State v. J. W. B. (In re J. W. B.)
| Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | A174434 |
| Citation | 312 Or.App. 549,492 P.3d 142 |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF J. W. B., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. State of Oregon, Respondent, v. J. W. B., Appellant. |
Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Joseph Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Hadlock, Judge pro tempore.
We reverse a judgment committing appellant to the Mental Health Division. We briefly outline only the most pertinent evidence, as a comprehensive discussion of the facts would not benefit the parties, the bench, or the bar.
Appellant has been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder
, he has "command hallucinations" that include perceiving that God tells him to be violent toward other people, and he does not want to take antipsychotic medications. Appellant was hospitalized after he became angry with a teenager, who was with friends in a common area at appellant's apartment complex. Appellant came out of his apartment with a large kitchen knife and held the knife over his head, yelling at the teenager and his friends to leave. Appellant was 30 to 40 feet from the teenagers at that point, he did not rush at them, and he stayed in the area "right outside of his apartment." The teenagers went inside another apartment and locked the door. Two other people (not part of the group of teenagers) had been within 10 feet of appellant, but they had left quickly.
Appellant was taken to a hospital, where he struggled against being secured to a gurney. Records reflect that he made verbal threats and displayed physical aggression while in the emergency room, but the evidence included no detail of the nature of that aggression. After being admitted to a unit, appellant made additional verbal threats, including to gouge one patient's eye out with a pen, but he did not display further physical aggression. At some point, however, appellant threw water at another patient. He also urinated and defecated on the floor and threw at least the urine at a camera. The record indicates that appellant committed two assaults in the past, but it gives no further details beyond noting that neither assault appears to have been recent.
State v. E. J. J. , 308 Or. App. 603, 612, 479 P.3d 1073 (2021) ().
On this record, the trial court could find that appellant's mental disorder caused him to engage in extremely disturbing behavior and that he could benefit from treatment that he would not accept absent involuntary commitment.1 However, the evidence admitted at the hearing was not sufficient to support a finding that appellant was "highly likely" to engage in "actual" physical violence against others, given the lack of evidence of recent violence (other than resisting hospitalization) and the relatively isolated nature of his threatening behavior at the apartment complex. We also conclude that the risk that anybody would harm appellant as a result of his behavior was too speculative to support commitment on the basis that appellant was dangerous to himself.
Reversed.
I agree that on this record there is insufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to have found that it was highly probable that appellant is "dangerous to others" as that statutory phrase has been interpreted over the years. A person is "dangerous to others" for purposes of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A) if the person's "mental disorder makes [the person] highly likely to engage in future violence toward others, absent commitment." State v. S. E. R. , 297 Or. App. 121, 122, 441 P.3d 254 (2019). I write separately to observe that the "dangerous to *** others" standard may have strayed from the legislative intent embodied by the plain text of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A)1 . In an appropriate case where the parties have properly raised it for our consideration, we may want to examine whether that standard has become untethered to the legislative intent embodied in the civil-commitment framework.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the statutory framework involves more than just a binary choice between involuntary commitment or dismissal. There are five possible outcomes in a civil-commitment hearing. See, e.g. , State v. J. R. B. , 290 Or. App. 858, 859-60, 418 P.3d 38 (2018) (). Three of those potential outcomes follow a trial court's determination that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person is a person with mental illness:
An order for conditional release or involuntary commitment shall not exceed 180 days under ORS 426.130(2). There are two potential outcomes that arise if a court determines that the person is not a "person with mental illness" as defined by ORS 426.005(1)(f) :
Thus, although it does not directly bear on whether the "dangerous to others" standard has strayed from the legislature's intent, it is important to note that, even when a trial court concludes that the person meets the statutory definition of a "person with mental illness," involuntary commitment is not the only possible outcome.2
In articulating the high standard for a civil commitment based on danger to others, we have explained:
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