State v. Jackson, 98-919.

Decision Date09 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-919.,98-919.
Citation601 N.W.2d 354
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Robert L. JACKSON, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia A. Johnston, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence H. Schultz, County Attorney, and Bruce A. Ingham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, TERNUS, CADY, and HARRIS,1 JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

Defendant Robert Jackson was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the offense of attempted burglary in the third degree, an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code §§ 713.2, 713.6B (1997). He was given an indeterminate two-year prison sentence and required to make restitution. On this appeal he contends that certain portions of the restitution required are contrary to law. He also argues that in ordering restitution the district court failed to exercise its discretion not to order restitution for room and board costs in the county jail and failed to consider defendant's ability to pay the amount of restitution ordered. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. The Illegal Sentence Issue.

In addition to defendant's prison sentence, the district court ordered him to pay restitution for pecuniary damages, court costs, court-appointed attorney fees, and for room and board jail expenses at the rate of $10 per day. Defendant asserts that he may not be required to pay for jail expenses incurred during the period of time before his plea of guilty. He bases this argument on language contained in Iowa Code section 356.7(1) (1997), which provides, in part:

The county sheriff may charge a prisoner who is eighteen years of age or older and who has been convicted of a criminal offense or sentenced for contempt of court for violation of a domestic abuse order for the room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff.

Defendant contends that the language "who has been convicted of a criminal offense" limits the recoupment of room and board costs from jail prisoners to the period of time they spent in jail following conviction. We disagree.

Certain rules offer guidance in determining the meaning of a statute. If the terms of the statute are explicit, the plain meaning of the language will be applied. Woodbury County v. City of Sioux City, 475 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa 1991); State v. Perry, 440 N.W.2d 389, 391 (Iowa 1989). We are convinced that the language "who has been convicted of a criminal offense" describes who may be charged rather than the services for which charges may be made. The expenses that may be recouped are identified by the language "room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff." This language denotes all room and board while in such custody.

If any ambiguity exists concerning the meaning of section 356.7(1), and we believe that it does not, the same interpretation is demanded by our obligation to reach a reasonable interpretation that effectuates rather than defeats the purpose of the legislation. State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Iowa 1998); Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1985). It is the purpose of this legislation to assist the county in recovering the costs incurred for housing and feeding prisoners during jail stays. No reason appears to distinguish between time spent in jail before conviction and time spent in jail following conviction in achieving that goal. If the interpretation proposed by defendant was adopted, only a small portion of these costs could be recouped, thereby curtailing the apparent purpose that the statute seeks to accomplish. The district court did not act beyond its authority in requiring restitution based on charges certified by the sheriff for the entire period of defendant's stay in the county jail.

II. Whether the Sentencing Judge Failed to Exercise Discretion in Requiring Restitution of Room and Board Costs at the Jail.

During the sentencing hearing the sentencing judge expressed the view that he was required by law to order restitution for defendant's room and board at the jail. Defendant contends that this was an incorrect statement of the law because the imposition of restitution for room and board expenses for a defendant's stay in jail is discretionary. As support for this contention, he relies on the language of section 356.7(1) that provides: "The county sheriff may charge a prisoner ... for the room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff." (Emphasis added.)

The defendant is correct in contending that, if a court has discretion, a defendant is entitled to have it exercised. State v. Harrison, 351 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Iowa 1984). We believe, however, that defendant's effort to establish discretion by the use of the word "may" in section 356.7(1) confuses the...

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24 cases
  • State v. Richardson, 14-1174
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • February 17, 2017
    ...... State v. Jackson , 601 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Iowa 1999). On a related note, we are also not addressing the possibility that a juvenile homicide offender could show a ......
  • State v. Shears
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • November 30, 2018
    ...Iowa Code § 910.2(1). The imposition of restitution in a criminal matter is thus a mandatory requirement of Iowa law. State v. Jackson , 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999) ; Watts , 587 N.W.2d at 751. Determining the amount of restitution, however, is in the sound discretion of the court. See ......
  • Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • May 10, 2000
    ...impediment to the statutes' application. See, e.g., Ford v. Arizona, 979 P.2d 10, 11, 13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Iowa v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356-57 (Iowa 1999); State Treasurer v. Gardner , 583 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Mich. 1998); cf. Auge v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, 743 A.2d 315, No. ......
  • St. Paul Reinsurance v. Commercial Fin., C00-4080 MWB.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 8th Circuit. Northern District of Iowa
    • May 4, 2001
    ...the plain meaning of the language will be applied." Teggatz v. Ringleb, 610 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999)); see also Drahaus v. State, 584 N.W.2d 270, 274 (Iowa 1998) (when text of statute is plain and its meaning clear, court will not......
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