State v. J.L.D., 91-2729
| Decision Date | 25 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-2729,91-2729 |
| Citation | 168 Wis.2d 361,485 N.W.2d 840 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. In the Interest of J.L.D., A Person Under the Age of 18. STATE of Wisconsin, Respondent, v. J.L.D., Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha county: Lee S. Dreyfus, Jr., Judge.
Circuit Court, Waukesha County.
AFFIRMED.
J.L.D. appeals from the juvenile court's order waiving its jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district attorney for appropriate criminal proceedings in adult court. On appeal, J.L.D. contends that: (1) the waiver petition did not sufficiently state facts supportive of the waiver request; (2) Waukesha county was the wrong venue for one of the delinquency petitions; (3) the state failed to meet its burden of proof as to the waiver request; and (4) the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering waiver. We reject J.L.D.'s arguments and affirm the waiver order. We will recite the relevant facts as we discuss each issue.
The state filed four delinquency petitions against J.L.D. charging three counts of burglary and one count of battery. 2 The state also filed waiver petitions in each matter. The substantive portions of the three waiver petitions are identical. Each alleges, inter alia, that J.L.D. is seventeen years of age and will attain eighteen years of age on May 3, 1992; that she is not mentally ill or developmentally disabled and is physically and mentally mature; that her motives are similar to those often seen in adult offenders; that the offenses were committed in a premeditated and willful manner; and that due to the limited time remaining until J.L.D. attains eighteen years of age, the juvenile system is inadequate and unsuitable to address J.L.D.'s needs and the protection of the public. In addition, each petition recited the charge alleged in the corresponding delinquency petition.
J.L.D. first argues that these allegations are insufficient to support the state's waiver requests. 3 The sufficiency of a pleading presents a question of law. See Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis.2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25, 28 (1985). We review such questions de novo without deference to the juvenile court's ruling. See Grotelueschen v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 163 Wis.2d 666, 674, 472 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Ct.App.1991).
Section 48.18(2), Stats., requires that a waiver petition "shall contain a brief statement of the facts supporting the request for waiver." The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed this statute in In re J.V.R., 127 Wis.2d 192, 378 N.W.2d 266 (1985). There the state had filed a waiver petition which simply incorporated by reference an accompanying delinquency petition and which additionally stated that the "remedies available to the criminal court would be more effective under the circumstances of this case than those available to the juvenile court." Id. at 195, 378 N.W.2d at 267. Finding the petition insufficient, the supreme court stated:
Section 48.18(5), Stats., contains numerous factors which guide the juvenile court when it exercises its discretion in making a waiver decision.... Section 48.18(2) operates to provide the juvenile with notice of the facts upon which the state will rely in seeking waiver so that the juvenile can focus his defense on the relevant factors from sec. 48.18(5). A waiver petition which merely refers to the factors contained in sec. 48.18(5) will not suffice.
Id. at 201-02, 378 N.W.2d at 270.
The waiver petitions in this case did more than merely refer to the factors contained in sec. 48.18(5), Stats. Rather, as we have recounted above, the waiver petitions here specifically related those ultimate facts upon which the state based its waiver request. The deficiencies present in J.V.R. were not present here and J.L.D. was appropriately notified by the waiver petitions as to the grounds for the state's waiver request.
Whether the state ultimately carried its burden of proof as to these allegations and whether the juvenile court ultimately exercised proper discretion in waiving J.L.D. present different questions. All we are concerned with as to this first issue is whether the waiver petitions pass muster under sec. 48.18(2), Stats., and J.V.R. We are satisfied that they do.
Next, J.L.D. argues that Waukesha county was not sufficiently established as the proper venue in case No. 91-JV-806-A, in which J.L.D. was charged with a burglary allegedly committed in Washington county. Section 48.185(1), Stats., provides that: "Venue for any proceeding [in a delinquency case] may be in any of the following: the county where the child resides, the county where the child is present or, in the case of a violation of a state law or a county, town or municipal ordinance, the county where the violation occurred."
In finding that Waukesha county was the proper venue, the juvenile court judicially noticed that J.L.D. "was a resident of Waukesha county, was placed on a temporary placement with her aunt in Milwaukee County as of August 17th of this year." On the basis of these judicially noticed facts, the court concluded that J.L.D.'s residence was in Waukesha county at the time of the commencement of these proceedings, thus satisfying the venue requirements of sec. 48.185(1), Stats.
The juvenile court did not specifically indicate the sources upon which it judicially noticed this information. See sec. 902.01(2)(b), Stats. However, the appellate record, as supplemented upon our order, reveals that at a detention hearing on August 13, 1991, Court Commissioner Linda Georgeson authorized the temporary placement of J.L.D. with her grandmother. The "Request For Temporary Physical Custody Authorization" which prompted this hearing recites J.L.D.'s residence at an Oconomowoc address--a location which we judicially notice as located in Waukesha county. See sec. 902.01(2)(a), Stats. We assume this is the source of the juvenile court's judicial notice. Even if it is not, this documentation nonetheless supports the court's ultimate ruling that J.L.D. was a resident of Waukesha county at the time the proceeding in 91-JV-806-A was commenced. Thus, the venue requirements of the statute were satisfied.
J.L.D. next argues that the state failed to meet its burden of proof on its waiver requests and that, regardless, the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering waiver. We address these arguments in a single discussion.
Whether a party has met its burden of proof presents a question of law which we review de novo without giving deference to the trial court's conclusion. Becker v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 141 Wis.2d 804, 811, 416 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Ct.App.1987). However, the decision whether to waive juvenile court jurisdiction is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court. In re D.H., 76 Wis.2d 286, 302-03, 251 N.W.2d 196, 205 (1977). In matters of discretion, our inquiry is not whether we would have ruled as did the trial court. Liles v. Employers Mut. Ins., 126 Wis.2d 492, 502, 377 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Ct.App.1985). Rather, we will sustain the trial court's ruling if the court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982).
In support of its waiver decision, the juvenile court noted that J.L.D.'s mot...
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