State v. Jackson, 57973

Decision Date21 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 57973,57973
Citation238 Kan. 793,714 P.2d 1368
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Joel D. JACKSON, Appellant.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Evidence of a defendant's diminished capacity to commit a crime is admissible to negate specific intent but not to remove criminal responsibility.

2. When the defense of insanity is relied upon, the jury must consider the insanity issue prior to considering evidence of diminished capacity. If the jury finds the defendant sane, it can then consider evidence of diminished capacity as a defense to a crime requiring proof of a specific intent.

3. When the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is raised, the standard of review on appeal is whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, convinces the appellate court that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

4. In order to remove the issue of insanity from a jury's consideration on the basis of the evidence, reasonable persons must necessarily possess a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity and must conclude that the government has failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the capacity to commit the crime.

5. Although expert medical testimony is unanimous that an accused was legally insane at the time of the act, such testimony is not conclusive simply because it is not disputed by other medical testimony. In addition to expert testimony, the jury can consider the testimony of non-expert witnesses who observed the accused's actions before, during and after the crime.

Daniel E. Monnat, of Fisher & Monnat, Wichita, argued the cause and Stanley Spurrier, III, and Orval L. Fisher, were with him on brief for appellant.

Geary N. Gorup, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Clark V. Owens, Dist. Atty., were with him on brief for appellee.

HERD, Justice:

This is a criminal action. Joel D. Jackson was convicted by a jury of attempted first-degree murder (K.S.A.1984 Supp. 21-3301 and K.S.A. 21-3401) and aggravated kidnapping (K.S.A. 21-3421).

Joel Jackson rented stalls at Sunflower Farms where he boarded horses owned by himself and his mother. The victim, Denise Picard, was employed as a horse trainer at Sunflower Farms. Her duties included feeding, grooming and training the owners' horses and cleaning stalls. At the time of the incident, Denise lived in a one-room apartment built inside the barn.

Prior to the incident which resulted in appellant's conviction, a number of antagonistic exchanges had taken place between him and the victim which resulted in the victim's being afraid of him.

Jackson continually criticized Denise's work, telling her she wasn't doing things properly and that if she couldn't handle the job, she should quit. Denise's fear of appellant and his harassment drove her to tears on many occasions. Frequently Jackson would ask Denise's supervisor, Fred Oden, to fire Denise and to hire him. He was told by Mr. Oden that Denise was progressing fine in her work and he was not ready to hire anyone else. By early April of 1984, appellant's dislike for Denise had taken on a more menacing tone, when he told Mr. Oden, "Denise better not never mess with me because if she do, I'll cut her up." Mr. Oden told appellant that if he was going to talk like that, he should load up his horses and leave.

On the morning of April 20, 1984, Joel Jackson drove to Sunflower Farms, where Denise was helping the owners of a sick horse. Jackson told Denise his mother was bringing two more horses out that day and he was going to bring out a stud as well. Denise told him he would have to wait until the following Monday because there was no additional room in the stables. She also explained she couldn't put a stud with the other horses or the horses would fight. They argued over this matter for a few minutes until appellant finally gave up and walked away.

Jackson's story differed from that of Denise. He testified that after arriving at Sunflower Farms, he began checking horses in various stalls. He claimed Mr. Oden had asked him to keep an eye on things while he was away. Mr. Oden and the owners of Sunflower Farms were at a horse show in St. Louis at the time of the incident. He further testified Denise asked him to look at a sick horse and after a conversation about the horse, some new boarders arrived at the barn. He said he left shortly thereafter, and he and Denise did not argue that morning.

After leaving Sunflower Farms, Jackson went to work at the China Inn restaurant in Wichita. While he was cutting vegetables at work that morning, he asked his boss, Bill Mar, to sharpen a knife. The knife had a plastic handle and a six-inch blade. Mr. Mar noticed the following day that a knife similar to the one that he had sharpened for Jackson the morning before was now missing. A knife of the same type was used in the attack on Denise.

After working through the noon hour, appellant received permission from Mr. Mar to leave. He was scheduled to return to work at 5:00 that evening. Before he left the China Inn, Mr. Mar asked him to pick up some supplies for the restaurant and gave him $150 with which to purchase them. Appellant picked up the supplies and then drove back out to Sunflower Farms.

According to Denise, Joel Jackson returned to Sunflower Farms at about 2:40 p.m. that afternoon. Denise was there alone at the time. She was hand-spreading straw in the stalls when she saw appellant's car back up to the west entrance of the barn. After about five minutes, appellant came into the barn and began looking into the stalls. Denise asked him if he was still waiting for his mother to bring out the horses, but he did not respond. Denise then started for the hallway leading to the west exit from the barn. Appellant followed her.

