State v. Hutton

Decision Date03 February 2022
Docket NumberDocket No. 47847
Parties STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Craig Leon HUTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Thomas Monaghan Law, Boise, for Appellant. Thomas Monaghan argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kacey Jones argued.

MOELLER, Justice.

Defendant Craig Hutton was charged and convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine following the execution of a search warrant on his home. Prior to trial, Hutton moved to suppress the evidence seized during the execution of the warrant. He appeals the district court's denial of his motion on the basis that (1) the warrant was founded on unreliable hearsay by an informant and (2) the magistrate court improperly authorized nighttime service. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court's order denying the motion to suppress.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At approximately 4:00 a.m. on March 8, 2019, Owyhee County deputies executed a search warrant on the home of Craig Hutton. The deputies found an assortment of drugs: 602.3 grams of methamphetamine, 7.3 grams of marijuana, 3.7 grams of cocaine, and 11 "tabs" of LSD. Additional suspicious items found in Hutton's residence included rolls of small plastic baggies, two portable digital scales, a mechanical scale (with white crystal residue), straight razors (also with white crystal residue), and $4,800 in cash. The deputies seized the items as evidence and arrested Hutton. The State charged Hutton with one felony count of trafficking methamphetamine, three felony counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and one misdemeanor count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

Deputies conducted the search pursuant to a warrant issued by the magistrate court on March 5, 2019. The warrant authorized the search to occur "at any time of the day or night." This search warrant was based on the affidavit of Deputy Lindsey Fuquay. In her affidavit, Deputy Fuquay provided a detailed description of Hutton's property and residence. Deputy Fuquay then recounted that she has been "gathering information" from a "confidential informant" over "the last several months" regarding local methamphetamine trafficking. She stated:

[The confidential informant] has told me of sales that are taking place at the residence while they have been present, actually saw money exchanged for methamphetamine. [Confidential informant] has also purchased meth from [Hutton]. [Confidential informant] has taken several people out to the residence for them to purchase methamphetamine. If [Hutton] is unsure of a new buyer, [Hutton] will make them smoke meth with him present.

Deputy Fuquay then explained details about the informant's background. Namely, that the informant had been friends with Hutton for several years, and had known about Hutton's methamphetamine sales over a long period of time. The informant "ha[d] been keeping in contact with [Deputy Fuquay]," alerting her to every visit made at Hutton's residence. A total of four visits were reported in the affidavit: January 17, January 27, February 10, and February 21 of 2019. The informant also told Fuquay "they often go to the residence just to visit with [Hutton] and to see how he is doing."

The informant told Deputy Fuquay they purchased methamphetamine on the February 21 visit, and provided varied, accurate details of the house and locations where Hutton had placed drugs within his residence. For example, the informant described a "rock" of methamphetamine hidden inside a Crown Royal whiskey bag, a razor magnet on the fridge "used to cut meth off the rock," scales on the kitchen table, a mirror beneath the scales to catch falling meth, several additional Crown Royal bags hidden in the top drawer of Hutton's wooden filing cabinet, a coffee table compartment containing a Bible and pre-packaged baggies of methamphetamine, pipes for smoking methamphetamine, and additional details concerning the interior of Hutton's home. In addition, the informant told Fuquay that methamphetamine was always present in Hutton's residence, and that Hutton generally carries "a little black bag" on his person with "several ‘teeners’ [one-sixteenth of an ounce of methamphetamine] already measured out and packaged for sales." The informant's stated purpose for relaying this information to Deputy Fuquay was "to help clean up the town so the younger generation has a chance of not becoming addicts."

Following Hutton's arrest and arraignment, he moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing the search of his home was unreasonable and in violation of both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court heard oral argument on the motion and subsequently denied it. The district court ultimately determined that the informant's "personal observations" in the affidavit "[were a] strong indication of the informant's basis of knowledge." The observations were also "specific and concrete" enough to demonstrate reliability because such information is "not easily obtained." Likewise, the court determined that "the interests of justice were best served by the authorization of nighttime service," both to obtain the large amount of drugs before they were potentially moved and to reduce the possibility of a physical altercation between Hutton and the deputies.

