State v. Iola Theater Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 November 1932
• Docket Number: 30849.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. TAYLOR, County Attorney, v. IOLA THEATER CORPORATION et al. [*]
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

15 P.2d 459

136 Kan. 411

STATE ex rel. TAYLOR, County Attorney, v. IOLA THEATER CORPORATION et al. ^[*]

No. 30849.

Supreme Court of Kansas

November 5, 1932

Syllabus by the Court.

Injunction against operation of theater on Sundays in violation of criminal statutes held properly denied, where violation did not constitute public nuisance and state had adequate remedy at law (Rev. St. 1923, 21--952 et seq.).

Correct judgment rendered by trial court, although based upon wrong theory or upon erroneous reason, must stand.

The record of an application to obtain an injunction to prevent defendants from maintaining and operating a movie show in its theater in violation of the statutes prohibiting the performance of labor on Sunday, and also prohibiting the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise on that day, considered, and held, that the remedy of injunction is not available to the state.

Appeal from District Court, Allen County; Frank R. Forrest, Judge.

Action by the State, on the relation of Frank W. Taylor, as County Attorney of Allen County, against the Iola Theater Corporation, and another. Judgment for the defendants, and the relator appeals.

Roland Boynton, Atty. Gen., R. O. Mason, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Frank W. Taylor, Co. Atty., of Iola, for appellant.

Kenneth H. Foust, of Iola, for appellees.

JOHNSTON C. J.

This was an action of injunction brought by the state, on the relation of Frank W. Taylor, as county attorney of Allen county, against the Iola Theater Corporation and Vogel Gettier, its manager, to enjoin the defendants from maintaining and operating a talking and movie show in Iola on Sundays, in violation of the statutes prohibiting the performing of labor and work on Sunday, and prohibiting the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise on that day.

The state alleged that defendants had maintained and operated the theater in violation of the Sunday Law, on January 24, 1932 and on divers Sundays from that day until the present time and that Gettier and several others named performed labor in connection with its operation and also sold goods, wares, and merchandise in violation of the statute and intended to continue to do so permanently. It is alleged that there is no adequate remedy at law to prevent the violations, and that unless an injunction is granted, the defendants will continue to so violate the law. The case was tried upon statements and admissions of the parties with the result that the injunction was denied and that this appeal has been taken by the state.

It appears from the admission and statements upon which the decision was based that Gettier, the manager of the theater was arrested upon a complaint for the violation of a city ordinance, prohibiting the violations of the Sunday Law (R. S. 21--952 et seq.), which was substantially similar to the state law forbidding the performance of labor except works of necessity or charity, gaming, or the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise on Sunday. It appears he was convicted of that charge in the latter part of January, 1932, and that later he was charged before a justice of the peace with continuing to operate the theater in violation of the state Sunday Law. It was admitted by defendants that they were claiming the operation of a theater on Sunday to be legal, and that they would continue to operate it until they were stopped or their right to do so was legally determined. Nothing was produced to show any disorderly conduct on the part of those attending the Sunday shows or of those operating the theater. The state relied alone upon the violation of the statute, claiming that such violation itself constituted a nuisance which a court of equity could and should enjoin. It is a general rule that courts of equity will not interfere to prevent the commission of a crime such as the Sunday Law unless the acts constitute a nuisance or there exists some other ground than the mere violation of a criminal statute.

The question submitted for decision is whether under the facts stated, a court of equity may interfere and enjoin the operation of the theater. In a case, State ex rel. v. Barron (Kan. Sup.) 15 P.2d 456, the identical question involved in this case was submitted and decided at the same session of court that the instant case was decided, and it was determined in that case that there was an adequate remedy at law, and that an interference of a court of equity to enjoin the operation of the theater on Sunday was not warranted. It is unnecessary to repeat the grounds and views of the court which lead to the judgment there rendered. Following that decision, it must be held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy sought in this case. It appears that the trial court in a long dissertation as to the conduct of those responsible for the initiation of this proceeding, before entering judgment animadverted upon the action of the county attorney and others in bringing the action against the defendants and taking steps against other violators of the law and because the county attorney was not seeking to enjoin nor apply the same remedy to others who were engaged in other avocations and who were openly violating the Sunday Law. The county attorney frankly admitted his belief that others in the county which the court named were selling goods and doing business on Sunday contrary to the provisions of the Sunday Law, but, there being urgent opposition to the operation of the theater, he had determined to bring this action, and his theory was that a start had to be made some place, and he had chosen to make the start against the operation of Sunday shows in defendant's theater.

Some of the statements made by the court in brief were that it was in favor of the enforcement of the statute, but it must be impartially enforced, and, "if the county attorney will prepare a complaint in equity, notifying every violator in Allen county-- the filling stations, the drug stores, the soda fountains, the jitneys, the cement plants, and the garages--that they are violating this section of the statute and unless they cease doing so action will be instituted in the district court against them, and you then present that proposition to me, with a pleading broad enough to take them all in, I will sign that order in a minute." The court decided that under the admissions made by...