State v. Huttinger
Decision Date | 22 May 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 14546,14546 |
Citation | 36 St.Rep. 945,595 P.2d 363,182 Mont. 50 |
Parties | The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Brad William HUTTINGER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, for defendant and appellant.
Mike Greely, Atty. Gen., Helena, Chris Tweeten argued, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, J. Fred Bourdeau, County Atty., Great Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Brad Huttinger appeals from the order of the District Court of Cascade County, the Honorable H. William Coder, denying his motion to withdraw a plea of guilty to the charge of deliberate homicide. The District Court postponed sentencing pending the final disposition of this appeal. Huttinger remains at Warm Springs State Hospital where he was sent pending sentencing.
On July 9, 1976, Huttinger was charged with the crimes of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping in the stabbing death of an elderly Great Falls woman. The District Court ordered a psychiatric evaluation of Huttinger which was conducted on August 4, 1976. The reporting psychiatrist, Dr. Ronald Hughes, concluded that on the date of the crimes charged that Huttinger, although under the influence of a variety of psychoactive drugs, "knew the difference between right and wrong insofar as it is related to the charges against him" and did not "lack the ability to adhere to the right." (Ultimately, however, Dr. Hughes recommended that Huttinger be hospitalized in the maximum security ward at Warm Springs State Hospital.)
On December 3, 1976, Huttinger entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. On February 14, 1977, Huttinger allegedly changed his plea to guilty on the charge of deliberate homicide in exchange for a dismissal of the charge of aggravated kidnapping.
Immediately after the February 14 proceedings, Huttinger was sent to Warm Springs State Hospital for a complete psychiatric evaluation. The examining psychiatrist, Dr. William Alexander, concluded:
In a clarifying letter received on July 25, 1977, Dr. Alexander wrote to the District Court "In my opinion, at the time of the incident, this patient was unable to conduct himself according to the requirements of the law because of his severe, chronic, emotional illness which probably started in very early childhood but was certainly present eight years ago, and for which he has, to my knowledge, never received treatment."
On September 1, 1977, the District Court sentenced Huttinger to 100 years in prison without parole. Huttinger appealed the sentence and on April 10, 1978, this Court, in an unreported per curiam order, vacated the sentence pursuant to a stipulation of counsel and remanded the case for resentencing.
Huttinger thereafter filed a Motion for Leave of Court for Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty on May 26, 1978. At a hearing on this motion, Huttinger asserted that, prior to originally entering his plea of guilty to the charge of deliberate homicide, he had not been informed of the availability of the possible defense of insanity or that other factors present at the time of the crime charged might serve to mitigate his sentence. The State presented testimony of Huttinger's attorneys at the time of entry of his plea of guilty to the effect that they had discussed the insanity defense with Huttinger and he had rejected it.
On August 10, 1978, the District Court entered findings, conclusions, and an order denying Huttinger's motion. Huttinger appeals.
The issue presented for this Court's review is:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Huttinger's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty?
This appeal requires a balancing of three conflicting factors or aspects involved in a criminal defendant's attempt to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty. The three factors of which we speak are (1) the adequacy of the interrogation by the District Court of the defendant at the entry of the guilty plea as to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea, (2) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea, and (3) the fact that the defendant's plea was apparently the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge, in this case, aggravated kidnapping, a felony. All three factors, among others, have been discussed in previous cases as considerations in the determination of whether a District Court should allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
Before discussing these particular factors, we first state some general principles governing the withdrawal of a guilty plea. The right of a criminal defendant to a trial by jury is safeguarded by Art. II, Sections 24 and 26 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Section 95-1606(e), R.C.M.1947, now section 46-12-204 MCA, states in part:
More specifically, section 95-1902, R.C.M.1947, now section 46-16-105(2) MCA, states in part:
"At any time before or after judgment the court may for good cause shown permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted."
"There is no set rule or standard which can be relied on in any given case where a motion is made to withdraw a guilty plea." State v. Lewis (1978), Mont., 582 P.2d 346, 352, 35 St.Rep. 1089, 1096. "Each case must be examined on its own record . . . " State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 21, 535 P.2d 498, 503.
"A plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary where it appears that the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists he may have plead guilty to a crime of which he is innocent." State ex rel. Gladue v. Eighth Judicial District (1978), Mont., 575 P.2d 65, 66, 35 St.Rep. 220, 221-22.
If, however, there is any doubt that a plea is not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in the defendant's favor. On application to change a plea, all doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. State v. Doty (1977), Mont., 566 P.2d 1388, 1391, 34 St.Rep. 731, 734.
With these general principles in mind, we proceed to an examination of the three factors described above.
Adequacy of District Court's Interrogation. For ease of analysis, we find it helpful to set forth the Complete transcript of the hearing at which Huttinger allegedly made his guilty plea:
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