State v. Jackson
Decision Date | 14 February 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 24910.,24910. |
Citation | 890 A.2d 586,93 Conn.App. 671 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey JACKSON. |
Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Proloy K. Das, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Stacey M. Haupt, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
FLYNN, BISHOP and McDONALD, Js.*
The defendant, Jeffrey Jackson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279(a). He has raised as the sole issue in his appeal the claim that the trial court's jury instruction as to "reasonable doubt" improperly diluted the state's burden of proof. We agree with the defendant's claim, reverse the judgment of the trial court and order a new trial.
The following evidence was presented at the defendant's trial. On May 3, 2002, while incarcerated at the New Haven Correctional Center, the defendant underwent two strip searches after a correctional officer received information from informants that the defendant was in possession of narcotics. A correctional officer, while searching the defendant a second time, found a substance in his sock that later tested positive for cocaine. At trial, the court instructed the jury regarding reasonable doubt as follows:
The defendant took exception to the charge and properly preserved the issue for appeal. On September 17, 2003, the jury found the defendant guilty. The defendant was later sentenced, and this appeal followed.
The defendant claims that the court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt improperly diluted the state's burden of proof. He claims that the court's instruction that the jury must be "firmly convinced" of the defendant's guilt, by failing to define further and properly the term "reasonable doubt," misled the jury to a finding of guilt by a lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the court failed to distinguish the clear and convincing standard of proof from the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, he also claims the state's burden of proof was impermissibly diluted.
We first set forth our standard of review. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Holley, 90 Conn.App. 350, 358-59, 877 A.2d 872, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 929, 883 A.2d 1249 (2005).
Although the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994).1
In State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 796 A.2d 1118 (2002), our Supreme Court stated: (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 370-71, 796 A.2d 1118.
Our Supreme Court concluded in Ferguson that an instruction that the jury must be "firmly convinced" of the defendant's guilt, which also included language defining reasonable doubt, was not improper "when ... viewed in the context of an entire charge."2 Id., at 371, 796 A.2d 1118. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court in Ferguson also stated: "We consistently have held that the definition of reasonable doubt as a real doubt, an honest doubt, a doubt which has its foundation in the evidence or lack of evidence, as a doubt for which a valid reason can be assigned, and as a doubt which in the serious affairs which concern you in every day life you would pay heed and attention to does not dilute the state's burden of proof when such definitions are viewed in the context of an entire charge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The court in State v. Ferguson, supra, 260 Conn. at 371, 796 A.2d 1118, also referred to State v. Nunes, 58 Conn.App. 296, 309, 752 A.2d 93, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944, 762 A.2d 906 (2000), in which we stated that an instruction regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt that explains that the jury must be "firmly convinced" that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged does not dilute the state's burden of proof when "considered in conjunction with the court's instructions in their entirety ...."3 (Emphasis added.) State v. Nunes, supra, at 309, 752 A.2d 93.
In State v. Ferguson, supra, 260 Conn. at 371, 796 A.2d 1118, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant offered no compelling reason for it to reconsider Nunes and other cases defining reasonable doubt. Moreover, the court could see no reasonable possibility that the challenged language, when read in the context of the entire charge, misled the jury. Id.
In cases where the language "a firm conviction of the guilt of the accused" has been approved by our Supreme Court and this court, the charge also has included language defining reasonable doubt as opposed to possible doubt. In Victor, the United States Supreme Court defined a "possible" doubt as an "imaginary" one; id., at 7, 114 S.Ct. 1239; or "a speculative one"; id., at 20, 114 S.Ct. 1239; and upheld an instruction that defined a reasonable doubt "as an actual and substantial doubt" and distinguished it "from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 18, 114 S.Ct. 1239. As Victor pointed out, that explicit distinction between a substantial doubt and a fanciful conjecture was not present in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990); Victor v. Nebraska, supra, at 20, 114 S.Ct. 1239; in which the court found the jury instructions to be improper. Victor v. Nebraska, supra, at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239.
In the present case, the court explained that beyond a reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty that "overcomes every possible doubt," but did not utilize the language found in the Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 21 (1988),4 defining a reasonable doubt as a "real possibility [the defendant] is not guilty ...."5 As a result, the court did not point out that a possible doubt is not a reasonable doubt because a reasonable doubt involves a "real possibility that the defendant was not guilty" and failed to distinguish the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
The court also failed to present the alternative definition of a reasonable doubt as a real doubt for which a valid reason can be assigned, a definition repeatedly approved by the United States Supreme Court and by our Supreme Court. That alternative definition points out the difference between a fanciful or speculative doubt, which the state's evidence need not overcome, and a real doubt that is based on reason, which the state's evidence must overcome.
After considering the charge as whole,6 we...
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