State v. J. R. Wersebe

Decision Date05 November 1935
PartiesSTATE v. J. R. WERSEBE
CourtVermont Supreme Court

October Term, 1935.

Status of Exceptions Taken during Trial When Transcript Not Referred to in Bill of Exceptions---Measure of Sufficiency of Complaint Charging Statutory Offense---Lottery Defined---P. L. 8683, How Construed---Description of Lottery in Complaint Not Necessary---Offense under P. L. 8683 Sufficiently Charged---Insufficiency of Count Charging Mere Purchase of Lottery Ticket---Harmless Error Where One of Two Counts Based on Same Circumstances and Treated as One Offense Held Defective---Status of Objections Raised in Brief But Not Below.

1. Where there is only skeleton bill of exceptions which in no way refers to the transcript, exceptions taken during trial are not brought into record and are not before Supreme Court on appeal.

2. It is sufficient to charge a statutory effense in the words of the act if every fact necessary to constitute the offense is charged or necessarily implied by following such language but if from the nature of the offense the words of the statute do not clearly and definitely apprise the respondent of the offense charged against him, such particularity must be used as will reasonably indicate the offense of which the respondent is accused, and enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and successfully to plead the judgment if subsequently prosecuted for the same offense.

3. The word "lottery" in its legal as in its popular signification may be defined as a scheme by which one or more prizes are distributed by chance among persons who have paid or promised a consideration for a chance to win them.

4. P L. 8683 relating to lotteries and providing penalty for promotion thereof, etc., is to be construed chiefly by the meaning of the term lottery as used in a popular sense and by reference to the mischief intended to be redressed.

5. As no lottery is authorized in this State, it is not necessary that a complaint under P. L. 8683 should allege a description of the lottery in question.

6. In prosecution under P. L. 8683 relating to lotteries, held that certain counts in information charging that the respondent disposed of money by a lottery, and count charging that respondent aided in the promotion of a lottery, by paying a certain sum to a named person on account of a lottery ticket held by him, set forth all the essential elements of the offense sought to be charged with sufficient clearness and directness.

7. In prosecution under P. L. 8683 count in information apparently charging respondent with aiding in promotion of lottery by simply buying a lottery ticket, held defective, the statute being enacted for the protection of the purchaser.

8. In prosecution under P. L. 8683, where two counts on which respondent was convicted were based upon but one set of circumstances and attempted to charge but one offense, and court below so treated them and imposed but one fine for both, though on appeal one of such counts is held defective the error is harmless.

9. Objections raised by respondent's brief but not raised below are not to be considered by Supreme Court.

INFORMATION for violation of P. L. 8683 relating to lotteries. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury in Franklin municipal court, P. L. Shangraw, Municipal Judge, presiding. Verdict of guilty on four counts and judgment and sentence thereon. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case. Exceptions overruled. Let execution be done.

Exceptions overruled. Let execution be done.

P. C. Warner for the respondent.

John H. Webster, State's attorney, for the State.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and SHERBURNE, JJ.

OPINION
SHERBURNE

This is a prosecution based upon P. L. 8683, which, so far as material here, provides that "a person who * * * promotes a lottery for money * * *, or disposes of money * * * by a lottery, and a person aiding * * * in so doing, shall be fined * * *." There were numerous counts in the information, but the respondent was only found guilty upon counts 2, 3, 7, and 8. These contained the usual allegations of time and place and the usual conclusion, and respectively charged as follows:

No. 2. That the respondent "did aid in the promotion of a lottery for money by to wit paying a certain sum of money, to wit, $ 22.50, for a lottery ticket to one Robert Sullivan."

No. 3. That the respondent "did dispose of money by a lottery, in that, to wit, he did pay a certain sum of money to wit, the sum of $ 22.50 to one Robert Sullivan on account of a certain lottery ticket held by the said Sullivan."

