State v. Huse

• Decision Date: 15 December 1992
• Docket Number: 18002,Nos. 17402,s. 17402
• Citation: 842 S.W.2d 579
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Darrell HUSE, Appellant. Darrell HUSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 579

842 S.W.2d 579

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Darrell HUSE, Appellant.

Darrell HUSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

Nos. 17402, 18002.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Dec. 15, 1992.

Ellen H. Flottman, Columbia, for appellant.

William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Hugh L. Marshall, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge.

Darrell Huse (Defendant) was convicted upon jury trial on the charge of second degree murder, in violation of § 565.021.1(1), RSMo 1986. The amended information alleged Defendant "knowingly or with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to Britain Ogle caused the death of Britain Ogle by striking him." Following the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment. His direct appeal to this Court alleges the trial court erred in the following respects:

(1) By failing to sustain his motion to suppress his statements to Deputy Sheriff Neil because his statements at the Jasper County Jail were fruit of the poisonous tree since they followed his custodial and unmirandized interrogation by Neil at Defendant's home;

(2) By admitting evidence of anal injuries to Britain Ogle which compelled the Defendant to defend against an uncharged crime of sodomy;

(3) By admitting into evidence a photograph depicting the anal area of Britain Ogle either because it was irrelevant or its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect;

(4) By refusing to admit into evidence certain letters that were probative to show another baby-sitter of Britain Ogle had a proclivity towards anal intercourse; and

(5) By giving Instruction 4, patterned after MAI-CR 3d 302.04, defining reasonable doubt since the definition given allows conviction upon a lesser degree of proof than allowed by the due process clause.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On January 1, 1990, Kima Ogle was living with Defendant and her three children in a trailer home near Carthage, Missouri. She worked at the X-Press Truck Stop near her trailer where Defendant often cared for her children while she worked. Britain Ogle, her youngest son, was six months old at the time of his death. On January 1, 1990, Ogle went to work at 2:00 p.m., leaving her children in the care of Defendant. Before leaving, Ogle bathed Britain and changed his diaper. She saw no bruises nor anything unusual about his rectal area.

Defendant came to the truck stop on at least three occasions that afternoon on various errands. At 8:00 p.m. that evening, he brought Britain, wrapped in a blanket, to the truck stop and said, "We have to go.... I can't get Britain to wake up." Defendant laid Britain on a countertop while Ogle called an ambulance and Ogle's fellow employee administered CPR to the baby.

After delivery to the hospital Britain was declared dead. There, numerous bruises, at different stages of healing, were observed over Britain's body. His anal area was dilated, torn and bruised.

On January 2, 1990, Deputy Sheriff Neil attended the autopsy on Britain. The results of the autopsy revealed the cause of death was a large laceration to the spleen which caused massive hemorrhaging. The rupture was caused by an external blow to the abdominal cavity. A large bruise was observed in the left lower quadrant of Britain's abdomen. The bruise was consistent with an injury caused by an open hand in a jabbing motion.

Following the autopsy, Deputy Sheriff Neil stated he had a suspect and was going to interview him. The deputy later explained Defendant was one of the suspects he had in mind. Upon arrival at the Ogle trailer, Neil asked Defendant the whereabouts of Britain's mother. He was informed she was lying on the couch where Neil observed her vomiting. Neil learned that a number of her relatives were on the way to the trailer. At that point Neil asked Defendant the location of the baby's room and "if they had a curling iron" (because of a burn mark on the baby). Because of the illness of Ogle and her relatives coming to the trailer Neil asked Defendant to come to the sheriff's office for questioning. Defendant asked Neil for a ride to the sheriff's office since he had no car and Neil accommodated him. No Miranda ¹ warnings were given to Defendant at the trailer.

Upon arrival at the jail, Defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights, whereupon he gave both a written and taped statement. Defendant stated he had become frustrated with the baby and "did get rough with the baby." In order to stop the baby from "pooping," Defendant stated he inserted his finger in the baby's rectum, picked up the baby and squeezed him and jabbed the baby's stomach with his fingers. Defendant denied sodomizing the baby. After his statements, Defendant was placed under arrest.

APPEAL NO. 17402 (Direct Appeal)

I.

Defendant contends his unmirandized questioning at the trailer constituted custodial interrogation, and his statements at the sheriff's office should be suppressed "as fruit of the poisonous tree."

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the inquiry is limited to whether the court's decision is supported by substantial evidence and deference is given to the trial court's superior opportunity to determine credibility of witnesses. State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253, 261 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1413, 84 L.Ed.2d 796 (1985).

The issue presented under this point is whether the interrogation of Defendant at the trailer was a "custodial interrogation," thereby entitling Defendant to Miranda warnings prior to any questioning. "Custodial interrogation" is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

In State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1991), the defendant maintained the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress on the same grounds as Defendant asserts here. The facts in Feltrop surrounding defendant's confession are strikingly similar to those here. In Feltrop, the defendant's live-in girlfriend was brutally murdered. Defendant was contacted by Sgt. Speidel in response to a request from the St. Charles County Sheriff's Office for an interview. After talking with Sgt. Speidel, defendant followed him to the station where defendant waited for the St. Charles County officers to arrive. Upon arrival, those officers asked defendant about his relationship with the victim, why he reported her missing, and where he thought she might be. They asked defendant if he was a Christian and whether he would tell the truth. Defendant then told the officers "he had 'tried to take the knife away.' " Id. at 12. At that point Miranda warnings were given and waived by defendant. Questioning then resumed and defendant gave his version of the killing. Based on the foregoing facts, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The Court said:

At all times prior to his making the incriminating statement, appellant was free to depart. Even assuming appellant was a suspect in the minds of the officers, there is no custodial interrogation when a suspect is questioned when not under arrest or otherwise restrained of his liberty. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Furthermore, in the absence of arrest or restraint of freedom of movement, questioning that takes place in a coercive environment does not require Miranda warnings.

Id. at 13.

In the instant case, Defendant was not under arrest at the trailer nor was his freedom restrained in any way. It was Defendant who asked Neil for a ride to the sheriff's office, thereby indicating Defendant knew his freedom was unrestrained. Furthermore, the minimal questioning of Defendant at the trailer was in a less coercive environment than Defendant's questioning at the police station in Feltrop.

At the most, the questions asked of Defendant at the trailer were investigatory in nature, and a person is not in custody when he is simply being asked investigatory questions by the police. State v. Calmese, 628 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo.App.1982). In addition, custodial interrogation does not exist where the person is not a suspect in the crime. State v. Mouser, 714 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Mo.App.1986). The trial court had substantial evidence to believe Defendant was not a suspect in this case when Neil went to the trailer. Neil testified at the suppression hearing he went to the trailer "just doing an investigation." At that time, Neil had the possibility of several suspects in mind such as all baby-sitters. Neil was unaware of the persons who had cared for the baby. He denied any intent to arrest the baby-sitter caring for the child at the time of his death because such arrest would have been "premature" without further investigation.

Suspect or not, Defendant was not in custody at the trailer and he was not entitled to any Miranda warnings. The trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was based upon substantial evidence.

II.

Defendant believes the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of anal injury sustained by Britain because such evidence implied the crime of sodomy had been committed by Defendant.

Absent a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not interfere with the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence. State v. Urban, 798 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Mo.App.1990). A trial court enjoys broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence offered by the parties at trial. Id.

Generally, evidence of commission by defendant of crimes separate and distinct from the crime for which he is charged is inadmissible. State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). "But such evidence is...