Hutton entered a conditional plea agreement with the State, agreeing to plead guilty to a reduced trafficking charge in return for the dismissal of his remaining charges. In making this plea agreement, Hutton specifically reserved his right to appeal the denied suppression motion. Hutton then entered a guilty plea to the trafficking charge under Idaho Code section 37-2732B(a)(4)(A). The district court sentenced Hutton to a unified sentence of 25 years consisting of a fixed, minimum period of confinement of 4 years followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of 21 years. Hutton timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although this is an appeal from the district court, Hutton's challenges concern the decisions of two courts: the magistrate court's underlying decisions to issue the search warrant and authorize night-time service, and the district court's ruling denying Hutton's motion to suppress. Therefore, we review both courts’ decisions based on the standards applicable to the stage of the proceedings in which they were made. State v. Josephson , 123 Idaho 790, 792, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1993) ; State v. Belden , 148 Idaho 277, 279–80, 220 P.3d 1096, 1098–99 (Ct. App. 2009).

When an appeal challenges probable cause to issue a search warrant, "this Court's function on review is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, and in this regard, great deference is to be paid to the magistrate's decision." Josephson , 123 Idaho at 792, 852 P.2d at 1389 (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). "A magistrate's evaluation of probable cause is determined from the facts set forth in the affidavit or any recorded testimony given in support of the search warrant." Id. The appellate court's "test for reviewing the magistrate's action is whether he or she abused his or her discretion in finding that probable cause existed." Belden , 148 Idaho at 280, 220 P.3d at 1099. Thus, we must determine whether the magistrate court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). Furthermore, "[w]hen a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show that the search was invalid." Belden , 148 Idaho at 280, 220 P.3d at 1099.

On review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact, "which will be upheld so long as they are not clearly erroneous." State v. Bishop , 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous as long as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 810, 203 P.3d at 1209. "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court." Id. Nevertheless, this Court exercises free review over the trial court's determination of whether the constitutional requirements were met in light of the facts found. State v. Pruss , 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) ; State v. Henage , 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). Under this bifurcated standard of review, this Court is deferential to the trial court's findings of fact, but "freely reviews the constitutionality of [the] search and seizure." Bishop , 146 Idaho at 810, 203 P.3d at 1209.

III. ANALYSIS

Hutton was convicted pursuant to a conditional plea agreement with the State by which he preserved his right to appeal the denied motion to suppress evidence seized in the search of his home. He raises two key issues on appeal before this Court: (1) whether the district erred in inferring the confidential informant was known to law enforcement, and (2) whether the magistrate court's nighttime service authorization was founded on reasonable cause.

A. The district court correctly determined that the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion because it had a substantial basis to conclude probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrant.

Hutton contends that the magistrate court erred in relying on Deputy Fuquay's account of the informant's hearsay information to establish probable cause, primarily because there was a "lack of any indication this...

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2 cases
  • State v. Hollist
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 19 Julio 2022
    ...as long as they are not "clearly erroneous." State v. Amstutz, 169 Idaho 144, 146, 492 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2021). In State v. Hutton , 169 Idaho 756, 503 P.3d 972, 975–76 (2022), we recently explained how we apply this standard:In review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress eviden......
  • State v. Hollist
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 19 Julio 2022
    ... ... unusual. As noted by the majority, we typically defer to the ... trial court's findings of fact as long as they are not ... "clearly erroneous." State v. Amstutz, 169 ... Idaho 144, 146, 492 P.3d 1103, 1105 (2021). In State v ... Hutton , 169 Idaho 772, 503 P.3d 972, 975-76 (2022), we ... recently explained how we apply this standard: ... In review of a trial court's denial of a motion to ... suppress evidence, this Court defers to the trial court's ... findings of fact, "which will be upheld so long as ... ...

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