State v. Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana
• Writing for the Court: Drew
• Citation: State v. Jackson, 857 So.2d 39 (La. App. 2003)
• Decision Date: 20 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 37,244-KA.,37,244-KA.
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee, v. ROBERT JACKSON III Appellant.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee, v. ROBERT JACKSON III Appellant.

No. 37,244-KA.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

August 20, 2003.

Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana, Trial Court No. 200,991.

Honorable Leon Lewis Emanuel III, Judge.

ROBERT JACKSON III, Pro Se.

PAUL JOSEPH CARMOUCHE, District Attorney, Counsel for Appellee.

J. THOMAS BUTLER, JASON W. WALTMAN, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, PEATROSS, and DREW, JJ.

DREW, J.:

At a trial before a judge alone, jury trial being waived, Robert Jackson, III, was:

• convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm;

• adjudicated an habitual offender, in absentia;

• sentenced to serve 17 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence;

• convicted of contempt of court; and

• sentenced to serve four months for contempt.

He now appeals from all of the above. We affirm his conviction of illegal use of a weapon, reverse the contempt conviction and sentence, vacate the rest, and remand.

FACTS

The facts regarding the offense are simple. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 10, 1999, Jack George was in his home on 76^th Street in Shreveport. Also present were his adult daughter, Natalie George, and her infant son. Robert Jackson, III, defendant herein, is the father of the child.¹ Mr. George heard some gunshots in the front of the house. He armed himself with a heavy beer mug and rushed to the front of his house. There, he found defendant coming through the front door, armed with a 12-gauge pump shotgun. The lock had been shot off of the door. George responded by throwing the beer mug at the defendant, ducking behind a wall.

At approximately the same time, the defendant shot at George. George then fought with the defendant. The defendant hollered at George that the reason he had shot his way into the home was that his daughter had done him wrong by being out with someone else. George took the shotgun away from him. At some time during the struggle, George was hit in the right arm with one shotgun pellet, the injury being minor.

As the unarmed defendant fled the house, he was spotted by George's wife, who gave chase in her vehicle while shooting at him as she tried to run him down with her car.

When the defendant was arrested several days later, he was Mirandized at the police station. While being booked, he volunteered a statement that Natalie George had told him that for them to be together, he would have to kill her father. The defendant further volunteered that if his fingerprints were on the gun, it was because he had handled the gun earlier that day when a friend had given it to him. Lastly, the defendant had stated "that he knew the law, he could get out of any charge and he'll make them think he's crazy."

The procedural history is much more complicated. The defendant was initially charged by bill of information with the crime of Illegal Use of a Weapon, La. R.S. 14:94(F), while committing aggravated battery, a crime of violence.² The defendant retained counsel and pled not guilty. His retained counsel filed motions for preliminary examination and for discovery, which were promptly heard and satisfied.

Shortly after arraignment, the defendant began filing an avalanche of pro se motions. Many were duplicates of earlier motions. Repeatedly throughout this pre-trial process, the defendant would ask for new counsel, then ask to represent himself, and then change his mind again. For many months and many hearings, the trial court maintained its composure, diligently and patiently addressing all of the defendant's motions while repeatedly advising the defendant of the dangers of representing himself.

One repeatedly-filed motion requested the court to appoint a private investigator as well as fund other experts. The trial court found that the defendant failed to provide a factual basis for the requested state funding. The trial court repeatedly inquired as to how much time the defendant was going to the jail law library. The defendant repeatedly asked for additional time, which requests were denied by the trial court.

The hearing on the defendant's motions to suppress his statements to the police took up several days of testimony. The trial court granted the motion to suppress as to all statements made by the defendant to the police prior to his being advised of his Miranda rights at the police station. As to statements made after he was advised of his Miranda rights at the police station, the motion to suppress was denied.

After the ruling on the motions to suppress, the defendant continued to file numerous other pro se motions, again copying earlier motions. The trial court continued to diligently address the numerous pending issues, all the while advising that the court would appoint him a lawyer. In fact, on several occasions, defendant was appointed counsel, only to quickly ask that his counsel be discharged.

