State v. Iovieno
Decision Date | 14 June 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 4862,4862 |
Citation | 14 Conn.App. 710,543 A.2d 766 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Michael IOVIENO. |
Kent Drager, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Leah Hawley, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Arnold Markle, State's Atty., and Susan C. Marks, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and DALY and NORCOTT, JJ.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-102(a), one count of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95(a), and one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a). 1 He claims that the trial court erred (1) in determining that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, (2) in granting the state's motion for joinder of the three cases and denying the defendant's motion for severance, (3) in its instructions concerning the elements of burglary in the second degree, (4) in permitting the prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to testify in his closing argument, and (5) in its instructions concerning the state's burden of proof. We find error in part.
Three of the counts against the defendant, burglary in the second degree, unlawful restraint, and sexual assault in the first degree, all stem from an incident involving a residence on Rock Road, North Haven. The count of burglary in the second degree with intent to commit the crime of sexual assault therein involves a residence on Putnam Avenue in Hamden, and the remaining count of burglary in the second degree involves a residence on Dixwell Avenue in Hamden.
The defendant's first claim of error is that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The issue of sufficiency of evidence and its appropriate standard of review has been analyzed countless times by both this court and our Supreme Court. An excellent summation of the issue of sufficiency was collated and reported in State v. Little, 194 Conn. 665, 485 A.2d 913 (1984). In Little, the court stated: ' ' State v. Gabriel, 192 Conn. 405, 421-22, 473 A.2d 300 (1984). " ' State v. Little, supra, 194 Conn. at 671-72, 485 A.2d 913. We will consider the crimes at each of the three locations in chronological order and the facts which the jury could have found in support of its guilty verdicts.
At approximately 1 a.m. on November 13, 1984, a young woman had been dropped off after a date and walked to the front door of her house on Dixwell Avenue in Hamden. The young woman lived in a two-family house with her two sisters and their families. As she was ringing the doorbell, she heard an automobile put on its brakes rather hard and observed a man get out of the stopped car. She recalled that the car was an older model, red, with a red vinyl top. The driver subsequently identified by her as the defendant, was a male about five feet, ten inches tall, with brown hair, and a full beard and moustache. He appeared to be in his late twenties, and was wearing a white hat and a dungaree jacket. Fearing an encounter with the defendant, the woman fled to the rear of the house where she frantically knocked, cracking a window in the process, to get the attention of her sisters. Her sister admitted her and she went upstairs to her room where she saw the defendant return to his vehicle and drive away.
While the young woman was being admitted into the house by her sister, her brother-in-law went to the front door and unlocked it. After discovering that his sister-in-law had been allowed in, he turned to the front door and observed the defendant who had walked into the house. The defendant asked for Billy Anderson, a nephew of the occupants who no longer resided there although the name Anderson was listed on the mailbox. The defendant, who identified himself as Mike Johnson, went out to his car after being informed that Billy no longer lived there. 2
The defendant argues that there was no evidence concerning the necessary element of the defendant's "intent to commit a crime therein" as required for a conviction of burglary in the second degree under General Statutes § 53a-102(a). 3 We agree.
State v. D'Ambrosia, 14 Conn.App. 309, 321, 541 A.2d 880 (1988). In this case, there was no such circumstantial evidence available for the jury. In State v. Zayas, 195 Conn. 611, 620, 490 A.2d 68 (1985), our Supreme Court stated that, in burglary cases, evidence of an attempt to make a forcible entry was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer an intent to commit the crime of theft therein. Similarly, in State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 577-78, 500 A.2d 539 (1985), the court relied upon the defendant's "surreptitious entry" and his flight from apprehension to uphold the jury's inference beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's similar intent.
In this case, there is no forcible entry, since the defendant simply walked through the unlocked front door. Indeed, the defendant's behavior, at the time of entry, did not indicate intent to commit a crime. Moreover, there was no evidence introduced about flight. The defendant, upon being told that Billy Anderson no longer lived there, walked out to his car. It is important to recognize that the state's theory of the crime is that the defendant intended to commit a sexual assault. The intent to commit a crime must occur when the defendant enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling. Any intent that the defendant might have had to commit a crime appeared to have evaporated since the defendant did not pursue the young woman and he did not know whether she had been allowed in the house when he entered. Moreover, since he was visible to those in front of the house, and vice versa, his conduct did not support an inference to commit any crime therein. The evidence presented was therefore insufficient to support the defendant's conviction on one of the burglary counts.
On that same night, at approximately 1:20 a.m., Barbara Collins was in her Putnam Avenue apartment with her fifteen year old son, her ten year old daughter and her son's girlfriend. She heard a noise by the kitchen door and called to her son that someone was at the door. Seeing the doorknob move she headed for the kitchen telephone to call the police. At this point, the door was kicked open and a male, later identified as the defendant, burst into the apartment and lunged for Collins. He was attempting to push...
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