State v. Jackson, No. 98

• Docket Nº: No. 98
• Citation: 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666
• Case Date: January 27, 1981
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

Page 666

273 S.E.2d 666 302 N.C. 101 STATE of North Carolina
v.
James Lewis JACKSON. No. 98. Supreme Court of North Carolina. Jan. 27, 1981.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen., by Barry S. McNeill, Associate Atty. Gen., for the State.

Barry T. Winston, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

HUSKINS, Justice:

Defendant first assigns error to the finding by the trial court that defendant had sufficient capacity to stand trial. The amended record shows that a psychiatrist offered by the State, Dr. James F. Groce, found no evidence of psychosis. Defendant's psychiatrist, Dr. Milton F. Gipstein, testified at a hearing on defendant's motion prior to trial that he found defendant clearly psychotic.

Defendant had been ordered evaluated at Dorothea Dix Hospital by Judge Paschal on 13 December 1979. The staff of that hospital reported him competent to stand trial on 19 December 1979. On hearing the evidence of both the State and defendant, Judge Brewer entered an order on 13 February 1980 finding defendant competent to stand trial. That same day, Judge Brewer also ordered defendant reevaluated apparently in light of Dr. Gipstein's[302 N.C. 104] testimony that defendant did have mental problems. The staff of Dorothea Dix again found defendant competent on 7 March 1980.

In his order of 13 February 1980 finding defendant competent, Judge Brewer adopted in toto neither the report of the State's psychiatrist that defendant was fully competent nor the finding of defendant's psychiatrist that defendant was psychotic. Rather, Judge Brewer found defendant manifested some symptoms of mental illness but nonetheless had sufficient capacity to proceed to trial.

Defendant argues that because the court did not adopt the report by the State, any finding that defendant suffered some sort of mental disease was unsupported by the evidence. In effect, defendant argues that the trial court in this instance was required to adopt the psychiatric report of either the State or the defense but could not arrive at an independent conclusion. Such is not the law.

The test for capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his counsel so that any available defense may be interposed. State v. Bundridge, 294 N.C. 45, 239 S.E.2d 811 (1978). The issue may be resolved by the trial court with or without the aid of a jury. State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977). When the trial judge conducts the inquiry without a jury, the court's findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal. State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E.2d 305 (1975).

Here, the evidence offered by the State indicated defendant was fully capable of standing trial. Testimony for the defense by Dr. Gipstein was to the effect that in stressful situations the defendant manifested some symptoms of mental illness. But Dr. Gipstein also stated that in his opinion Jackson understood the nature of the proceedings against him. Based on the psychiatric evidence before the court, the finding of the trial judge that defendant was competent was clearly supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal. State v. Cooper, supra.

As a second assignment, defendant asserts error in the trial court's denial of his motions to suppress various items of evidence. We will consider the two challenged rulings separately.

[302 N.C. 105] Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress various items of evidence seized

Page 670

from his person following his arrest. Defendant contends he was unlawfully detained prior to his arrest, and, therefore, items seized incident to his arrest should have been suppressed.

The factual basis for defendant's allegation that he was unlawfully detained is found, according to defendant, in his being stopped by a Carrboro policeman who did not have probable cause to detain him. Rather, that officer responded to a request from the officer with whom the prosecutrix was riding that the defendant be detained.

Detention on "investigative custody" without probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is restricted by the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Nevertheless, decisions both state and federal have recognized the need and the right of a police officer in the performance of his duties, and in limited circumstances, to detain a person who is not subject to lawful arrest. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3210, 49 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1976). The constitutional question here, simply put, is whether the detention of this defendant was reasonable. We hold that it was.

First, we note that the detention was reasonable as to time. It occurred in the middle of the day after defendant was spotted walking along the road. It was also reasonable as to manner. The officer who stopped the defendant simply asked him to wait until the investigating officer arrived, a period of a few minutes. This the defendant willingly did. As the Supreme Court stated in Adams v. Williams, supra, 407 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d at 616-17:

The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response.

[302 N.C. 106] This assignment is overruled.

Defendant also filed a motion to suppress a knife found among his belongings, on the grounds that it was found during an illegal search. Apparently, after the arrest, a police officer and friend of defendant's family went to defendant's home to secure a change of clothing for defendant. The officer told defendant's mother of the arrest and the reason for the visit. The mother invited the officer into the kitchen, where defendant's clothing was in two bags. Defendant's mother opened one of the bags and a knife fell out. Upon request, the mother gave the knife to the officer.

Defendant's primary argument is that his mother, by going through defendant's things, was an agent of the State and engaged in a warrantless search. See 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures § 14. But the factual record shows defendant's mother was not asked to search her son's clothes, nor did the police officer intend to conduct a warrantless search. The sole purpose of the officer's visit was to secure a change of clothing for defendant. The officer was invited into the room where the bags were by the person in control of the house, the mother. There, when the knife fell into view, the officer had the right to take it under the "plain view" doctrine. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968); State v. Hunter, 299 N.C. 29, 261 S.E.2d 189 (1980).

Defendant next asks this Court to abandon its adherence to the test of insanity established by the M'Naghten rule in favor of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code standard. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft, § 4.01 (1962). Suffice it to say that we have adhered to the "right and wrong" M'Naghten test for many years and are not disposed to depart from it now.

Page 671

See State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 441 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2046, 60 L.Ed.2d 657 (1979), and cases cited therein.

As his fourth assignment, defendant alleges error by the...