No. 7. That the respondent "did aid in the promotion of a lottery for money by, to wit, paying a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of eighty dollars ($ 80.00) to one John M. Paquette on account of a lottery ticket previously purchased by the said John M. Paquette and then held by him.

No. 8. That the respondent "did dispose of money by a lottery, in that, to wit, he did pay a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of eighty dollars ($ 80.00) to one John M. Paquette on account of a certain lottery ticket held by the said Paquette."

Upon the verdict of guilty judgment was entered. As counts 2 and 3 only covered one transaction but one fine was imposed. The same applies to counts 7 and 8.

Both sides have briefed numerous exceptions taken during the trial and we have been furnished with the transcript, but, as the bill of exceptions is only a skeleton bill and in no way refers to the transcript, the exceptions so taken are not brought into the record and are not before us. O'Boyle v. Parker-Young Co., 95 Vt. 58, 63, 112 A. 385; Francis v. London G. & A. Co., 100 Vt. 425, 429, 138 A. 780; In re Estate of Prouty, 105 Vt. 66, 72, 163 A. 566. However, the bill of exceptions does show that after verdict and before judgment the respondent filed a motion in arrest and duly excepted to its denial. Although this motion was not brought into the printed case as it should have been, we treat the exception to its denial as properly before us and have examined the original motion for its contents.

Omitting the grounds of the motion not briefed, the remaining grounds may be summarized as follows: That a lottery has no settled or technical meaning and that the plan and operation of the scheme so as to show that it was in fact a lottery should have been alleged; that there is no allegation of manner or means, nor that the money was paid out or disposed of by the way of a prize as the result of a hazard or chance, nor that the respondent received a consideration. As to counts 2 and 7 the respondent says that the allegation that he aided in the promotion of a lottery by paying a sum of money goes no further than to allege that he purchased a lottery ticket, which is not a crime under the statute.

It is sufficient to charge a statutory offense in the words of the act if every fact necessary to constitute the offense is charged or necessarily implied by following such language. But if from the nature of the offense the words of the statute do not clearly and definitely apprise the respondent of the offense charged against him, greater particularity must be used. State v. Fiske, 66 Vt....

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5 cases
  • State v. Edward Van Ness
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 3, 1938
    ... ... 1, art. 10, of ... the Constitution of Vermont, which provides that "in all ... prosecution for criminal offenses, a person hath a right to ... demand the cause and nature of his accusation." ... State v. Villa , 92 Vt. 121, 123, 102 A ... 935, and cases cited; State v. Wersebe , 107 ... Vt. 529, 532, 181 A. 299; State v. Webber , ... 78 Vt. 463, 466, 62 A. 1018; State v ... Monte , 90 Vt. 566, 568, 99 A. 264 ...           ... State v. Villa, supra , was a prosecution ... for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, under P. S ... 5102, which ... ...
  • State v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 1, 1938
    ...so narrowly to construe the definition of a lottery adopted by the decisions of this Court. See State v. Williams, supra; State v. Wersebe, supra. To pay consideration is to furnish or give a consideration. The word "pay" used in this connection may be taken to include the doing of an act o......
  • State v. Milo Persons
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1946
    ... ... The complaint ... or information must set forth the charge with such ... particularity as will reasonably indicate the offense of ... which the respondent is accused, and enable him intelligently ... to plead the judgment if subsequently prosecuted for the same ... offense. State v. Wersebe, 107 Vt. 529, ... 532, 181 A. 299; State v. Van Ness, 109 Vt ... 392, 399, 199 A. 759; State v. Gosselin, ... 110 Vt. 361, 365, 6 A.2d 14 ...           An ... information may be defective under the common law [114 Vt ... 437] and under the state constitution because it fails to ... ...
  • State v. Hormidas Gosselin
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 2, 1939
    ...motion as to count 1 before mentioned. Although this motion was not brought into the printed case as it should have been, State v. Wersebe, 107 Vt. 529, 181 A. 299, it is referred to in the bill of exceptions, and the entries certified to the clerk of the general term and to which we may re......
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