The bench trial began on January 22, 2002, with the defendant representing himself, accompanied by appointed standby counsel. Before the trial actually commenced, the trial court considered and denied new motions for continuances, alleging, among other things, that the defendant was unable to try the case because of a spider bite. The trial court questioned the jailer about the alleged jailhouse injury and denied the motion, leaving the record open for the defendant to obtain other evidence regarding his medical condition.

Jack George and his wife testified about the altercation, with the defendant raising innumerable objections. The trial court, a model of restraint, considered each and carefully ruled, granting some and denying some. The defendant was prepared and showed a working knowledge of trial procedure.

After the state rested, the defendant filed a pro se motion for acquittal, arguing that the state failed to show the weapon was discharged while committing an aggravated battery. This motion was denied. A motion for mistrial was denied.

The defendant's first witness was James Snider, a fellow inmate at the Caddo Parish Jail. The defendant tendered his fellow prisoner as a firearms expert, based on his life experiences using firearms.³ Over the state's objection, the trial court allowed Snider to testify as an expert. Snider examined the shotgun, ammo, and the photographs of the crime scene, and he opined that the distance of the shotgun from the point of impact was only three to four feet, not 20 feet, based on the tightness of the pattern of the pellets. Snider also testified that it was unlikely that a person would have been hit by a single pellet from three to four feet, because the tightness of the pattern would have "cut them in half." Snider opined that at 20 feet, the pellets would have spread to the point of covering the entire wall, making being hit by a single pellet a freak accident.

The defendant's next witness was Rose Hanna, who testified about Diane George calling her immediately after the shooting, and not telling her that Jack George had been shot. When the state objected to this testimony as hearsay, the defendant successfully argued that the statements were excited utterances and not hearsay since George had previously testified and was still subject to cross-examination. Hanna then testified that she had purchased from Wal-Mart some 12-gauge shotgun shells containing #4- and #7½-size shot, cut them open, and counted the number of shot in each. The #4 shotgun shell contained 168 pellets, and the #7½ contained 425 pellets. For whatever this proved, the counted pellets were introduced into evidence, and the defendant rested.

The defendant filed 50 proposed jury instructions, to which the state objected to 16. After argument, the trial court denied 12 of the remaining proposed instructions, and accepted instruction number three. The defendant waived the remaining three proposed charges.

The trial court found the defendant guilty as charged.

The state filed an habitual offender bill of information, alleging the defendant to be a second felony offender, to which the defendant pled not guilty, unleashing a flood of post-trial motions.

The habitual offender hearing was scheduled for May 29, 2002. At the beginning of the hearing, the defendant was present, with standby counsel, The Kurt Goins. The trial court denied all of the defendant's motions. defendant also requested subpoenas for witnesses regarding the spider bite and medical treatment. He called Deputy Denzel Shivers to the stand, a corrections officer with the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Department. No relief was granted.

During argument on the pro se post-trial motions, the defendant alleged misinformation about his charges tainted his waiver of counsel. The surprised trial court recounted the numerous warnings from the bench about the dangers of self-representation, to which the defendant turned a deaf ear. The trial court then warned that if he made any more statements, he would be removed from the courtroom. When the defendant kept noting his objections for the record, the trial court, finally pushed to complete exasperation, appointed standby counsel as the defendant's attorney, then committed reversible error by ordering the defendant from the courtroom.

After a recess, the multiple bill hearing was begun, without the defendant present, yet with defense counsel announcing that he was ready to proceed. The state established that the defendant's fingerprints were on the bills of information for the prior conviction, as well as the present conviction. The trial court found the defendant to be a second felony offender.

Following the adjudication, the defendant filed further pro se motions complaining about the trial court denying him the right to represent himself, or in the alternative, not appointing effective counsel.

The defendant was sentenced on June 19, 2002, to 17 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation,...