State v. Iaukea

• Decision Date: 16 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 5688,5688
• Citation: 56 Haw. 343,537 P.2d 724
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert IAUKEA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 724

537 P.2d 724

56 Haw. 343

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert IAUKEA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5688

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

June 16, 1975.

As Amended July 21, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Except when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence that is relevant is not exclusded because it reveals the commission of an offense other than that charged. The general tests of the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case are: does it tend logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the state, or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense? If it does, then it is admissible.

2. The general rule is that evidence is inadmissible which tends to prove that the accused committed a crime other than the one charged in the indictment. But this rule is subject to certain well-established exceptions to the end that all relevant facts and circumstances tending to establish any of the constituent elements of the crime for which the accused is on trial may be made to appear.

3. The general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment, or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged. The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with categorical precision. Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

4. Where the testimony of the complaining witness concerning the prior crimes which, to her knowledge, appellant had committed, credibly explained and placed in context many of her statements to and actions toward him, such testimony was relevant and admissible to prove forcible compulsion, which is an important element of the crimes of rape and sodomy in the first degree.

5. Where the appellant capitalized on his own history and the complaining witness's knowledge of it to create the scenario for the crime and where he further took advantage of his record to instill an extra measure of fear in his victim, testimony referring to the appellant's commission of other crimes is admissible as part of the 'scheme, plan or design' exception to the rule excluding evidence of prior crimes.

6. Denial of a motion for a mistrial is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Where the challenged evidence was properly admitted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial.

7. A party who assigns as error the giving, the refusal to give, or the modification of an instruction, must object before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection in order to preserve his grounds for appellate review of such instruction. However, the court may notice such an error, not so preserved, if it is a plain error or defect affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. (Rule 30(e) and Rule 52(b) H.R.Cr. P.) 8. Although appellant's substantial rights could have been affected by the trial court's giving of State's requested instruction No. 22, no error, plain or otherwise was committed thereby. Appellant's acts of violence or intimidation need not be done for the very purpose of taking the victim's property to constitute robbery. It is enough that he took advantage of a situation which he created for some other purpose. The challenged instruction was, therefore, a proper statement of the law.

9. Where the evidence would permit a reasonable mind to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant took forty dollars and an automobile from the complaining witness through the threat of the imminent use of force, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal for robbery in the first degree and unauthorized operation of a propelled vehicle.

10. A penalty which is legal under the applicable sentencing statute is generally held not to be cruel and unusual, if the statute is constitutionally valid. A life sentence for a multiple offender convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery and sexual abuse in the first degree is a valid sentence under HRS § 706-661 and HRS § 706-662(4) where appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of these sections of the statute.

11. Where appellant's crimes were serious and his record extensive, a life sentence imposed upon appellant as a multiple offender is not shocking to the conscience or an outrage to the moral sense of the community when regarded in the light of developing concepts of decency and fairness. Thus, the sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii.

Stuart H. Oda, Hilo (Kushi, Shimokusu & Kushi, Hilo, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Paul M. De Silva, Pros. Atty., County of Hawaii, Hilo, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., KOBAYASHI and OGATA, JJ., HAYASHI, Circuit Judge, in Place of MENOR, J., disqualified, and KATO, Circuit Judge, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

OGATA, Justice.

Defendant-appellant, Albert Iaukea (hereinafter appellant), was tried for and convicted of rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and unauthorized operation of a propelled vehicle in a jury trial before the Third Circuit Court. The appellant was sentenced by the court to life imprisonment under the extended term provisions of HRS §§ 706-661 and 706-662(4), as a multiple offender.

He now appeals from the judgment and sentence. He presents for our consideration the following contentions: (1) that the testimony by the complaining witness about appellant's three prior assaults against women and a rape charge pending against him at the time of the alleged rape of the complaining witness deprived appellant of due process; (2) that the court erred when it denied appellant's motion for a mistrial when references were made to prior assaults and alleged prior rape; (3) that the court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal for robbery in the first degree and unauthorized operation of a propelled vehicle at the close of the State's case; (4) that the court erred in giving State's requested instruction No. 22 over appellant's objection; and (5) that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the court upon appellant as a multiple offender constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Federal and State Constitutions. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we hold that appellant's contentions are without merit.

The appellant was referred for counseling by the public defender to the complaining witness, a thirty-one year old psychiatric social worker at the Hilo Counseling Center. The complaining witness held her first interview with appellant on Wednesday, February 13, 1974. At this session, appellant informed the complaining witness that he would have to appear in court that Friday, February 15, 1974. The complaining witness further learned, at that time, many details of appellant's criminal record and obtained a great deal of information abouth his family background and social problems. She learned that the upcoming trial involved a rape charge. Appellant returned to the office of the complaining witness unexpectedly the next afternoon, Thursday, February 14, 1974. The complaining witness testified that she could smell liquor on his breath. Appellant told her that he had an argument with his girlfriend that morning. The complaining witness feared that appellant might get himself into more trouble and even fail to appear in court the next day if left alone in a troubled state. She, therefore, inquired if he had any friends or relatives he could stay with. Appellant then stated he thought he could stay with his aunt in Keaukaha. Appellant then feigned a telephone call to his aunt. ¹ He spoke as though his aunt agreed to let him stay with her. The complaining witness then offered to drive appellant to his aunt's house, because she believed that he would be less likely to get into trouble and fail to appear in court if she did so. The complaining witness further testified that she and others employed at the Hilo Counseling Center often provide rides for patients.

The complaining witness and the appellant drove from the Hilo Counseling Center to Keaukaha in the complaining witness's 1968 Mustang. Appellant directed the complaining witness to drive along the Escape Road (in Keaukaha), on the pretext that his aunt's home was in that direction. After the 1968 Mustang had reached a deserted stretch of the Escape Road, the appellant grabbed the complaining witness around her neck and held a knife to her stomach. The appellant then proceeded to commit the acts of rape and sodomy which formed the basis of the charges.

The testimony of the complaining witness contained several references to the appellant's use of the knife to threaten her and to his use of his greater size and strength to overcome her will. She also testified that she tried to talk the appellant out of raping or hurting her, but to no avail. She stated that her training as a psychiatric social worker had taught her to cope with crisis situations in a calm manner. Moreover, she did not wish to excite appellant to greater violence because then he might use the knife on her. Her fear was heightened by her knowledge of his past history of assaults and pending rape charge. The victim was further put in fear by appellant's statement to the effect that since he was...