State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 16 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2019-KA-0255,2019-KA-0255 |
| Citation | 280 So.3d 1225 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Wayne JACKSON |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Perry M. Nicosia, District Attorney, Josephine P. Heller, Assistant District Attorney, DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE ST. BERNARD PARISH, 1101 W. Saint Bernard Hwy., Chalmette, LA 70043, COUNSEL FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA/APPELLEE
Bruce G. Whittaker, LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT, 1215 Prytania Street, Suite 332, New Orleans, LA 70130, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods, Judge Dale N. Atkins )
The defendant, Wayne Jackson, challenges his conviction and sentence. For the reasons that follow, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
On December 5, 2014, Nathanial Hebert and his wife, Heather, were living in an apartment on Lyndell Drive in Chalmette, Louisiana. They were getting ready to go out when they heard a lot of noise from the upstairs neighbors. He called the police because the noise was very loud. Mr. Hebert walked out of his apartment and saw his neighbors' children standing outside. The children said that their father had hurt their mother. Mr. Hebert went to the apartment and saw the victim in the living room. Mr. Hebert called 911 for help. He stated that the victim was bleeding from her neck, face and arms and she was gasping for breath.
Deputy Joshua English responded to a domestic call involving a potential stabbing on December 5, 2014. When the officer arrived on the scene, he observed a woman in the living room who appeared to have been stabbed multiple times. When Deputy English entered the kitchen, he saw a man, later identified as the defendant, who also appeared to have been stabbed. Khalil Sudlow, the victim's son, identified the defendant as the person who stabbed his mother several times after an argument.
On January 20, 2015, the defendant, Wayne Jackson, was charged by bill of information with the attempted second degree murder of Ameisha Jackson. The defendant pled not guilty at his arraignment. Subsequent to his not guilty plea, counsel for the defendant made an oral motion for a sanity commission, which the trial court granted. After a sanity commission hearing on August 13, 2015, the defendant was found competent to proceed. On October 20, 2015, the defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty to the offense. Then, on April 19, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court granted the motion on the same date. In October of 2017, the defendant filed a motion to change his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court granted the motion and ordered a sanity commission. Approximately seven months later, the defendant and the State of Louisiana received the experts' reports on the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense.
After a three-day jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The defendant subsequently filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. After a hearing on October 16, 2018, the trial court denied the motions. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve thirty-five years at hard labor, with credit for time served. The defendant orally filed a motion for appeal, which was granted by the trial court.
A review of the record for errors patent reveals that the trial court failed to state that the defendant's sentence was to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14: 30.1. and La. R.S. 14:27 require that a person convicted of attempted second degree murder serve the sentence imposed without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The trial court failed to impose these restrictions at the sentencing hearing held on December 18, 2018. These restrictions are automatically contained in the sentence whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) ; State v. Dominick , 2013-0121, p. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/13), 129 So.3d 782, 787. Accordingly, those errors patent are self-correcting. See State v. Klein , 2018-0022, p.12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/22/18), 252 So.3d 973, 981.
On appeal, the defendant challenges his conviction on the grounds that the State failed to prove the necessary elements for attempted second degree murder. More specifically, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove he had the intent to kill the victim. Therefore, he maintains that the evidence was only sufficient to support a verdict of attempted manslaughter. Alternatively, if his conviction is affirmed, he claims his sentence of thirty-five years is excessive.
The defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence focuses on the State's failure to prove the intent to kill, which is required for attempted second degree murder. He argues that because the State did not prove the element of intent, the jury should have returned a verdict of attempted manslaughter.
It is well settled that Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), is the standard under which this court evaluates whether evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction. Reviewing the record under Jackson requires an appellate court to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Watkins , 2013-1248, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/6/14), 146 So. 3d 294, 303.
To obtain a conviction for attempted second degree murder the State must prove the defendant: (1) intended to kill the victim; and (2) committed an overt act tending toward the accomplishment of the victim's death. State ex rel. G.B. , 2007-1577, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/08), 985 So.2d 828, 830 ; State v. Bishop , 2001-2548, p. 4 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437. A conviction for attempted second degree murder requires proof that the offender "had the specific intent to kill and committed an act tending toward the accomplishment of that goal."
State v. Sullivan , 97-1037, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/24/99), 729 So.2d 1101, 1111. "Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). "Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant." State v. Caliste , 2012-0533, p.9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/4/13), 125 So.3d 8, 14 ; Bishop, supra .
In contrast, manslaughter is defined, in pertinent part, by La. R.S. 14:31 as "[a] homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection." The Supreme Court has explained the relationship between the two separate offenses of homicide and manslaughter as follows:
It is the presence of "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" that distinguishes manslaughter from murder. This court has repeatedly stated, however, that "sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter. Rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense which exhibit a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed in the absence of these factors. Because they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" is entitled to a verdict of manslaughter.
State v. Snyder , 98-1078, p. 4 (La. 4/14/99), 750 So.2d 832, 837-838 (internal citations omitted).
"Heat of blood" or "sudden passion" is defined in the jurisprudence as provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. State v. Miller , 98-642, p. 10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 829, 834. However, such provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled or that an average person's blood would have cooled at the time the offense was committed. State v. Collor , 99-0175, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/26/00), 762 So.2d 96, 102. When reviewing the argument that evidence was produced that the offender committed the crime in sudden passion or heat of blood, the Jackson standard of review must be employed to determine whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found that the mitigating factors were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Snyder , 98-1078, pp. 4-5, 750 So.2d at 838. However, defendant need not affirmatively establish the factors; the jury is free to infer the mitigating circumstances from the evidence. State v. Robinson , 2001-1305, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/17/02), 820 So.2d 571, 579 ; State v. Lindsey , 98-1064, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/98), 715 So.2d 544, 547.
In a recent case, State v. Bias , 2018-268 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/19), 265 So.3d 821, the defendant's conviction for attempted second degree murder was affirmed. The facts in Bias , were that the victim and Ladray Bias, Jr., had a dating relationship until June 2016. Mr. Bias sought to re-establish the relationship calling the victim numerous times, but the victim refused to speak with him. On the night of July 29, 2016, the victim was at a friend's house for dinner. Mr. Bias came to the house on three separate occasions. On each visit to the house, Mr. Bias showed increasingly aggressive behavior toward the victim, and the police were called after each incident. On the second visit to the house, Mr. Bias was physically abusive hitting the victim several times in the face, and...
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