State v. Jackson, SC 20193
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Writing for the Court | McDONALD, J. |
| Citation | 334 Conn. 793,224 A.3d 886 |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Raashon JACKSON |
| Docket Number | SC 20193 |
| Decision Date | 03 March 2020 |
334 Conn. 793
224 A.3d 886
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Raashon JACKSON
SC 20193
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Argued September 25, 2019
Officially released March 3, 2020
Pamela S. Nagy, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, C. Robert Satti, Jr., supervisory assistant state's attorney, and Pamela J. Esposito, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.
McDONALD, J.
The defendant, Raashon Jackson, appeals from the Appellate Court's judgment affirming his conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a), and four counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). See State v. Jackson , 183 Conn. App. 623, 627, 193 A.3d 585 (2018). The defendant claims, among other things, that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to permit the state's expert witness on cell site location information (CSLI) to testify as to what that information revealed about the location of the defendant and his associates during the time the crimes occurred because the state disclosed the expert after voir dire began and only one week before evidence
started, despite a court order issued six months earlier requiring the state to disclose any experts. Alternatively, the defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his related motion for a continuance to obtain his own CSLI expert. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the state's late disclosed expert witness to testify without first granting the defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert. Because we also conclude that this error was harmful, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the facts that the jury could reasonably have found; see id., at 627–29, 193 A.3d 585 ; which we summarize in relevant part as follows. On September 10, 2013, Roderick Rogers called his cousin, David Anderson, for a ride from Rogers' home in Bridgeport. Before Anderson arrived, a social worker, William Muniz, came to Rogers' house at 2:10 p.m. to discuss a job opportunity. Rogers informed Muniz that he had to leave but would be back in one hour. As Muniz was leaving, Anderson arrived. Because Anderson was on probation, he wore a global positioning system (GPS) device that tracked his movements.
Anderson and Rogers left the house in Anderson's car, and Rogers directed Anderson to drive toward Palisade Avenue, on the east side of Bridgeport. On Palisade Avenue, Rogers saw the defendant, a friend whom he called Red Dreads, and directed Anderson to stop the car. The defendant got into the backseat of Anderson's car. Rogers then directed Anderson to drive to the "Terrace," a reference to the Beardsley Terrace housing complex located in the north end of Bridgeport. After arriving at the housing complex, Rogers told Anderson to park on a side street off Reservoir Avenue. Rogers asked Anderson if he had an extra shirt, and Anderson told him to check the trunk. Rogers asked Anderson to wait because he and the defendant would be right back. Rogers and the defendant got out of the car, went
to the open trunk, shut the trunk, and walked down a hill.
At that time, a group of young men was gathered outside the housing complex. Rogers and the defendant approached the group, remarked, "y'all just came through the Ave shooting Braz, you all f'ed up," and either Rogers or the defendant began shooting at the group. One of the shooting victims, LaChristopher Pettway, sustained a fatal gunshot wound to his back. Four other victims, Tamar Hamilton, Leroy Shaw, Jauwane Edwards, and Aijahlon Tisdale, sustained nonfatal wounds.
Rogers and the defendant then left the scene of the shootings and returned to Anderson's car. Rogers told Anderson to drive down Reservoir Avenue. Anderson then drove to the corner of Stratford Avenue and Hollister Avenue, where Anderson parked the car on the side of the street. The defendant got out of the car, and Anderson drove Rogers home. Rogers called Muniz at 2:46 p.m., and Muniz returned to Rogers' home by 3 p.m.
The record reveals the following procedural history. On September 16, 2013, Rogers was arrested. That same day, Rogers sent the defendant a text message stating that "[d]ey taken [me]." Thereafter, the defendant also was arrested and charged in the operative information with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and four counts of assault in the first degree.1 The trial court granted the state's motion to consolidate for trial the defendant's case with Rogers' case.
Anderson testified as a witness for the state. Over defense counsel's objection, the state also presented the testimony of the state's CSLI expert, Sergeant Andrew Weaver of the Hartford Police Department, who testified
to the location of Rogers' and the defendant's cell phones and Anderson's GPS monitor. The court also took judicial notice, over the defendant's objection, of facts surrounding the defendant's failure to appear in court, on unrelated charges, following the shootings as
evidence of consciousness of guilt in this case.
The jury found the defendant guilty of all counts,2 and he was sentenced to a total effective term of fifty-five years of incarceration. He appealed from the trial court's judgment, challenging various evidentiary rulings and the trial court's decision to deny his motion for a continuance to allow him to obtain an expert to respond to the state's belatedly disclosed expert. The Appellate Court rejected each of the defendant's arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction. See State v. Jackson , supra, 183 Conn. App. at 669, 193 A.3d 585.
