State v. Hyder, No. 18068

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Julius B. Aiken; MOSS; TAYLOR
• Citation: 242 S.C. 372,131 S.E.2d 96
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Lawrence L. HYDER, Appellant
• Docket Number: No. 18068
• Decision Date: 14 May 1963

Page 96

131 S.E.2d 96 242 S.C. 372 The STATE, Respondent,
v.
Lawrence L. HYDER, Appellant No. 18068. Supreme Court of South Carolina. May 14, 1963.

Page 98

[242 S.C. 374] Julius B. Aiken, J. Wiley Brown, Greenville, for appellant.

County Sol. C. Victor Pyle, Asst. County Sol. G. M. Ashmore, Greenville, for respondent.

[242 S.C. 375] MOSS, Justice.

Lawrence L. Hyder, the appellant herein, was tried and convicted in the Greenville County Court upon an indictment charging him with having in possession sixty-six gallons of alcoholic liquors to which the revenue stamps required by Section 65-1267 of the Code had not been affixed, Section 65-1270 of the Code; and also of having in possession for an unlawful use and storing the said alcoholic liquors in violation of Section 4-91 et seq., of the 1952 Code. The appellant made appropriate motions for a directed verdict on the ground that there was a lack of evidence tending to prove the guilt of the appellant or from which guilt could be inferred. These motions were refused. This appeal followed. The appellant contends, by appropriate exceptions, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and, therefore, there was error in refusing his motions for a directed verdict.

In considering whether the Court below erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the appellant, we must view the testimony in the light most favorable to the State. When a motion for a directed verdict is made, the trial Judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not with its weight, and although he should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit the case to the jury if there is evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the appellant or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. We have also held that in a prosecution for the violation of the liquor laws each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts and surrounding circumstances. State v. Rayfield, 232 S.C. 230, 101 S.E.2d 505.

It is undisuted that on September 22, 1961, in a peach orchard near the Ridge Road in Greenville County, the law enforcement officers found sixty-six gallons of alcoholic [242 S.C. 376] liquors in half gallon fruit jars. There were no state revenue stamps affixed to the containers.

One of the officers testified that previous to September 22, 1961, that a distillery had been located in the woods near the edge of the peach orchard directly across the Ridge Road from a tenant house. This officer arrived on the scene at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning and found that one hundred

Page 99

and twenty-six gallons of whiskey, which had been made the previous day, was stacked up in the edge of the peach orchard. He testified that the appellant and a negro man drove into the yard of the tenant house at about 6:35 A.M. in an old model Chevrolet automobile. They walked around in the yard for some little time and the negro man walked across the road and in the direction where the whiskey was stacked. He then came back to the house and left in the Chevrolet automobile and was gone for thirty or forty minutes, the appellant remaining in the house. The negro man then came back and drove into the yard of the tenant house and, thereafter, drove across the road and down into the peach orchard where the whiskey was stacked. This witness testified that he heard sounds indicating that something was being loaded into the car. At approximately 8:00 o'clock in the morning the car drove out of the peach orchard and back up into the tenant house yard. This witness testified that he could see the cases of fruit jars stacked up in the back seat and in the trunk of the car. The appellant met the car in the yard and 'walked beside of it as the negro drove it on up into the peach orchard.' This witness further testified that when the car came back out of the peach orchard to the yard of the tenant houe that the appellant carried an automobile seat from the house to the car. It was then testified that the negro man left in the car and the appellant walked away from the house. A short time thereafter some woman drove an automobile up to the tenant house and blew the horn. Presumably, the appellant left in this car because he was not seen further until he came back to the tenant house in a Ford automobile with the same negro man that had left earlier in [242 S.C. 377] the Chevrolet. A young white boy accompanied them. The negro man and the young white boy got out of the Ford, removed a gallon jug therefrom and went in the direction of the distillery and the appellant left. At about 1:00 o'clock P.M. the appellant came back to the tenant house, being brought there by a car that just stopped that let him out. This witness, by radio, advised other officers that the appellant was in the house and for them to come to the tenant house. As the officers approached the house, the appellant was talking on a telephone which was contained in a locked box on the front porch of the tenant...