State v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 26 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-36400,A-1-CA-36400
• Citation: 468 P.3d 901
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

468 P.3d 901

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Joshua JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-36400

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: FEBRUARY 26, 2020

Certiorari Denied, June 9, 2020, No. S-1-SC-38203

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} Defendant Joshua Jackson appeals his convictions for kidnapping with intent to commit a sexual offense, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-4-1(A) (2003) ; two counts of criminal sexual penetration in the second degree (in the commission of a felony) (CSP II), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-11(E)(5) (2009), two counts of felony aggravated battery against a household member, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-3-16(C) (2008, amended 2018),¹ criminal sexual contact (CSC) with a deadly weapon, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-12(C) (1993), and misdemeanor aggravated battery against a household member, contrary to Section 30-3-16(B). Defendant argues that his convictions should be vacated because the State failed to join the instant case with a previous case, in violation of our compulsory joinder rule. Defendant also challenges his convictions on the basis of double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel, and sufficiency of the evidence. We hold that Defendant waived his compulsory joinder claim by failing to raise the issue before his second trial. We further hold that (1) Defendant's convictions did not violate double jeopardy, (2) Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) Defendant failed to develop his sufficiency argument. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant was charged in two separate cases based on events that occurred between Defendant and his former girlfriend (Victim) on April 4, 2015 and April 10, 2015. The first case, State v. Jackson , Ninth Judicial District Court Case No. D-905-CR-2015-00136 (Jackson I ), was filed on May 4, 2015, and charged Defendant with kidnapping with intent to inflict physical injury and battery against a household member based upon the April 10, 2015 events. The second case, State v. Jackson , Ninth Judicial District Court Case No. D-905-CR-2015-00135 (Jackson II ), was also filed on May 4, 2015—one minute before Jackson I —and charged Defendant with the crimes he now appeals based on the April 4, 2015 events. Defendant was arraigned in both cases at the same time on May 8, 2015. Following a jury trial in February 2016, Defendant was convicted of both crimes as charged in Jackson I . One year later, Defendant was found guilty of all crimes as charged in Jackson II . We provide the following outline of Victim's testimony given at Defendant's trials, reserving discussion of additional facts and testimony as necessary for our analysis.

Testimony from Jackson I

{3} Victim testified that she was in a relationship with Defendant in April 2015, who was living at her house "off and on." On the afternoon of April 10, 2015, Defendant called Victim and requested to come over to Victim's house to collect some of his belongings. When Defendant arrived, Defendant and Victim began arguing. At some point during the argument, Defendant punched Victim in the ribs. Defendant then went into the other room to collect his belongings, at which point Victim "took off running" out the front door because she was afraid Defendant would continue to hit her. Defendant ran after Victim and caught up with her in an alleyway, and Victim fell to the ground. Defendant pulled Victim's hair and dragged her back to the house by her arm.

{4} Once back in the house, Defendant locked the door, stood in front of it, and told Victim, "Stop being stupid. Don't run out there. I'm not going to hit you." When Victim agreed to stay, Defendant went into the other room to collect his belongings. At that point, Victim again "took off running" out the front door, screaming for help. Defendant again caught up with Victim, grabbed her, and began carrying her back to her house. Victim grabbed a nearby telephone pole in an attempt to stop Defendant from taking her back into the house. Defendant then bit Victim, prompting her to let go, and carried her back to the house. Sometime later, when Defendant was in another room, Victim ran out the front door for a third time, successfully escaping and alerting the authorities.

Testimony from Jackson II

{5} Victim testified that on April 4, Victim and Defendant began arguing at a friend's house because Defendant wanted to smoke methamphetamine, whereas Victim did not. The argument continued as Victim and Defendant returned to Victim's house, where things escalated. Defendant punched Victim in the face, prompting Victim to scream and run toward the front door. Defendant chased after Victim, locked the front door, and told the Victim "to go sit down." Even though Victim did not want to, she sat down. Defendant again struck Victim and told her to go into the bathroom. When Victim did not obey, Defendant dragged Victim by her hair into the bathroom.

{6} Once in the bathroom, Defendant "put all his weight" on Victim, pulled her pants down, and inserted a stick into Victim's anus. Defendant then tried to put a folding knife in Victim's vagina, cutting her in the process and causing her to bleed. At some point during the struggle, Defendant forced Victim into the bathtub and scalded her with hot water. When Victim tried to get out, Defendant stood in front of her and forced his penis in Victim's mouth. Victim bit Defendant's penis, which prompted Defendant to punch her again in her face—causing her tooth to go through her lip.

{7} Victim did not report the incident until April 16—six days after she first spoke with police regarding the April 10 incident. When asked why Victim did not report the incident right away, Victim responded, "Because I was locked in the house with him. I couldn't go nowhere." During cross-examination, defense counsel asked if Defendant ever left the house on April 4, to which Victim responded, "He didn't leave until that day I took off running from him." In response to defense counsel's question asking Victim if she smoked methamphetamine or drank before she reported the incident, Victim answered, "No, I did not drink, I didn't do nothing. I was just with him, like I couldn't even leave my house. Like we were just sitting in the house all day watching TV." Defense counsel then confirmed, "It's your testimony that he didn't leave the house at all over the next ten days?" to which Victim appeared to respond affirmatively.

DISCUSSION

I. Compulsory joinder

{8} We begin by addressing Defendant's argument that his convictions stemming from Jackson II should be vacated because the State violated Rule 5-203(A) NMRA, our compulsory joinder rule, by failing to join Jackson I and Jackson II . The State, in turn, argues that Defendant waived his claim for compulsory joinder because he failed to invoke Rule 5-203(A) below. Alternatively, the State argues that it was not required to join Defendant's charges because they stemmed from two separate incidents of distinct nature. We conclude that Defendant waived his compulsory joinder claim by failing to raise the issue before jeopardy attached in Jackson II , and that the failure to join did not constitute fundamental error. In making these determinations, we need not address the issue of whether Defendant's charges should have been joined.

Standard of Review

{9} "The proper interpretation of our Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question of law that we review de novo." Allen v. LeMaster , 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 11, 267 P.3d 806. "When construing our procedural rules, we use the same rules of construction applicable to the interpretation of statutes." State v. Aslin , 2020-NMSC-004, ¶ 9, 457 P.3d 249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "We begin by examining the plain language of the rule as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the rule and the object and purpose." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "If the language of the [rule] is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further ... interpretation." State v. Wilson , 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 706, 228 P.3d 490 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand, if the rule's language is "doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction," we construe the rule "according to its obvious spirit or reason." State v. Padilla , 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A. Compulsory Joinder and the Remedy of Dismissal

{10} "At common law, whether charges should be joined in the same indictment was a matter of prudence and discretion which rested with the judges to exercise." State v. Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (alteration, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Following the common law, our joinder rule was originally discretionary. See NMSA 1953, § 41-23-10 (1972) (Vol. 6, 2d. Rep., 1975 Pocket Supp.) (providing that "[t]wo ... or more offenses may be joined" (emphasis added)). In 1979, our Supreme Court exercised its supervisory powers to change our joinder rule from permissive to mandatory, recognizing "that requiring prosecutors to get their facts straight, their theories clearly in mind and trying all charges together has the salutary effect of avoiding prejudice to the defendant[,]" as well as our "distaste for piecemeal prosecutions." Gallegos , 2007-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 11, 14, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). As a result, our joinder rule, embodied in Rule 5-203(A), now provides:

Two or more offenses s

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