State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. J.M.S.)

• Decision Date: 13 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 20091015.,20091015.
• Citation: State v. J.M.S. (State ex rel. J.M.S.), 280 P.3d 410, 697 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 2011 UT 75 (Utah 2011)
• Parties: STATE of Utah, in the interest of J.M.S., a person under eighteen years of age. State of Utah, Appellant, v. J.M.S., Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

280 P.3d 410

697 Utah Adv. Rep. 60

2011 UT 75

STATE of Utah, in the interest of J.M.S., a person under eighteen years of age.State of Utah, Appellant,

v.J.M.S., Appellee.

No. 20091015.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Dec. 13, 2011.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Att'y Gen., for appellant.

Richard L. King, Salt Lake City, for appellee.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals

Chief Justice DURHAM, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1We must decide whether the juvenile court erred in concluding that a minor's alleged solicitation of a stranger to punch her and terminate her pregnancy qualifies as an abortion, as the term is defined in the Utah Code.The juvenile court held that an assault of a woman by punching her stomach was a “procedure” intended to terminate her pregnancy and therefore fell within the statutory definition of “abortion.”Because a woman cannot be held criminally liable for seeking an abortion, the court dismissed the State's delinquency petition against the minor.

¶ 2We hold that the solicited assault of a woman to terminate her pregnancy is not a “procedure” as contemplated by statute, and therefore does not constitute an abortion.Accordingly, we reverse the juvenile court's order dismissing the State's petition and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In May 2009, the State filed a delinquency petition in juvenile court alleging that J.M.S., a seventeen-year-old girl, had engaged in criminal solicitation to commit murder, a first degree felony if committed by an adult.According to the State,¹ J.M.S. became pregnant and sought to abort the fetus because her boyfriend threatened to have nothing to do with her while she was pregnant.J.M.S. visited a Utah clinic to obtain an abortion but was told she was ineligible because her pregnancy was too far advanced.

¶ 4 Approximately thirteen weeks later, J.M.S. approached Aaron Harrison, ² a stranger, and asked him to help end her pregnancy.The two went to Mr. Harrison's house, having agreed that J.M.S. would pay him to punch her in the stomach to terminate her pregnancy.Mr. Harrison repeatedly punched J.M.S. in the stomach, and she paid him for his participation.

¶ 5 Afterward, J.M.S. called her mother and claimed that someone had sexually assaulted her.J.M.S.'s mother drove her to the police station.During questioning, J.M.S. revealed that she had not been sexually assaulted, but instead had paid Mr. Harrison to hit her to kill her fetus.³The attempt to end the pregnancy was unsuccessful, and the child was born relatively healthy.

¶ 6 Before the juvenile court, J.M.S. entered a no-contest admission to criminal solicitation to commit murder, which the State reduced to the equivalent of a second degree felony if committed by an adult.J.M.S. then obtained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw her admission and to release her from detention.J.M.S. asserted in her motion that her prior court-appointed counsel had simultaneously represented her and the alleged father of her child in separate cases, which raised a conflict of interest.J.M.S. also argued that her prior counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to perform even minimal legal research, did not adequately investigate the case, did not accurately explain to her the consequences of her admission, and spent little time communicating with her prior to her no-contest admission.Moreover, J.M.S. argued that her prior counsel's failure to research the law applicable to the case resulted in the omission of a critical defense: namely, that a woman cannot be held criminally liable for seeking to obtain an abortion.SeeUtah CodeAnn. § 76–7–314(1)(Supp.2009).⁴

¶ 7 Without addressing J.M.S.'s claims regarding her prior counsel's alleged conflict of interest and ineffective assistance, the juvenile court granted J.M.S.'s motion to withdraw her admission.In its order, the juvenile court reviewed the statutory definition of “abortion,” which “includes any and all procedures undertaken to kill a live unborn child,”Utah Code Ann. § 76–7–301(1)(2008), and noted that a “procedure” is merely “a series of steps taken to achieve a result.”The court therefore reasoned that, assuming the State's allegations were true, J.M.S.'s conduct constituted seeking an abortion, not solicitation of murder.Consequently, J.M.S. could not be held criminally liable under the Utah Code.The juvenile court later granted J.M.S.'s motion to dismissthe State's delinquency petition based on the same grounds.

