State v. Hyde
| Decision Date | 31 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 20160437,20160437 |
| Citation | 899 N.W.2d 671 |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Floyd Erik HYDE, Defendant and Appellant |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Ashley K. Schell, Assistant State's Attorney, Minot, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Kyle R. Craig, Minot, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
[¶1] Floyd Hyde appeals a criminal judgment after entering a conditional plea of guilty to three drug charges. In his plea, Hyde reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Hyde argues the district court erred in finding the warrantless entry of his home fell within the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. We reverse and remand to allow him to withdraw his plea.
[¶2] Two Ward County deputies entered Hyde's residence in response to a report that he may be suicidal. At the time of their warrantless entry into Hyde's residence, the information available to the deputies included the following facts, about which there are no material conflicts in testimony. At 8:41 a.m. on May 13, 2015, Hyde's brother called the Ward County Sheriff's Department. He called the non-emergency dispatch line rather than 911. A dispatch log summarized the call as reporting that Hyde had "been calling his mother crying with suicidal ideations." The dispatch log also noted that Hyde's calls to his mother occurred "last night about a quarter to 01:00 hrs." The dispatcher recorded the request for a welfare check as "Status: Routine, Priority: Low." Deputy Olson testified as follows about the information she received from the dispatcher:
[¶3] Deputy Olson testified that when she and another deputy arrived at Hyde's residence, she initially spoke to the landlord. The landlord told her that he had seen Hyde the night before. The landlord gave the deputies no indication that Hyde had shown any signs of distress. He went on to say that if a gold SUV was in the driveway, Hyde was probably home. The SUV was parked in the driveway. The landlord also said he believed Hyde was asleep. Starting at 10:20 a.m., the deputies began knocking on the door. After approximately nine minutes of knocking repeatedly without an answer, the deputies entered Hyde's residence through the unlocked door.
[¶4] Upon entering the residence, the deputies checked the living room and two bedrooms for Hyde. In the first bedroom, the deputies did not see Hyde, but they did see a marijuana plant on the floor. The deputies located Hyde asleep in the second bedroom. One deputy shook Hyde to wake him. To the deputy, Hyde seemed very groggy. Hyde told the deputies that he had taken a sleeping pill the night before. The deputy inquired into Hyde's mental health. Hyde acknowledged that he was having a rough time, but he was not suicidal and would be okay. The deputy advised Hyde that she needed to confiscate the marijuana plant she saw in the first bedroom. Hyde agreed and told her she could have all of the plants. Hyde then showed the deputy where he had additional marijuana plants. Based on the information obtained during the initial warrantless entry, a search warrant was obtained. The deputies' search of Hyde's home yielded bagged marijuana, thirty-five marijuana plants, and marijuana paraphernalia.
[¶5] Hyde was charged with manufacturing marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. Hyde brought a motion to suppress the evidence found after the deputies entered his residence without a warrant. The district court denied the motion. Hyde entered a conditional plea of guilty on the charges. On appeal, Hyde argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because the deputies did not have a warrant to enter his house and there were no exigent circumstances or emergency to justify their warrantless entry.
[¶6] Our standard for reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress is well established:
[W]e give deference to the district court's findings of fact and we resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. State v. Tognotti , 2003 ND 99, ¶ 5, 663 N.W.2d 642. We "will not reverse a district court decision on a motion to suppress ... if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the court's findings, and if the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." State v. Gefroh , 2011 ND 153, ¶ 7, 801 N.W.2d 429. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law. Id.
State v. Reis , 2014 ND 30, ¶ 8, 842 N.W.2d 845.
[¶7] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 8, of the North Dakota Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches of homes are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Stewart , 2014 ND 165, ¶ 12, 851 N.W.2d 153. A warrantless search is not constitutionally unreasonable if an exception to the search warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, applies. Id. We have defined exigent circumstances as "an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence." State v. Nagel , 308 N.W.2d 539, 543 (N.D. 1981) (quoting State v. Page , 277 N.W.2d 112, 117 (N.D. 1979) ).
[¶8] We have referred to this warrant exception both as exigent circumstances and as the emergency exception. State v. Stewart , 2014 ND 165, ¶ 13, 851 N.W.2d 153 (citing State v. Matthews , 2003 ND 108, ¶ 27, 665 N.W.2d 28 ). Exigent circumstances commonly refers to situations in which law enforcement suspects criminal activity but there is "no time for them to secure a warrant." Michigan v. Tyler , 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). The emergency exception may be considered a subset of exigent circumstances in which law enforcement has an objectively reasonable basis to believe someone is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Michigan v. Fisher , 558 U.S. 45, 47-48, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart , 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) ). To the extent the analysis is distinct, the search of Hyde's home presents an application of the emergency exception and not exigent circumstances. Huber , 2011 ND 23, ¶ 13, 793 N.W.2d 781.
[¶9] The emergency exception "does not require probable cause [of a crime] but must be actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid or assistance."
State v. Huber , 2011 ND 23, ¶ 13, 793 N.W.2d 781 (quoting State v. Matthews , 2003 ND 108, ¶ 13, 665 N.W.2d 28 ). Three requirements must be met to apply the emergency exception:
Stewart , 2014 ND 165, ¶ 13, 851 N.W.2d 153. The burden is on the State to prove that each of these three requirements existed at the time of the warrantless entry into a home. State v. DeCoteau , 1999 ND 77, ¶ 14, 592 N.W.2d 579.
[¶10] On appeal, Hyde challenges only whether the State proved the first requirement. Therefore, the issue is whether law enforcement had reasonable grounds to believe an emergency existed which required "an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property." Stewart , 2014 ND 165, ¶ 13, 851 N.W.2d 153.
[¶11] For the first requirement, we apply an objective standard of reasonableness: "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of [the entry] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Matthews , 2003 ND 108, ¶ 33, 665 N.W.2d 28 (quoting Root v. Gauper , 438 F.2d 361, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). An officer's belief that an emergency exists "must be grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective feelings." Matthews , at ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Mitchell , 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609-10 (1976) ).
[¶12] The exigent circumstances exception normally applies when officers have an urgent need to act and there is no time to get a warrant. State v. Morales , 2015 ND 230, ¶ 11, 869 N.W.2d 417 (citing Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558-59, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ). The deputies' concern here was entirely premised on the report of suicidal comments. Unassisted suicide and attempted suicide have not been criminal offenses since Chapter 12-33, N.D.C.C., was repealed in 1973. Because there was no reason to suspect criminal activity in Hyde's home, consideration of whether there was time to get a warrant is inapplicable to these circumstances. N.D.R.Crim.P. 41(b). The parties do not dispute that the deputies' intent in entering Hyde's residence was to protect him from harm.
[¶13] The emergency exception may be traced back to U.S. Supreme Court dictum suggesting a warrant may not be required " ‘where the officers, passing by on the street,...
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