State v. Iniguez
| Citation | 167 Wn.2d 273,217 P.3d 768 |
| Decision Date | 08 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 81750-2.,81750-2. |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Ricardo INIGUEZ, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
¶ 1 This case requires us to examine the contours of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Following his arrest on four counts of first degree robbery, Ricardo Iniguez remained in custody pending a joint trial with his codefendant. The State moved for a total of four trial continuances, the last of which the State sought because it belatedly learned a key witness was out of town. In addition, Iniguez's codefendant and counsel sought various continuances. Iniguez objected to all continuance requests and also moved for a bail reduction, severance, and a dismissal of the charges against him. The trial court denied all of Iniguez's motions. Trial began more than eight months after Iniguez's arrest, and the jury convicted him on all counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez's conviction and dismissed the charges against him with prejudice. While rejecting Iniguez's claim that the continuances violated the allowed time for trial under CrR 3.3, the court held that the more than eight-month delay between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial and violated Iniguez's constitutional right to a speedy trial. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold there was no constitutional speedy trial violation under either article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution or the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
¶ 2 Iniguez was arrested on May 25, 2005 and eventually charged with four counts of first degree robbery with a special firearm allegation. At arraignment, the court set trial for July 27, 2005, and Iniguez's attorney notified the court that due to a planned vacation, he would not be available for the trial date. On July 26th, the State filed a stipulation to join Iniguez with codefendant, Jimmy McIntosh. McIntosh had previously waived his speedy trial rights, and his trial was set for October 5, 2005. Noting his previously-disclosed unavailability, Iniguez's attorney asked for a two-week continuance. The State also moved for a continuance to October 5th based on the joinder. Iniguez objected to a continuance and filed a pro se motion to dismiss based on a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. In the alternative, Iniguez requested that his bail be reduced so that he could be released pending trial. The court granted the State's continuance to October 5th, holding that concerns about judicial economy and trying the two defendants together outweighed Iniguez's speedy trial rights. The court refused to address the motion to dismiss until it was properly filed and served and denied Iniguez's motion to reduce bail.
¶ 3 On September 27, 2005, the State and McIntosh agreed to another continuance to November 16th, at least in part because the prosecutor had not interviewed all the witnesses.1 McIntosh waived his speedy trial rights. Iniguez again objected to the continuance, arguing it violated his right to a speedy trial. The court granted the continuance to November 16th based on the joinder of the cases.
¶ 4 At a pretrial hearing on November 8, 2005, McIntosh's counsel notified the court that he had a conflict with the trial date due to previously-scheduled trials in other counties. Iniguez again objected to a continuance based on his speedy trial rights and moved to sever his case from McIntosh's. The court denied the motion without explanation and set trial for January 4, 2006.
¶ 5 On January 3, 2006, the State filed a motion for a continuance due to the unexpected unavailability of a material witness. On December 18, 2005, the sheriff's office unsuccessfully attempted to serve the witness with a subpoena to appear on the new trial date. It was later discovered that the witness had traveled to Mexico to visit family and would not return until early February. While the witness had been served with a subpoena for previous trial dates and was therefore aware he was under a continuing obligation to testify until dismissed, there was no evidence that the State informed the witness of the new trial date prior to the attempted service of the subpoena on December 18, 2005.
¶ 6 Because the witness was out of town until early February, the State requested a new trial date of February 8, 2006. Both Iniguez and McIntosh objected to the continuance, and Iniguez moved to dismiss with prejudice due to a speedy trial violation. In the alternative, Iniguez renewed his motion for severance. Both Iniguez and McIntosh argued that they were prejudiced by their seven-month incarceration, though neither identified any specific prejudice. The judge determined that the State was not at fault for the witness's unavailability and that there would be no prejudice from a continuance of only a little over 30 days. The court granted the State's motion for a continuance and scheduled trial for February 8, 2006.
¶ 7 Trial began with jury selection on February 8, 2006. During pretrial motions, Iniguez moved to dismiss the charges but the trial court denied his motion. After one day of trial testimony, the trial court granted a mistrial based on inaccurate translations made by the court-appointed interpreter. The second trial began on April 12, 2006. The jury convicted Iniguez of four counts of first degree burglary with special findings that he was armed with a firearm.
¶ 8 Iniguez appealed, arguing that the numerous continuances violated the time for trial rules under CrR 3.3 and his speedy trial rights under the federal and state constitutions. The Court of Appeals reversed Iniguez's conviction and dismissed the case with prejudice. State v. Iniguez, 143 Wash.App. 845, 850, 180 P.3d 855 (2008). The court held that, while the numerous continuances did not violate CrR 3.3, they did violate Iniguez's constitutional speedy trial rights. Id. at 855, 859, 180 P.3d 855. The Court of Appeals explained that the more than eight-month delay between arrest and trial was presumptively prejudicial and resulted in a violation of Iniguez's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. at 859, 180 P.3d 855. The State petitioned for review, which we granted. State v. Iniguez, 164 Wash.2d 1025, 195 P.3d 958 (2008).
¶ 9 At the outset, there is a disagreement over the proper standard of review. The State argues that we review a trial courts' decisions to grant a continuance and deny severance for an abuse of discretion. In contrast, in an amicus curiae brief, the Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (WACDL) argues that a constitutional question of speedy trial rights is reviewed de novo, citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).
¶ 10 Both sides are, in a sense, correct. It is true that we review the denial of a severance motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dent, 123 Wash.2d 467, 484, 869 P.2d 392 (1994). Similarly, we review a decision to grant or deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion. State v. Flinn, 154 Wash.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). However, a court "necessarily abuses its discretion by denying a criminal defendant's constitutional rights." State v. Perez, 137 Wash. App. 97, 105, 151 P.3d 249 (2007). And we review de novo a claim of a denial of constitutional rights. See Brown v. State, 155 Wash.2d 254, 261, 119 P.3d 341 (2005); see also United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1469 (9th Cir.1988) (). Because Iniguez argues his constitutional speedy trial rights were violated, our review is de novo.
¶ 11 Iniguez argues that the more than eight-month delay between his arrest and first trial was presumptively prejudicial and violated his speedy trial rights under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.2 He further contends that article I, section 22 provides broader speedy trial protections than the Sixth Amendment. Iniguez suggests that under article I, section 22, any pretrial delay of more than six months for incarcerated defendants conclusively establishes a constitutional violation.
¶ 12 The State responds that no violation of Iniguez's speedy trial rights occurred because the delay between the arrest and his first trial was not long enough to be presumptively prejudicial under either article I, section 22 or the Sixth Amendment. In the alternative, the State argues that even if the delay was presumptively prejudicial, the balancing of the relevant factors under Barker demonstrates that there was no constitutional violation. Finally, the State contends that article I, section 22 was not intended to provide greater protections than the Sixth Amendment.
¶ 13 When we are presented with both federal and state constitutional arguments, we turn first to our own constitution. State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 443, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). We have never before addressed whether and, if so, to what extent speedy trial rights are uniquely protected under article I, section 22 of our constitution.
¶ 14 Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution provides that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial." Because we have not previously determined what a "speedy public trial" requires under our constitution, it is useful to review the speedy trial protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the...
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