State v. J.V.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2020
• Docket Number: 082507,A-95 September Term 2018
• Citation: 242 N.J. 432,231 A.3d 710
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.V., Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

242 N.J. 432

231 A.3d 710

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.J.V., Defendant-Respondent.

A-95 September Term 2018

082507

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 3, 2020

Decided June 11, 2020

Revised June 12, 2020

Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Carol M. Henderson, Trenton, of counsel and on the briefs).

Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Michele E. Friedman, of counsel and on the briefs).

John McNamara, Jr., Chief Assistant Morris County Prosecutor, argued the cause for amicus curiae County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey (Francis Koch, President, attorney; John McNamara, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).

Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Barry Evenchick, Hackensack, argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of counsel and on the brief).

JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this matter, we consider whether the new juvenile waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1 (Section 26.1), applies retroactively to a juvenile who was waived to adult court, pled guilty, and was sentenced before the statute became effective. The Appellate Division found retroactivity and concluded defendant J.V. was entitled to a new juvenile waiver hearing in light of Section 26.1.

We cannot agree. The language of Section 26.1 is plain and unambiguous. It became effective years after J.V. was waived to adult court. We conclude the Legislature intended the statute to apply prospectively to those juvenile waiver hearings conducted after the statute became effective. Clearly, the statute does not apply to J.V. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.

I.

The facts are straightforward and undisputed. We glean them from the juvenile waiver proceeding and J.V.'s plea colloquy.

A.

On Mother's Day in 2013, seventeen-year-old J.V. left his house armed with a kitchen knife with plans to rob someone of money or a cellphone. He walked to a train station near his home and spotted the victim -- an unsuspecting twenty-eight-year-old man who had just been dropped off. J.V. approached the victim and asked to use his cellphone. The victim was initially startled but allowed J.V. to use his cellphone because J.V. was a "kid." J.V. took the cellphone and pretended to make a phone call by pressing the phone's buttons and placing it to his ear.

After making the fake call, J.V. walked back to the victim and told him he was keeping the phone. The victim demanded his phone back and, when J.V. refused, they began to fight for it. During the ensuing struggle, J.V. whipped out the kitchen knife and stabbed the victim nine times, piercing and cutting the victim's neck, ear, shoulders, and the top of his head. J.V.'s knife pierced the victim's vocal cords, causing permanent damage. After the ninth blow, the victim fell to the ground.

J.V. ran from the train station with the victim's cellphone in hand. He discarded his knife in a garbage can. Witnesses at the train station observed the stabbing and called the police. An off-duty police officer was driving near the train station and overheard sirens. Turning on his radio, he heard a dispatch report of a robbery at the train station. The officer observed J.V. run past his vehicle, noting that J.V. matched the assailant's description provided by the dispatch. The officer pursued J.V. and radioed his location to other officers. Moments later, the police apprehended J.V. He was "drenched" in blood. During the arrest, J.V. blurted out he had just taken "a guy's" cellphone and discarded a knife. J.V. gave the cellphone to the officers and led them to the knife in the garbage can.

The police began interviewing J.V. at police headquarters. Upon learning J.V. was a juvenile, they notified his parents. J.V.'s father came to the police station and briefly sat in on the interview. J.V. admitted he planned to steal someone's cellphone and brought the knife with him for coercion. J.V. then detailed the assault and the stabbing.

Following the interview, the police charged J.V. with acts of delinquency which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and 2C:5-1(a)(1) ; armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) ; unlawful possession of a knife, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) ; and possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d).

B.

A month after the stabbing, on June 4, 2013, the State filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction from the Superior Court's Family Part to the Criminal Part to try J.V. as an adult under the then-existing, but now repealed, juvenile waiver statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(a).