¶ 8The State appealed.Seeid.§ 78A–6–1109(1)(Supp. 2011)(permitting appeal “from any order, decree, or judgment of the juvenile court”).We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review for correctness.”T–Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,2011 UT 28, ¶ 9, 254 P.3d 752.

ANALYSIS

I.THE TERM “PROCEDURE” IN THE UTAH ABORTION STATUTE REFERS TO MEDICAL PROCEDURES AND DOES NOT EMBRACE THE SOLICITED ASSAULT OF A WOMAN

¶ 10 Under the Utah Code, a pregnant woman cannot be held criminally liable for seeking or obtaining an abortion.SeeUtah CodeAnn. § 76–7–314(1)(Supp.2009)(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a woman who seeks to have or obtains an abortion for herself is not criminally liable.”).At the time of the alleged solicited assault, the term “abortion” was defined as “the intentional termination or attempted termination of human pregnancy after implantation of a fertilized ovum, and includes any and all procedures undertaken to kill a live unborn child and includes all procedures undertaken to produce a miscarriage.”⁵Id.§ 76–7–301(1)(2008)(emphases added).The Utah Code does not, however, define the term “procedure” as it relates to the performance of an abortion.

¶ 11The State advocates an interpretation of the term “procedure” that is limited to medical procedures.It argues that the plain language of the statute supports this interpretation and that it is the only sensible interpretation because a broader reading would mean that any act, whether humane or heinous, intended to terminate a pregnancy would constitute an abortion.In contrast, J.M.S. urges us to uphold the juvenile court's interpretation.The juvenile court interpreted “procedure” as meaning “a series of steps taken to achieve a result.”Under this view, the alleged solicited assault of J.M.S. was a series of steps taken to achieve the termination of her pregnancy and therefore would qualify as an abortion, for which J.M.S. could not be held criminally liable.

¶ 12We agree with the State that the term “procedure” in the abortion definition is confined to medical procedures.We reach this interpretation for three reasons.First, this interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the abortion definition, given its place in the context of the statutory provisions governing the practice of abortion (the Abortion Statute).Second, adoption of the juvenile court's interpretation of “procedure” would render inoperable a portion of the Utah Code's criminal homicide statute, whereas we seek to avoid statutory interpretations that render related provisions meaningless.Finally, under our doctrine of “absurd results,”we deem it inconceivable that the legislature could have intended for any act, of any nature, intended to kill an unborn child to qualify as an abortion.Our interpretation of the abortion definition necessarily excludes the alleged solicited assault of a woman, and we therefore reverse the juvenile court's dismissal of the State's petition against J.M.S.⁶

A.In Light of the Abortion Statute's Scheme, the Term “Procedure” in the Definition of “Abortion” Refers to Medical Procedures

¶ 13 Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cnty.,2011 UT 18, 118, 251 P.3d 804.To do so, “we look first to [the statute's] plain language and presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.”Boyle v. Christensen,2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810(internal quotation marks omitted).Often, “statutory text may not be ‘plain’ when read in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context.”Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City,2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465.For this reason, “our interpretation of a statute requires that each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.”Anderson v. Bell,2010 UT 47, ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 1147(internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 14 The term “procedure,” when read in isolation, is capable of multiple interpretations.In a broad sense, the term may mean “[a] specific method or course of action.”Black's Law Dictionary 1323 (9th ed. 2009).The term may further be refined to constitute the “traditional, customary, or otherwise established or accepted way of doing things.”Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1807(1961).These definitions, however, lead to an important question: A “specific method” or “established or accepted way” of doing what?What one means by using the term “procedure” depends heavily on context.A court's adherence to procedures, for example, is distinct from a physician's performance of procedures.CompareMacKay v. Hardy,973 P.2d 941, 947(Utah1998)(“Our rules of appellate procedure clearly set forth the requirements that appellants and appelleesmust meet when submitting briefs before this court.”(first emphasis added)), with Columbia HCA v. Labor Comm'n,2011 UT App 210, ¶ 2, 258 P.3d 640(“In her findings, the ALJ walked through the ten-year chronology of Seely's back problems, listing the major surgeries and procedures conducted ....”(emphasis added)).

¶ 15 The ordinary and accepted meaning of “procedure” in the definition...