State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 18 October 1905
• Citation: State v. Jackson, 128 Iowa 543, 105 N.W. 51 (Iowa 1905)
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. H. O. JACKSON, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

105 N.W. 51

128 Iowa 543

STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. H. O. JACKSON, Appellee

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 18, 1905

Appeal from Jasper District Court.--HON. W. G. CLEMENTS, Judge.

THE State appeals from a verdict of not guilty and a judgment dismissing an indictment against the defendant for the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses.

Affirmed.

Charles W. Mullan, Attorney General, Lawrence DeGraff, Assistant Attorney General, P. M. Cragar County Attorney, and W. A Spurrier, for the State.

Smyth & Smith, amici curioe.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The indictment charged defendant with having obtained from one Harrah, by certain false and fraudulent representations "about 180 head of cattle on credit," which were reasonably worth "about $ 15,000," and for which he agreed to pay "about $ 15,000." Although no attack was made upon this indictment in the court below, it is manifestly defective. It nowhere charges or alleges the ownership of the cattle, which is required in this State, as well as in many other jurisdictions. See cases cited in 8 Ency. Plead. & Prac., pages 877, 878.

Moreover the description of the cattle taken as "about 180 head," of the value of "about $ 15,000" is not in our opinion sufficiently certain. "Cattle" is a generic term, and may embrace a number of animals and different kinds of stock; and the qualifying word "about" leaves it distinctly uncertain as to the number of animals and the kind received by the defendant. The value and price of the animals is also uncertain. Redmond v. State, 35 Ohio St. 81. Again, the negation of the truth of the alleged representations was not in accord with established principles of criminal pleading. McClain's Crim. Law, section 702.

Had defendant been convicted, he could have raised these objections by motion in arrest of judgment, and the trial court would have been compelled to discharge him; so that in any event no prejudice resulted to the State from any erroneous rulings which may have been made by the trial court during the course of the trial. We might very well refuse to consider the case further; but, as the Attorney General has prosecuted the appeal in order that certain propositions of law may be considered and settled, we shall review such rulings as seem to be of importance.

II. There was a question regarding the good faith of the prosecutor in instituting and pressing these proceedings, and the trial court instructed as follows:

You are further instructed that it is improper to use the criminal laws of the State for the purpose of serving private ends; and in this connection you are advised that, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you are at liberty to consider whether the prosecution is conducted for the purpose of vindicating the criminal laws of the State, or for the collection of a debt claimed to be due from the defendant to the prosecuting witness, Albert Harrah.

The State vigorously contends that this instruction was and is erroneous; and with this contention we are constrained to agree. The offense, if there was one, was against the State, and not against any particular individual; and the guilt or innocence of one accused of crime is not to be determined from the motives or purposes of any of the witnesses for the State. Donohoo v. State, 59 Ark. 375 (27 S.W. 226); People v. Wieger, 100 Cal. 352 (34 P. 826); People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49 (11 N.W. 804); McClain's Crim. Law, section 659 et seq.

Of course, the motive of the prosecuting witness, or of any other witness for that matter, may be shown for the purpose of testing his credibility, etc.; but the guilt or innocence of one accused of crime does not depend primarily upon the motive of the prosecutor. It frequently happens that the prosecutor is not acting from the purest of motives. He may be smarting from the wrong done him, and have little thought of vindicating the majesty of the law. But this is not reason in itself for saying that the accused is innocent of the charge made against him. So that, even though the prosecutor in this case may have instituted the proceedings for the purpose of collecting a debt, the defendant may nevertheless have been guilty of the offense charged against him; and he should not be allowed to shield himself behind any unworthy motives entertained by the prosecuting witness. It goes without saying that everything tending to show the interest, motive, and purpose of the prosecutor may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility as a witness and testing the truth of his testimony; but the ultimate question of guilt or innocence should not be made to depend upon whether or not the prosecution was instituted for the purpose of collecting a debt. Except as stated, the motive of the prosecutor is immaterial. McQuade v. Collins, 93 Iowa 22, 61 N.W. 213; State v. Donovan, 61 Iowa 278, 16 N.W. 130. In the case last cited it is said: "If defendant committed the crime of which he was charged, it was the duty of the jury to convict him, without regard to the motives which led to his prosecution."

The trial court was undoubtedly led into giving the instruction complained of because of some language found in State v Rivers, 58 Iowa 102, 12 N.W. 117, and it must be confessed that there is warrant for such a charge in that opinion. However, what was said in that case had reference primarily to the admissibility of certain testimony tending to show the motives of the prosecutor. As said in that opinion, such cases as this "should be sifted to the bottom," and nothing which tends to show that the prosecutor was using the criminal law to enforce the collection of a debt should be kept from the consideration of the jury. But this is quite a different proposition from the broad statement that the motive of the prosecutor is alone sufficient to justify an acquittal, or that it has a direct bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. In so far as the case is an authority for the proposition that such fact should be considered as bearing directly upon the guilt or innocence of the accused -- that is to say, that it alone may be considered sufficient to justify an acquittal -- it is overruled. What we now hold is that such matters are admissible in evidence, and proper to be...