Under that waiver statute, the Legislature tasked the Attorney General (AG) with developing guidelines for prosecutors to follow when seeking to waive a juvenile to adult court. In response, the AG instructed prosecutors seeking to file a juvenile waiver motion to consider: (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the need for deterrence; (3) the effect of the waiver on the prosecution of any co-defendants; (4) the maximum sentence and length of time served; (5) the juvenile's prior record; (6) trial considerations, such as the likelihood of conviction and the potential need for a grand jury investigation; and (7) the victim's input. Office of the Attorney Gen., Juvenile Waiver Guidelines, 5-6 (Mar. 14, 2000) (AG Guidelines). In addition, the AG Guidelines directed prosecutors filing a waiver motion to include a statement of reasons addressing the prosecution's consideration and the applicability of the factors. Id. at 7.

Following the AG Guidelines, the prosecutor in this case filed a statement of reasons listing certain factors supporting waiving J.V. to adult court. After conducting the waiver hearing, the Family Part judge granted the State's motion to transfer jurisdiction. J.V.'s counsel made an application for bail, arguing that J.V. had an IQ of 58, had been in special education classes for the majority of his life, and had attempted suicide six times while detained in the juvenile detention center. The Family Part judge denied the requested bail and entered an order waiving jurisdiction on October 23, 2013.

Thereafter, a grand jury indicted J.V. for attempted murder, armed robbery, and weapons offenses. J.V.'s counsel requested an evaluation to determine whether J.V. was competent to stand trial. After a three-day hearing, the trial court found J.V. competent to stand trial but noted there was evidence that he was mentally impaired.

Once in adult court, on June 17, 2015, J.V. entered guilty pleas to attempted murder and armed robbery. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent eighteen-year prison terms, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

On the heels of J.V.'s guilty pleas, the Legislature repealed the juvenile waiver statute, replacing it with Section 26.1. L. 2015, c. 89, §§ 1-7. It codified the AG Guidelines, mandating supplementary factors for prosecutors to consider when seeking to waive a juvenile to adult court. Those factors include: the juvenile's age and maturity, the juvenile's need for special education classes, the juvenile's mental health status, and the juvenile's history of substance abuse and/or emotional instability. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26.1(c)(3)(d), (e), and (j). Section 26.1 was not made effective immediately, but instead, became effective on March 1, 2016. L. 2015, c. 89, § 7.

On September 18, 2015, the trial court sentenced J.V. in accordance with his plea deal. That sentencing occurred well before the effective date of the new statute.

C.

J.V. appealed, challenging both the Family Part judge's ruling to waive jurisdiction and his sentence. He contended he was entitled to a new waiver hearing in light of Section 26.1. Relying on the Appellate Division's decision in State in Interest of J.F., 446 N.J. Super. 39, 140 A.3d 564 (App. Div. 2016), J.V. argued that Section 26.1 should apply to him retroactively because of the ameliorative nature of the new waiver statute. J.V. speculated that had the prosecutor considered the new waiver factors under Section 26.1(c)(3), the prosecutor may not have sought to waive him to adult court. To the extent Section 26.1(c)(3) does not apply retroactively, J.V. claimed he was still entitled to a new waiver hearing because the prosecution abused its discretion in analyzing the factors under the AG Guidelines. He also argued that his sentence was excessive.

The Appellate Division agreed with J.V.'s Section 26.1 arguments. Given its decision in J.F., the Appellate Division concluded "[t]he waiver statute is ameliorative and thus subject to retroactive application." The court reasoned that the new waiver factors under Section 26.1(c)(3) "may affect the severity of the outcome for the juvenile." The court further found that J.V. was entitled to a new waiver hearing under the new waiver statute applying Section 26.1's provisions because he was sentenced after the "enactment of the more lenient waiver statute." The Appellate Division took note that under the new statute, prosecutors must now consider a juvenile's mental disability

but that such an evaluation was not mandated under the repealed statute or under the AG Guidelines. The Appellate Division remanded for a new waiver hearing in light of Section 26.1.

Because it ruled in his favor, the Appellate Division considered neither J.V.'s additional argument that the prosecution abused its discretion in analyzing the waiver factors under the AG Guidelines nor J.V.'s excessive sentencing claim.

This Court granted certification, 239 N.J. 10, 214 A.3d 1220 (2019), and...