State v. E.J.J.

Citation183 Wash.2d 497,354 P.3d 815
Decision Date25 June 2015
Docket NumberNo. 88694–6.,88694–6.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. E.J.J., Petitioner.

Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Prosecuting Atty. King County, Dennis John McCurdy King Co. Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Charles Christian Sipos, David A. Perez, Mica Dawn Simpson, Perkins Coie LLP, Sarah A. Dunne, Attorney at Law, Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, La Rond Baker, ACLU of Washington, amicus counsel for Aclu.

Opinion

JOHNSON, J.

¶ 1 This case challenges, on grounds under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a juvenile court “conviction” for obstructing a law enforcement officer under RCW 9A.76.020(1). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The basis for the prosecution centers on E.J.J. calling the officers abusive names, yelling, and using profanity toward the officers while they were engaged in a criminal investigation. We find insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that E.J.J.'s words directed at the officers are constitutionally protected. We reverse the conviction and dismiss.1

Facts and Procedural Posture

¶ 2 This case began as a call for police assistance to E.J.J.'s house to help with his intoxicated, out-of-control sister, R.J. (a juvenile at the time). The police responded and began their intervention by escorting R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a nightstick.2 E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house. Initially, E.J.J. did not comply, questioning why he had to return to the house. When, eventually, he did return to his home, he stood in the open doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. The house had double doors: a wrought iron screen door, through which someone could see out and communicate through, and a second, solid wood door. The officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to supervise the scene from the doorway (10 to 15 feet away from the other officers and R.J.) to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to stand behind the closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive names.3 An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction. After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. The entire interaction lasted approximately 10 to 15 minutes.

Standard of Review

¶ 3 The free speech provision of the First Amendment4 stands as a guardian protecting citizens against criminal prosecution when exercising their constitutional right to speak, to witness and engage in the political process, and to criticize certain governmental activities. Historically, First Amendment values have occupied a crucial place in shaping our democracy. Cases have consistently and strongly held that people cannot be held liable when exercising their right to speak. While E.J.J.'s words may have been disrespectful, discourteous, and annoying, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected.

¶ 4 E.J.J. challenges the obstruction statute as unconstitutional as applied to his behavior. We review such constitutional challenges de novo. State v. Abrams, 163 Wash.2d 277, 282, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008). In the context of the First Amendment, this requires a review of the record to determine that the conviction could not have been based only on constitutionally protected speech.5 The obstruction statute provides, “A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if the person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.” RCW 9A.76.020(1). To save the obstruction statute from being unconstitutionally overbroad in a First Amendment setting, we have construed the statute narrowly. Our cases have consistently required conduct in order to establish obstruction of an officer. State v. Williams, 171 Wash.2d 474, 485, 251 P.3d 877 (2011). In other words, a conviction for obstruction may not be based solely on an individual's speech because the speech itself is constitutionally protected. This review is also consistent with the approach established by the United States Supreme Court. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578, 89 S.Ct. 1354, 22 L.Ed.2d 572 (1969).

¶ 5 Washington courts have long limited the application of obstruction statutes, lest those statutes infringe on constitutionally protected activity. In Stone, the Court of Appeals invalidated portions of a city obstruction ordinance that criminalized the defendant's refusal to identify himself to police officers. City of Mountlake Terrace v. Stone, 6 Wash.App. 161, 492 P.2d 226 (1971). In Grant, this court invalidated portions of a similar state obstruction statute but held that the remainder of the obstruction statute was constitutionally adequate because it focused on conduct rather than speech. State v. Grant, 89 Wash.2d 678, 575 P.2d 210 (1978). Four years after Grant, we reviewed the successor obstruction statute, former RCW 9A.76.020 (1975).6

State v. White, 97 Wash.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). Although we held that subsections (1) and (2) were constitutionally overbroad, we left intact subsection (3), which made it a misdemeanor to ‘knowingly hinder, delay, or obstruct’ a public servant. White, 97 Wash.2d at 96, 640 P.2d 1061 (quoting former RCW 9A.76.020). Following White, in cases where defendants were charged under subsection (3) by giving false names or refusing to give any information to police—paradigmatic speech activity—our Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that subsection (3) requires conduct, not speech alone. See State v. Hoffman, 35 Wash.App. 13, 16–17, 664 P.2d 1259 (1983). Although our courts resolved these cases on the bases of due process and vagueness, the fundamental principle is the same. In order to satisfy our state and federal constitutions, obstruction statutes must have articulable, clear standards that do not impair important constitutional activities, such as speech.

¶ 6 After the legislature adopted the current obstruction statute, our courts continued to require conduct in order to survive a constitutional challenge. The current obstruction statute contains only the “willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs” subsection of the former statute. Former RCW 9A.76.020(1). Reviewing this revised language, the Court of Appeals in Williamson reversed the obstruction conviction of the defendant who falsely told police his name was Christopher Columbus.’ State v. Williamson, 84 Wash.App. 37, 45, 924 P.2d 960 (1996). The court reasoned that the defendant's response was speech, not conduct. Williamson, 84 Wash.App. at 43–45, 924 P.2d 960.

¶ 7 In Williams, we thoroughly discussed the history of cases analyzing the concerns our courts have long held in relation to attempts to criminalize incidents where speech is involved. We emphasized the concern that police could use this statute to detain and arrest individuals solely for their speech. In Williams, we vacated the defendant's conviction for obstruction when he gave a false name to police during a traffic stop, holding that “in order to avoid constitutional infirmities” we require some conduct to support a conviction. Williams, 171 Wash.2d at 478, 251 P.3d 877. As our history makes clear, conduct is prerequisite of an obstruction charge.

¶ 8 Given the important First Amendment rights at stake, we are required to engage in a careful review of the record to ensure that E.J.J.'s conviction could not have been based on speech alone.7 This analysis is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Street. In Street, the defendant burned an American flag in the street, telling police, We don't need no damn flag.’ Street, 394 U.S. at 579, 89 S.Ct. 1354. The defendant was convicted under a New York statute that made it a misdemeanor to ‘publicly ... mutilate, deface, defile ... or cast contempt upon either by words or act’ any flag of the United States. Street, 394 U.S. at 578, 89 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 1425). After holding that a person may not constitutionally be convicted for speaking contemptuous words about the flag, the United States Supreme Court held that it was compelled to reverse the conviction because given the record, the way Street was charged, and the general verdict entered, he could have been convicted for his speech alone. Street, 394 U.S. at 590, 89 S.Ct. 1354 ; see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942) (“To say that a general verdict of guilty should be upheld though we cannot know that it did not rest on the invalid constitutional ground ... would be to countenance a procedure which would cause a serious impairment of constitutional rights.”). Washington cases also follow this analysis. See Williamson, 84 Wash.App. at 44–45, 924 P.2d 960 (presuming prejudice when defendant was convicted of obstruction solely because he gave a false name). Thus, this case turns on whether the record suggests that E.J.J. was convicted of obstruction based solely on his words.8

¶ 9 The State argues that in addition to his abusive speech directed at the officers, E.J.J. engaged in conduct by approaching the officers while they were trying to...

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