We thereafter granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issues: (1) "Did the Appellate Court properly hold that the trial court's denial of the motion to preclude the state's late disclosed expert witness [on CSLI] and related motion for continuance was not an abuse of discretion and, even if an abuse of discretion, was not harmful error?" (2) "Did the Appellate Court properly [uphold] the trial court's exclusion of [testimony from the defendant's investigator on the issue of the defendant's cell phone location]?" (3) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence regarding the defendant's failure to appear in court on unrelated criminal charges as evidence of consciousness of guilt in this case?" And (4) "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant had failed to preserve his claim that, pursuant
to State v. Edwards , 325 Conn. 97, 156 A.3d 506 (2017), the trial court was required to hold a hearing in accordance with State v. Porter , 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997) [cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998) ], before allowing the state's expert to give expert testimony regarding the defendant's cell phone location?" State v. Jackson , 330 Conn. 922, 922–23, 193 A.3d 1214 (2018). We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the state's late disclosed expert witness to testify without first granting the defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain his own expert. We also conclude that this error was harmful. In light of this conclusion, we do not reach the remaining, certified issues.
I
We begin with the defendant's claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion either when it allowed the state's late disclosed expert witness to testify or when it declined to grant the defendant a continuance to obtain his own expert witness.
The record reveals the following additional facts relevant to this issue. In April, 2014, the defendant served on the state a request for disclosure, which included a request for reports or statements of any experts. In response, the state disclosed certain information but did not include any information pertaining to an expert. One year later, the defendant filed a motion, dated April 21, 2015, seeking disclosure of the expert witnesses the state intended to call at trial and the opinions to which each witness was expected to testify. At an April 29 pretrial hearing on the motion, defense counsel specifically stated that it was unclear whether the state had obtained a CSLI expert and, if so, what that expert's opinion might be with respect to
the defendant's cell phone location. The defendant indicated that, depending what the opinion was, he "would anticipate
that [he] may file a motion in limine to ... preclude entirely or to limit the scope of the testimony ...." The court confirmed that, "what you're asking for is, if the state's going to call an expert to give opinion evidence about the proximity of [the...
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State v. White, SC 20168
...to ensure that indigent defendants are aware of this procedure, especially when the need for additional funding is, at least in part, the 224 A.3d 886 byproduct of a state actor's untimely actions.--------Notes:1 The defendant also appears to be known as "John Kryzak."2 The defendant appeal......
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State v. Komisarjevsky, SC 18973
...reviewing court must also engage in harmless error analysis.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 811-12, 224 A.3d 886 (2020); see, e.g., State v. Brown, 242 Conn. 445, 459-61, 700 A.2d 1089 (1997) (The trial court did not abuse its discr......
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State v. Raynor, SC 20183
...A.3d 889 highly convincing in light of the technical nature of his analysis and his various credentials.10 See, e.g., State v. Jackson , 334 Conn. 793, 819, 224 A.3d 886 (2020) ("[t]here can be little doubt that jurors would have viewed as highly convincing [the] expert opinion; the testimo......
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State v. Raynor, SC 20183
...opinion highly convincing in light of the technical nature of his analysis and his various credentials.[10] See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 819, 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (‘‘[t]here can be little doubt that jurors would have viewed as highly convincing [the] expert opinion; the testim......
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State v. White, SC 20168
...to ensure that indigent defendants are aware of this procedure, especially when the need for additional funding is, at least in part, the 224 A.3d 886 byproduct of a state actor's untimely actions.--------Notes:1 The defendant also appears to be known as "John Kryzak."2 The defendant appeal......
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State v. Komisarjevsky, SC 18973
...reviewing court must also engage in harmless error analysis.'' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 811-12, 224 A.3d 886 (2020); see, e.g., State v. Brown, 242 Conn. 445, 459-61, 700 A.2d 1089 (1997) (The trial court did not abuse its discr......
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State v. Raynor, SC 20183
...A.3d 889 highly convincing in light of the technical nature of his analysis and his various credentials.10 See, e.g., State v. Jackson , 334 Conn. 793, 819, 224 A.3d 886 (2020) ("[t]here can be little doubt that jurors would have viewed as highly convincing [the] expert opinion; the testimo......
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State v. Raynor, SC 20183
...opinion highly convincing in light of the technical nature of his analysis and his various credentials.[10] See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 819, 224 A.3d 886 (2020) (‘‘[t]here can be little doubt that jurors would have viewed as highly convincing [the] expert opinion; the testim......