State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 02 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | A-11 September Term 2019,082735 |
| Citation | 243 N.J. 52,233 A.3d 440 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Michael A. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).
Milton S. Leibowitz, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and on the briefs, and Michele C. Buckley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).
Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander Shalom, Elyla Huertas, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
Michael Gilberti argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Jardim Meisner & Susser, attorneys, Florham Park; Michael Gilberti, on the brief).
Adam D. Klein, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Adam D. Klein, of counsel and on the brief).
In this appeal, we address whether a defendant facing the same charges as a cooperating witness should be barred from exploring that adverse witness's sentencing exposure. Under the circumstances here, we find defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial.
Tiffany Taylor, Javon Clarke, and defendant Michael A. Jackson were apprehended and charged with participating in a burglary. Clarke accepted a cooperating plea offer in which he agreed to provide testimony inculpating defendant and Taylor in exchange for a three-year sentence. The trial judge urged modification of the plea agreement, suggesting Clarke's sentencing exposure be lowered to 180 days in county jail, and probation. The new deal was consummated. Clarke thereafter testified that defendant and Taylor participated in the burglary.
In an effort to demonstrate Clarke's bias in favor of the prosecution, counsel for Jackson sought to elicit during cross-examination the sentencing range of three to five years’ imprisonment that Clarke would have faced had he not accepted a plea offer in exchange for agreeing to testify against defendant.
The trial court barred defense counsel's line of questioning regarding Clarke's maximum sentencing exposure, explaining that such information could improperly prejudice the jury if they heard Clarke's maximum sentencing exposure on the same crimes as defendant. The trial court permitted defense counsel to elicit testimony regarding only the initial plea offer of three years’ imprisonment and the final plea agreement, in which Clarke accepted 180 days’ imprisonment in county jail, plus probation. The trial court permitting the State to use the low end of the sentencing range led to testimony that Clarke had not received "such a good deal."
The jury acquitted defendant and Taylor of burglary and theft but convicted them of conspiracy to commit burglary. Defendant was sentenced to an extended term of seven years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court's limitation on the cross-examination of Clarke deprived him of his constitutional right to confront a key adverse witness. Defendant also argued that the limitation was exacerbated when the State was allowed to reference the low end of the range. The Appellate Division rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed his conviction.
We now reverse the Appellate Division's judgment. The jury should have had full access to Clarke's plea agreement history through the defense counsel's unfettered examination of that history. We hold the trial court's limitations on defendant's cross-examination to be in error.
We derive our summary of the facts from the record.
On November 6, 2014, L.G. received three phone calls from his ex-girlfriend, co-defendant Taylor, in which she asked if she could come over and borrow money. L.G. refused both requests, claiming to have to attend to other things.
Later that morning, while standing on his porch, L.G. saw Taylor's car drive by his home. For a short period, he left to drive a friend home. On his way back, he spotted Taylor's car again and became suspicious. He decided to pass his house and circle around the block to see if he could spot her again. Not seeing Taylor's car, a third time, he drove back home.
Upon arrival, L.G. observed a man exiting L.G.’s front door, carrying L.G.’s television. L.G. drove his car onto the sidewalk toward the man -- who immediately dropped the television and fled in response. L.G. exited his car, ran inside his house, and found the back door ajar and his television, laptop computer, and gaming system missing.
L.G. left his house, called the police, and began walking toward the street. L.G. saw Taylor's car exit a dead-end street that had unobstructed access to the rear of his house. When officers from the Rahway Police Department arrived, L.G. described the man who left the house with his television. He said that he suspected Taylor's involvement because he saw her car several times before and after the crime. He provided them with a description of her car.
While the Rahway officers were with L.G., they received notification that the Linden Police Department had detained two men who fit the suspect's description. Rahway Police transported L.G. to the location where the suspects were detained. L.G. identified Clarke as the person he saw leaving the front door of his house carrying his television. The other detainee was defendant, who L.G. recognized as Taylor's ex-boyfriend. Linden police officers also found a car matching the description of Taylor's. Following up on the call, Rahway police officers found the car and discovered that it was still warm to the touch.
Based on L.G.’s identification, the Rahway Police arrested Clarke, who provided a statement that same day inculpating defendant and Taylor.
Defendant and Taylor were indicted for third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 ; third-degree theft of property with value in excess of $500, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3 ; and third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2. The State tried them jointly before a jury.
At trial, Clarke testified that defendant participated in the burglary of L.G.’s house. According to Clarke, defendant called him on the morning of the burglary and then picked him up in defendant's car. Defendant and Clarke drove to Taylor's home where they found her waiting in her car; they then drove to L.G.’s house, while Taylor drove separately in her own car. Clarke explained that when they neared L.G.’s house, they saw two men standing on the porch. Once the two men left, defendant and Clarke walked to the rear of the house where defendant broke the back-door window to gain entry.
Clarke testified that, once inside, he took the television and defendant took the gaming system and laptop computer. Clarke exited through the front door. He saw L.G. returning home, dropped the television, and ran to defendant's car. They drove toward Taylor's home where they were stopped by police officers.
On cross-examination, the defense highlighted several discrepancies between the statement Clarke initially gave to the police on the day of his arrest and his in-court testimony about the burglary. The defense elicited from Clarke that he lied to the police about his age and whether he entered L.G.’s house and removed items from it. Clarke acknowledged that he lied to the police in his initial statement and agreed with defense counsel that there were "numerous inconsistencies" between his statement to the police and his testimony at trial, as well as "many instances where [he] did not tell the truth."
During defense counsel's cross-examination of Clarke, the following exchange occurred:
At sidebar, defense counsel argued that Clarke's knowledge of the sentencing range was necessary to show Clarke's state of mind, while the State responded that evidence of the sentencing range could unfairly apprise the jury of defendant's potential exposure to prison time, because Clarke faced the same charges as defendant. The trial court ruled as follows:
Defense counsel asked to let that question stand and for a curative instruction clarifying that the sentencing range Clarke faced was separate from the defendants’. The trial court rejected defense counsel's request and gave the following instruction to the jury:
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