State v. Inhabitants of Twp. of Belleville

• Decision Date: 21 February 1898
• Citation: 61 N.J.L. 455,39 A. 658
• Parties: STATE (MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEWARK, Prosecutor) v. INHABITANTS OF TOWNSHIP OF BELLEVILLE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

39 A. 658

61 N.J.L. 455

STATE (MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF NEWARK, Prosecutor)

v. INHABITANTS OF TOWNSHIP OF BELLEVILLE et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 21, 1898.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Certiorari by the state, at the prosecution of the mayor and council of the city of Newark, against the inhabitants of the township of Belleville, Essex county, and others, to review a levy of taxes on city property. Set aside.

Argued at November term, 1897, before VAN SYCKEL, DIXON, and COLLINS, JJ.

Frederick T. Johnson, for prosecutor.

Oliver H. Perry, for defendants.

COLLINS, J. Review by this court is invoked of taxes assessed by the authorities of the township of Belleville, in the county of Essex, in the years 1894, 1895, 1896, and 1897, upon property situate within the territory of that township, owned by the city of Newark. Some of the property is held without express authority of law; some is held for sale, and meanwhile rented, its original use being no longer necessary; and none is used for any present public purpose. In Freeholders v. Collins, 37 Atl. 623, this court held that the statute (3 Gen. St. p. 3320, p1. 200) exempting from taxation the property of the counties, townships, cities, and boroughs of this state extends to extraterritorial holdings used for public purposes, although acquired without specific legal authority. The only question therefore now before us is whether municipal property not used for public purposes is taxable notwithstanding the statute. The decision cited foreshadowed a negative answer to this question when it should arise, as did also the earlier case of Commissioners v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. Law, 131; and logically such must be the answer. Implied exemption from a general taxing law, of public property, is, indeed, conditioned upon public use. A municipality may have a mere proprietary ownership, which would come within the law. It is otherwise as to an express exemption. There the legislative will has been declared, and must control. The judicial function then is mere interpretation. In the statute we must now interpret, it has been enacted that the property of cities—all of it, not a part only—shall be exempt from taxation. We have no right to interpolate a limitation. There is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. To construe it so as to accord with what the court might think ought to have been enacted, and would have been enacted had attention been directed to this phase of the subject, would be, not to...