State v. Hyland, 74419
| Decision Date | 27 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 74419,74419 |
| Citation | 840 S.W.2d 219 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Henry HYLAND, Jr., Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Donald R. Cooley, Springfield, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Hugh L. Marshall, Elizabeth L. Ziegler, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
In this case we consider whether consent given to "look inside" a suitcase found in the trunk of an automobile stopped for speeding is sufficient in scope to permit a law enforcement officer to inspect the contents of that suitcase by lifting articles of clothing. The trial court found the search did not exceed the scope of the consent and overruled the defendant's motion to suppress. A bare majority of the Court of Appeals, Southern District, en banc, reversed. We granted transfer, Mo. Const. Art. V, § 10, and now affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Monitoring traffic along Interstate 44 in Greene County on the afternoon of November 17, 1989, Sergeant Matt Brown of the Missouri Highway Patrol noticed a white Buick violating the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit. Radar measured the Buick's speed at 60 miles-per-hour. Sergeant Brown pursued the Buick until its driver stopped on the shoulder of the interstate.
Sergeant Brown approached the Buick intending to issue a written warning. When Sergeant Brown reached the driver's window, he informed the driver that his speed had exceeded the posted limit and asked to see his driver's license. The driver, William Hyland, handed Brown his Arizona driver's license and nervously volunteered that he was moving to New York from Arizona. Brown asked to see the Buick's registration papers. Hyland said that he did not own the car, that it was a "drive away" vehicle that he was transporting for hire to New York. Hyland handed Brown his "drive away" contract.
During this exchange, Brown noticed that he could not see any of Hyland's personal belongings in the car. Thinking this odd for a person moving permanently from one state to another, Brown asked Hyland about his things. Hyland said they were in the trunk. Brown noted that Hyland's demeanor continued to be nervous and uneasy.
Still holding Hyland's driver's license and the drive away contract, Brown asked Hyland for permission to look in the trunk. Hyland agreed, got out and walked to the trunk to open it. Brown saw a golf bag and caddy, a backpack, and a green, hardsided suitcase sealed with duct tape. Thinking it unusual that duct tape sealed the suitcase, Brown asked Hyland for permission "to look inside the suitcase." Hyland removed the tape and lifted the lid revealing articles of clothing. Brown stuck his hand under the clothes and found a brick of vegetable matter wrapped in cellophane. Experience led Brown to believe he had found a brick of marijuana. Brown arrested Hyland. The laboratory later identified the vegetable matter as marijuana.
The State charged Hyland with possession of a controlled substance in violation of Section 195.202, RSMo 1986. Prior to trial, Hyland filed a motion to suppress the marijuana. The trial court overruled the motion after an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, the trial court found that Hyland had freely and voluntarily given Sergeant Brown consent to search the trunk of the Buick and that Hyland's consent "to look inside" the suitcase included permission to "enter the suitcase and look under the clothing."
The trial court found Hyland guilty following a bench trial and sentenced him to one year in prison. This appeal followed.
Hyland's single point on appeal assigns error to the trial court's failure to sustain his motion to suppress. Specifically, Hyland claims that the seizure of the marijuana violated the Fourth Amendment in that Sergeant Brown did not have probable cause to search the contents of the Buick; that Brown unlawfully detained Hyland beyond the time reasonably necessary to issue the traffic warning; and that Hyland's consent to "look inside" the suitcase did not extend to a search of the contents of the suitcase.
Hyland concedes the validity of the initial stop. Therefore, we turn first to consider his contention that Brown unlawfully detained him beyond the time reasonably necessary to issue the written traffic warning. We agree with Hyland's contention that a vehicle stop under these conditions constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).
The issue Hyland raises reaches in two directions. First, if the detention extends beyond the time reasonably necessary to effect its initial purpose, the seizure may lose its lawful character (assuming no new factual predicate for reasonable suspicion is found during the period of the lawful seizure.) Second, the length of an otherwise lawful seizure is relevant to a determination of the voluntariness of the consent. We consider the second prong at C, infra.
As to the first prong, the record reveals that Sergeant Brown's initial questions about Hyland's personal possessions occurred as, or immediately after, Hyland handed Brown the documentation necessary to complete the written traffic warning. Hyland's consent to the search of the trunk occurred during the time reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the traffic stop. Hyland's claims relating to the length of the stop are not supported by the record in this case and are thus devoid of merit.
Hyland's hope that Sergeant Brown needed probable cause to seek consent to search Hyland's trunk can be quickly dashed. Where consent is lawfully obtained, law enforcement officers may conduct a search commensurate in scope with the permission given. This is so even though the search was not otherwise supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Florida v. Jimeno, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bibbins
...402, 407, 420 S.E.2d 700 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Pipkins, 337 N.C. 431, 446 S.E.2d 360 (1994); State v. Hyland, 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo.1992); State v. Acinelli, 191 Ariz. 66, 69(2), 952 P.2d 304 (1997). 22. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Gaulrapp, supra at 608, 558 N.......
-
State v. Grayson
...604 (1985) (“stopping a car and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”); State v. Hyland, 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 1992) (“a vehicle stop ... constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments”). The issue......
-
State v. Pierce
...the officers' warrantless entry into his home. "A consent to search is valid only if it is freely and voluntarily given." State v. Hyland , 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 1992). But even assuming, without holding, that Pierce's consent to the search was not freely and voluntarily given, appl......
-
State v. Woolfolk
...is given without coercion, the subsequent search is not prohibited by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Moreover, State v. Hyland, 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 1992), expressly rejected any requirement that a suspect must be told he may refuse to consent. "[A]n effective consent to......
-
Section 9.27 Consent
...cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Cook, 854 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993) (quoting State v. Hyland, 840 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 1992)). The Fourth Amendment proscribes only those searches that are unreasonable, and “it is no doubt reasonable for the poli......