State v. Idler

• Decision Date: 09 June 1892
• Citation: 54 N.J.L. 467,24 A. 554
• Parties: STATE (WATSON, Prosecutrix) v. IDLER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

24 A. 554

54 N.J.L. 467

STATE (WATSON, Prosecutrix)

v. IDLER.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 9, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari at the prosecution of Laura Watson against Lucretia Idler to review a certain judgment by a justice of the peace. Writ dismissed.

The other facts fully appear in the folio wing statement by Rued, J.:

The writ of certiorari in this case brings up a judgment by a justice of the peace awarding the possession of a house to a claimant in a summary proceeding taken against a tenant under the landlord and tenant act. The following is a copy of the affidavit filed with the justice: "Charles A. Idler, being of full age, being duly sworn, on his oath says that he is for this purpose the duly-authorized agent of Lucretia P. Idler. That one Laura Watson is now in the possession of a certain furnished cottage of the said Lucretia P. Idler, situate at number 137 South Tennessee avenue, Atlantic City, New Jersey, upon an agreement between John Lewis Childs and the said Laura Watson, made the 7th day of May, A. D. 1891, whereby said John Lewis Childs let and rented the furnished cottage to the said Laura Watson, to bold the same from the 7th day of May, A. D. 1891, to the 15th day of October, A. D. 1891, at the rent or sum of six hundred dollars, to be paid as follows: Two hundred dollars on the signing of said lease, two hundred dollars on July 10, 1891, and two hundred dollars on August 10, 1891. That on or about May 23, 1891, the said John Lewis Childs conveyed the said premises to said Lucretia P. Idler, together with all his rights under said lease, and the right to recover said rents becoming due thereafter, of which the said Laura Watson had notice in writing, signed by said John Lewis Childs, by his duly-authorized agent, on or before July 10, 1891. That the second payment of rent under lease, amounting to the sum of two hundred dollars, came due on the 10th day of July, A. D. 1891, and the said Laura Watson made default in the payment thereof, and that said Lucretia P. Idler demanded the said rent from the said Laura Watson, in writing signed by said Lucretia P. Idler, by her attorney, which writing is hereto annexed, and hereby made a part hereof, by delivering or causing to be delivered to her personally a copy of said demand on the 11th day of July, A. D. 1891, requiring the payment of such rent in three days from the day of service of said notice, or the possession of said premises. And deponent further says that said rent, or any part thereof, has not been paid, and that said Laura Watson holds over and continues in possession of the said premises without the permission of the said Lucretia P. Idle", and that satisfaction for such rent cannot be obtained by distress of any goods." The record shows that upon filing this affidavit a summons was duly issued and served, returnable on July 22, 1891. On that day, the justice goes on to say, "Lucretia P. Idler, the claimant, appeared. The said Laura Watson did not appear, and, no sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, and it appearing that the aforesaid summons was duly served, I rendered judgment in favor of the said Lucretia P. Idler that she recover possession of the said premises."

Argued at February Term, 1892, before Dixon, Garrison, and Reed, JJ.

Samuel E. Perry, for prosecutrix.

REED, J., (after stating the facts.) The first reason assigned for the vacation of the judgment of the justice ordering the tenant to be dispossessed is that the affidavit filed by the agent of the claimant does not show a relation of landlord and tenant existing between the claimant and the tenant, no attornment being shown; and it does not show how the claimant became entitled to the rent accruing from the use of the said premises. The purpose of this reason is to direct attention to the fact that the claimant is neither the lessor, nor a person to whom the tenant has paid rent, nor one whom the tenant has in any way acknowledged as his landlord. It is obviously intended in this way to indicate that there is an absence of the conventional relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, and that the existence of such a relation is a jurisdictional fact essential to confer upon the justice authority to entertain the proceeding. The inquiry is thus naturally suggested, what is the attitude of the claimant towards the tenant in the light of this criticism? In turning to the affidavit, it appears that the claimant is the grantee of all the rights of the lessor in the leased premises, and of all the rents growing out of the same. At common law, neither the assignee of the reversion nor the assignee of the rent separate from the reversion held, by favor of the assignment itself, any relation with the tenant. Whether such a relation should ever arise between the lessee and the assignee and the lessor depended entirely upon the mood of the tenant. On account of reasons springing out of the system of feuds, it was not thought just to a tenant who had entered into the relation with one superior to have his duty to this landlord shifted, without his consent, to a stranger. So, unless he attorned to or professed the new landlord, lie owed him no duty. But, the reason for the required recognition by the tenant of the assignee having ceased to exist, and the rule itself presenting an unnecessary obstacle in the way of transferring property rights, the rule was abolished by an act of parliament known as the "Statute 4 Anne, c. 16, § 19." This statute was re-enacted in this state, and is now the seventy-fourth 'section of an act respecting conveyances, (Revision, p. 166.) Since the passage of this act, an assignment of the reversionary interest remaining in a lessor, followed by notice to the tenant that such assignment has been made, puts the assignee in the same relation with the tenant as would have arisen by an attornment. This created a privity between the tenant and assignee. This privity, however, was one of estate, and not of contract. But...