State v. Iowa Dist. Court for Scott Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-1255,15-1255
• Citation: 889 N.W.2d 467
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

889 N.W.2d 467

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff,

v.IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 15-1255

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed January 20, 2017

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Walton, County Attorney, and Steve Berger, Assistant County Attorney, for plaintiff.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant.

MANSFIELD, Justice.

This case requires us to interpret a special restitution law that applies to operating while intoxicated (OWI) cases. This law provides that the court "may order restitution paid to any public agency for the costs of the emergency response resulting from the actions constituting a violation of [the OWI statute]." Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b ) (2014). Here, an officer on regular nighttime patrol stopped the defendant's vehicle after observing she was driving erratically and had run a red light. The driver was arrested for and ultimately convicted of OWI, second offense. See id. § 321J.2(1)(a ), (2)(b ). The State sought $54.50 in restitution for the costs of this traffic stop and subsequent processing at the police station. The district court denied the request, ruling "there was no emergency in this case."

On our review, we agree with the district court. The legislature has defined "emergency response" as "any incident requiring response by fire fighting, law enforcement, ambulance, medical, or other emergency services." Id. § 321J.2(13)(b ). Contrary to the State, we do not read this definition as authorizing recovery of the costs of any law enforcement response, but only a response to something that meets the normal definition of an emergency. Routine law enforcement activities do not qualify. Therefore, we annul the writ.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

According to the minutes of testimony, Davenport Police Officer Jennifer Brewer was on overnight patrol in the early morning hours of November 1, 2014. She observed a black Mercury Mountaineer speed up and slow down several times as it drifted between lanes of traffic. Officer Brewer then saw the vehicle slowly run a red light and almost collide with another car. The officer activated the emergency lights on her squad car and pulled over the vehicle.

Officer Brewer approached the vehicle to speak with its driver, Esther Arriaga. The officer noticed Arriaga's eyes were watery and bloodshot and she was slurring her speech. Arriaga admitted she was drunk and thanked Officer Brewer for stopping her vehicle. As Arriaga exited the vehicle, Officer Brewer also detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from her. In addition, Arriaga was unsteady on her feet and not wearing shoes.

Officer Brewer transported Arriaga to the Scott County Jail. There, Arriaga failed both a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and a preliminary breath test. After making several phone calls, Arriaga refused to provide a breath sample for the chemical test. She was arrested for OWI, second offense.

Arriaga later pled guilty to OWI second in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)(a ) and (2)(b ). Before Arriaga's sentencing, the State submitted a form entitled "emergency response restitution" on behalf of the Davenport Police Department pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b ). The form requested restitution for the costs of Officer Brewer's time and the time her squad car was in use during the traffic stop, arrest, and processing of Arriaga at the jail. Arriaga resisted the State's request and disputed that Officer Brewer's response was an "emergency response" within the meaning of the statute. The court scheduled a separate hearing on the State's request for restitution.

At the restitution hearing, Officer Brewer testified that she initiated the traffic stop on Arriaga's vehicle at approximately 3:39 a.m. on November 1. Brewer acknowledged Arriaga had not caused an accident, but testified she made the stop "because [she] felt that [Arriaga] was going to end up hurting someone." Officer Brewer testified she had been dispatched on another call prior to the stop, but ultimately ignored the call in order to pull over Arriaga.

Officer Brewer explained that she left the jail approximately one hour after the initial vehicle stop, having finished dealing with Arriaga. Brewer then completed paperwork and reports related to the stop and arrest. Brewer testified that her normal duties as a patrol officer included initiating traffic stops, arresting individuals, and filling out paperwork. The State's restitution request on behalf of the city of Davenport thus covered two-and-a-half hours of Officer Brewer's time (at an hourly rate of $19) and one hour for the use of Brewer's squad car (at an hourly rate of $7) for a total of $54.50.¹

In a written ruling, the district court denied the State's claim for restitution. The court characterized the present case as "a typical OWI traffic stop in every way. There was no accident necessitating extra officers, fire or medic." The court added that Officer Brewer "was not responding to an emergency, she was investigating a crime." The court therefore concluded,

[T]he Iowa Legislature did not intend the routine arrest and processing of a Defendant to be subject to an emergency response restitution claim. If the legislature wanted to include nonemergency routine traffic stop activity, it would have said the cost of any response and not add the limiting language of "emergency." The legislature purposefully defined "emergency response" broadly to capture the often unique responses fire, medical, and law enforcement must have to these incidents. Not every emergency involves an accident, although that is typically the case.... The broadness of the Iowa definition was merely a way to include those weird, unique, case specific responses that happen even when there is no accident as a result of the violation. It is over reaching to include the routine traffic stop, investigation, and processing in the definition of "emergency response."

Thereafter, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this court.² See Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1). We granted the petition.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

"We review rulings on questions of statutory interpretation for correction of errors at law." State v. Olutunde , 878 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 2016) (quoting In re R.D. , 876 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Iowa 2016) ). We also review restitution orders for correction of errors at law. State v. Hagen , 840 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2013). "In reviewing a restitution order ‘we determine whether the court's findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or whether the court has not properly applied the law.’ " Id. (quoting State v. Bonstetter , 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001) ).

III. Analysis.

A. The Statute at Issue. Iowa Code section 321J.2(13)(b ) provides,

The court may order restitution paid to any public agency for the costs of the emergency response resulting from the actions constituting a violation of this section, not exceeding five hundred dollars per public agency for each such response. For the purposes of this paragraph, "emergency response " means any incident requiring response by fire fighting, law enforcement, ambulance, medical, or other emergency services. A public agency seeking such restitution shall consult with the county attorney regarding the expenses incurred by the public agency, and the county attorney may include the expenses in the statement of pecuniary damages pursuant to section 910.3.

Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b ) (2014). The dispute here can be summarized quickly. The State contends that "emergency response" as used in this subsection is a term of art that encompasses any required response by law enforcement. Arriaga maintains that "emergency response" is limited to situations where an especially urgent response was required, as opposed to a routine traffic stop.

We have not previously interpreted section 321J.2(13)(b ). It was enacted by the legislature in 1997. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 5 (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b ) ).³

This statute was part of a large omnibus bill aimed at reforming Iowa's OWI laws. See 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177. Many provisions increased the punishments for OWI offenses. For example, the legislation raised minimum fines for first-offense OWI, made revocation of the offender's driver's license mandatory, and imposed automatic referrals to treatment programs. See id. § 4 (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(3) ). The legislation also prohibited deferred judgments, deferred sentencing, or suspended sentences in a variety of circumstances, including for second-time offenders and those who refused to consent to testing required by section 321J.6. See id. (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(3)(b )(2) ). In addition, the legislature increased the punishment for the offense of vehicular homicide while intoxicated from a class "C" felony to a class "B" felony. Id. § 26.

Prior to the 1997 legislation, an offender convicted of OWI was required to pay victim restitution "in an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars." Iowa Code § 321J.2(8) (1997). However, the legislation removed this cap on victim restitution, instead requiring unlimited victim restitution "[i]n addition to any fine or penalty imposed under [chapter 321J]." 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, § 5 (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(a ) ).

Meanwhile, the same legislation authorized restitution to public agencies but capped it at "five hundred dollars per public agency for each such response." Id. § 5 (now codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(13)(b ) ). While restitution to victims remained mandatory, restitution to public agencies was entrusted to the discretion of the district court. See id. ("The court may order restitution paid to any public agency...." (Emphasis added.)).

B. Interpreting the Statute. Our first step when interpreting a statute is to determine whether it is ambiguous. See Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass'n for Justice , ...