State v. J.W.

Decision Date16 November 2015
Docket Number72967-5-I
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. J.W., Appellant.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Cox J.

Under Miranda v. Arizona, the State may not use a defendant's confessions made during a custodial interrogation unless the defendant was informed of certain rights.[1] J.W. appeals the trial court's admission of her statements, arguing that she confessed during a custodial interrogation. Because J.W. was not in custody when she confessed, the court properly admitted her confession. Assuming the admission of her confession was erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

J.W and two other young women were seated at a table near a Safeway when police officers arrived to investigate a report of shoplifting. Officer Matthew Hurley arrived as J.W. gave Officer Chris Shone her name and birth date. Officer Hurley observed an open bag next to J.W. containing bottles of alcohol. Officer Hurley then asked J.W. to repeat her date of birth and age. Officer Hurley then stated "you do understand that you could be arrested at this point for being in possession of alcohol as a minor."[2] J.W. then asked if she and Officer Hurley could step away from the table and talk. They walked a few feet away, and J.W. confessed to stealing the alcohol.

J.W returned to the table where she, the other young women, and the officers waited for 15 to 20 minutes for another officer to return from Safeway. After the other officer returned and the officers spoke, Officer Hurley arrested J.W. and provided a CrR 3.1 warning regarding her right to an attorney. This was not a full Miranda warning.

J.W moved to suppress her statements. The trial court held a CrR 3.5 suppression hearing, concluding that J.W. was in custody after Officer Hurley contacted her, but that there was no interrogation. The court's decision was based on J.W.'s age, the statement Officer Hurley made to her, and the fact that she was detained "for what a juvenile may have been [sic] considered an extended period of time."[3]

J.W appeals. The State did not cross-appeal, but argues that this court may affirm on any basis supported by this record.[4]

CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION

J.W argues that her confession was inadmissible because she confessed during a custodial interrogation. We disagree.

The State may not use a defendant's confessions made during a custodial interrogation unless the defendant was informed of certain rights.[5] We review the trial court's "denial of a motion to suppress by determining if substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and if those findings support the court's conclusions of law."[6] Determining whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of law and fact.[7] We "defer to the trial court's findings of fact but review its legal conclusions from those findings de novo."[8] Additionally, "unchallenged findings of facts and findings of fact supported by substantial evidence [are treated] as verities on appeal."[9] Constitutional harmless error analysis applies to erroneously admitted statements obtained in violation of Miranda.[10]

In Miranda v. Arizona, "the [United States] Supreme Court established a conclusive presumption that all confessions or admissions made during a custodial interrogation are compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination."[11] "[C]ustodial interrogation" is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."[12]

"Under the federal and state constitutions, a juvenile possesses rights against self-incrimination."[13] If a juvenile is involved, we include the juvenile's age in the custody analysis as long as the officer knew of the juvenile's age, or the juvenile's age "would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer" at the time of questioning.[14] Although a juvenile's age is not a "determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case, " it cannot be ignored.[15]

Custody and Terry Stops

The State argues that the court erred by determining that J.W was in custody. Specifically, the State argues that she was not in custody because she was merely detained for an investigatory stop. We agree.

A person is in "custody" if he is "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."[16] We use an objective standard to determine whether an interrogation is custodial and ask "'whether a reasonable person in the individual's position would believe he or she was in police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest."'[17] We can also ask whether "a 'reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.'"[18]

Courts must also look at other relevant factors to determine whether an individual is in custody, including the location and duration of the questioning, the statements made during the questioning, "the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, " and the individual's release after questioning.[19]But "whether the police had probable cause to arrest" is "irrelevant" to the custody analysis.[20] The "'defendant must show some objective facts indicating his . . . freedom of movement [or action] was restricted [or curtailed].'"[21]

According to Terry v. Ohio, [22] officers are not required to warn suspects of their Miranda rights during investigatory stops.[23] A "'temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop does not constitute Miranda custody.'"[24] An officer may "briefly detain a person for questioning if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is or is about to be engaged in criminal activity."[25] Officers may also briefly stop an individual "'if necessary to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information.'"[26] Thus, a suspect is not in custody during an investigatory Terry stop where the police question the suspect '"to confirm or dispel [their] suspicions.'"[27] But the suspect "is not obligated] to respond."[28]

A "Terry stop must be 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'"[29] But "'[t]he scope of an investigatory stop . . . may be enlarged or prolonged ... if the stop confirms or arouses further suspicions.'"[30]

State v. Heritage is instructive.[31] There, the 16-year-old defendant and other juveniles sat in a park when security officers approached them.[32] The security officers smelled marijuana, asked the group to identify the owner of the marijuana pipe, and the defendant admitted ownership.[33]

The supreme court discussed the custody requirements and compared them to a traffic stop and a Terry stop.[34] The court stated that a routine traffic stop, like a Terry stop, "is a seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes because it "curtails the freedom of a motorist such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave the scene."[35] But the court "recognized that because both traffic stops and routine Terry stops are brief, and they occur in public, they are 'substantially less police dominated' than the police interrogations contemplated by Miranda."[36]

The court also stated that "a detaining officer may ask a moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions without rendering the suspect 'in custody'" for Miranda purposes.[37] Thus, routine Terry stops are not custodial for Miranda purposes.[38]

The court then determined that the defendant was not in custody because the "encounter was analogous to a Terry stop."[39] Specifically, the court determined that the questioning occurred publicly, that the defendant was never physically restrained or isolated from her friends, and that the security officers assured her that they could not arrest her.[40] The court also found that the security officers asked questions which related to their suspicions.[41] Lastly, the court determined that the defendant's age did not make the encounter custodial, and that a 16 year old would not have reasonably "believed she was detained to a degree analogous to arrest."[42]

State v. Walton[43] is also instructive. There, Officer Leslie Gifts responded to a juvenile party and spoke with Jeffrey Walton, a 17-year-old.[44] Officer Gitts detected alcohol on Walton's breath and requested his identification, which revealed his age.[45] After Officer Gifts asked Walton if he had anything to drink, Walton responded that he had.[46]

At the hearing, Officer Gitts stated that he had been "pretty sure" Walton had violated the statute but was still investigating.[47] He also stated that he "probably would have arrested Walton had he attempted to leave."[48] Walton argued that his statement to Officer Gitts was the product of a custodial interrogation.[49]

This court stated that "unlike a formal arrest, a typical Terry stop is not inherently coercive because the detention is presumptively temporary and brief, is relatively less 'police dominated, ' and does not easily lend itself to deceptive interrogation tactics."[50] This court determined that the officer "acted in a noncoercive, routine investigatory manner" and asked a question "in the course of a typical Terry stop."[51] This court also determined that there was no evidence that the officer informed Walton of his plan to arrest him if he attempted to leave.[52] Accordingly, this court concluded that the "uncommunicated plan could not lead Walton, as a reasonable person, to believe that he was under arrest and in custody."[53]

Here J.W. was not in custody to the degree...

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