v.
HUNTER.

No. 3883.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 1, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Quay County; Harry L. Patton, Judge.

Paul Hunter was convicted of unlawfully giving intoxicating liquor to a minor, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Reviewing court could not consider alleged prejudicial occurrence on trial of accused, where only mention of occurrence was in motion for new trial, and was not settled as part of bill of exceptions.

[24 P.2d 251] James L. Briscoe, of Tucumcari, for appellant.

E. K. Neumann, Atty. Gen., and Quincy D. Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUDSPETH, Justice.

Appellant was convicted, under chapter 10 of the 1923 Session Laws, of unlawfully giving intoxicating liquor to a minor and sentenced to a term in the penitentiary of not less than one year and not more than eighteen months. From the conviction and sentence he prosecutes an appeal to this court.

The first point relied upon for reversal is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of appellant's guilt.

Ruby Washburn, the twenty-year old minor to whom appellant was charged with having given liquor, was the principal witness for the state and the only witness who directly testified that appellant had committed the offense. Her testimony on the issue was flatly contradicted by appellant and by two witnesses for the defense in whose presence Ruby testified the offense had been committed. Two other witnesses who were with her shortly after the alleged commission of the offense, and at a time when, according to her testimony, she was intoxicated, testified that she seemed entirely sober, and that they noticed no evidences of intoxication on her part.

There was no motion for a directed verdict made, either at the close of the state's case or at the close of the entire case, and the question of the sufficiency of the testimony of the prosecuting witness to serve as a basis for the jury's verdict was raised for the first time upon motion for a new trial. Appellant cannot therefore demand, as of right, a review of the question.

This court has, in some instances, in the exercise of its inherent power to prevent injustice, set aside verdicts of guilt not warranted by the evidence, in spite of a failure on the part of the defendant to take proper steps in the trial court to entitle him to a consideration in this court of the question of the sufficiency of the evidence. See [24 P.2d 252] State v. Garcia, 19 N. M. 414, 143 P. 1012; State v. Armijo, 25 N. M. 666, 187 P. 553; State v. Taylor, 32...