When she reached the pop machine in the hallway, appellant reached out and grabbed her hair with his left hand. He pulled a plastic-handled knife with a five- or six-inch blade from inside his coat, and cut the right side of her throat. Denise fell to her knees while Jackson continued to stab her throat and the right side of her head. She attempted to block the knife with her hands, resulting in numerous cuts to her hands. Appellant then began to pull and drag Denise towards the west exit. When they were within two feet from the door, he threw the knife back inside the barn, reached in his right-hand pocket and got out his car keys, all the while still holding on to Denise's hair. Upon reaching the doorway, he opened the trunk of his car and attempted to push Denise into the trunk. Her resistance was strong however, and he was able to get only her right hand and her head into the trunk.

Appellant then pulled Denise back inside the barn, pushed her down, took off his coat and threw it in the middle of the hallway. He retrieved the knife and began stabbing her again, five or six times. Denise was able to break away from her assailant momentarily, but he got hold of her again and pleaded with her to get into the trunk of his car.

After again unsuccessfully attempting to get Denise into the trunk, he slammed the trunk lid on her head three or four times. By grabbing his leg, Denise was able to get entirely out of the trunk so that it slammed shut. She then grabbed the keys from the trunk and threw them. Appellant released her to retrieve his keys and she was thus able to run across the porch and down the road. She ran behind a wire fence for protection until his car went by her. She then ran back to the barn and drove to the closest business for help.

Jackson's version of these events is essentially that Denise made sexual overtures to him which he spurned, prompting Denise to hit him in the back with a pitch fork. He then claims he "blacked out" and the next thing he remembers is he was standing next to Denise at the pop machine and observed that she was bleeding. He claims she then started yelling and screaming and ran out the front door of the barn. He says he followed her a short distance but could not catch her so he got into his car and left "very fast."

Jackson drove to his mother's home in El Dorado and, upon arriving there, told his mother he had been in a "terrible fight." He then called a friend in California, who advised him to contact an attorney. He called attorney Jim Hargrove, and with his attorney's help, surrendered himself at the Butler County sheriff's department that evening.

Jackson was charged with aggravated kidnapping, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated battery. The aggravated battery charge was later dismissed upon motion of the State.

At trial, Jackson presented an insanity defense. The jury found him guilty of aggravated kidnapping and attempted first-degree murder. After reviewing a report of appellant's examination and evaluation at Larned State Security Hospital, the trial judge sentenced him to fifteen years to life for attempted first-degree murder and to life imprisonment on the charge of aggravated kidnapping, with sentences to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

The appellant first claims error in the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction on the defense of diminished capacity. The appellant argues the doctrine of diminished capacity is recognized and applied in Kansas despite statements to the contrary in a number of opinions by this court.

Appellant's argument centers on our holding in State v. Dargatz, 228 Kan. 322, 614 P.2d 430 (1980). In Dargatz, we specifically rejected the doctrine of diminished capacity. However, we also stated:

"Although a mental illness or defect not amounting to legal insanity is not a defense, since, for purposes of the capacity to commit crime, degrees of mental abnormality are not recognized, where the crime charged requires a specific intent, evidence of a mental defect which negates...

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  • State v. Orr
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • May 30, 1997
    ...diminished capacity to commit a crime is admissible to negate specific intent but not to remove criminal responsibility. State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, Syl. p 1, 714 P.2d 1368, cert. denied 479 U.S. 821, 107 S.Ct. 88, 93 L.Ed.2d 40 The following testimony was offered at trial regarding the......
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    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2006
    ...that under Kansas law a victim's ability to escape does not mean that the act of kidnapping did not occur. In State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, 800, 714 P.2d 1368 (1986), the defendant argued that the evidence of aggravated kidnapping showed only an attempt because he lacked sufficient contro......
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    • January 19, 1990
    ...instruction on diminished capacity after the same was requested by defense counsel. Defendant contends this was error. In State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, 714 P.2d 1368, cert. denied 479 U.S. 821, 107 S.Ct. 88, 93 L.Ed.2d 40 (1986), we discussed the doctrine of diminished capacity in some "E......
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    • October 30, 1987
    ...second-degree murder. Counsel for defendant then introduced Dr. Brodsky's report into the record as a proffer. In State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, 714 P.2d 1368 (1986), we "The admission of such evidence for the limited purpose of a partial defense against the specific intent of the crime is......
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