State v. Jacob

Decision Date14 May 2002
Docket Number(AC 21375)
Citation69 Conn. App. 666,798 A.2d 974
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TERRANCE R.A. JACOB
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals

Mihalakos, Flynn and Shea, Js. Terrance R.A. Jacob, pro se, the appellant (acquittee).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Gerard A. Smyth, chief public defender, Monte P. Radler, public defender, and Suzanne L. McAlpine, deputy assistant public defender, filed a brief for the office of chief public defender as amicus curiae.

Opinion

FLYNN, J.

The acquittee,1 Terrance R.A. Jacob, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing2 his application for discharge from the custody and jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board). On appeal, the acquittee claims that (1) General Statutes § 17a-593 violates the due process rights of Connecticut acquittees because it is unconstitutionally vague, (2) the court's finding that the acquittee is currently mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute "a danger to himself or others" was not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing, (3) the court's finding that the acquittee is currently mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute "a danger to himself or others" was in contravention of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992), and (4) the court's denial of the acquittee's application for discharge was improperly based on information that was either misinterpreted by the court or false. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. In 1986, following the stabbing and robbing of a nun who had offered him a ride in her car because she thought he was a stranded motorist, the acquittee was charged with the crimes of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3), assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2) and larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (3). On May 11, 1987, he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13.3 On July 13, 1987, following an initial commitment to the custody of the commissioner of mental health and addiction services for a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582 (a), the court, W. Sullivan, J., committed the acquittee to the jurisdiction of the board for a period not to exceed twenty years.4

On September 22, 1999, in accordance with § 17a-593 (a), the acquittee filed an application with the court seeking a discharge from the custody and jurisdiction of the board. The court forwarded the acquittee's application to the board, which held a hearing on the application pursuant to § 17a-593 (d). On April 20, 2000, the board filed a report with the court recommending that the acquittee not be discharged from its jurisdiction because it found that the acquittee "remains mentally ill and continues to require treatment and supervision for that illness and that without such treatment [he] would pose a danger to himself or others." After receipt of that report, the court, Richards, J., promptly held a hearing on the acquittee's application for discharge pursuant to § 17a-593 (f).5 On the basis of its consideration of the testimony of the five witnesses who appeared at the hearing: Peter Zeman, Kenneth Selig and Patrick Fox, psychiatrists; Stephen Curtain, the acquittee's employer; and the acquittee himself, and all of the other evidence, the court concluded that the acquittee was currently mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others. The court, therefore, dismissed the acquittee's application for discharge. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The acquittee first claims that § 17a-593 violates the right of Connecticut acquittees to due process of law because it is impermissibly vague. In support of this claim, the acquittee advances two arguments. First, he argues that § 17a-593 is unconstitutionally vague because it requires an acquittee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would pose a danger to himself or others, yet it fails to define "danger" or "dangerous." Second, he argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it requires an acquittee to prove that his discharge will not constitute a danger to himself or others, which necessarily requires making a prediction about future conduct. He claims that no acquittee can meet this burden of proof because it is virtually impossible to predict future conduct. We conclude that § 17a-593 is not unconstitutionally vague.

The acquittee did not raise the vagueness claim in the trial court. A party can prevail on an issue not raised at trial only if all of the four requirements set out in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), have been met. We conclude that the first two prongs of Golding have been satisfied in that the record is adequate for review and the acquittee's claim is of constitutional magnitude. The acquittee has failed, however, to satisfy the third prong of Golding, which requires that a constitutional violation clearly existed and clearly deprived him of the right to a fair trial.

At the outset we note our standard of review. "In analyzing this claim, we proceed from the well recognized jurisprudential principle that [t]he party attacking a validly enacted statute ... bears the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt and we indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thalheim v. Greenwich, 256 Conn. 628, 640, 775 A.2d 947 (2001).

We now turn to the statute at issue, § 17a-593. Under this statute, "[a]n acquittee may apply for discharge [from the jurisdiction of the board] not more than once every six months...." General Statutes § 17a-593 (a). "The court shall forward any application for discharge received from the acquittee ... to the board. The board shall ... file a report with the court, and send a copy thereof to the state's attorney and counsel for the acquittee, setting forth its findings and conclusions as to whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. The board may hold a hearing or take other action appropriate to assist it in preparing its report." General Statutes § 17a-593 (d). "Within ten days of receipt ... of the board's report filed under subsection (d) of this section, either the state's attorney or counsel for the acquittee may file notice of intent to perform a separate examination of the acquittee. An examination conducted on behalf of the acquittee may be performed by a psychiatrist or psychologist of the acquittee's own choice and shall be performed at the expense of the acquittee unless he is indigent. If the acquittee is indigent, the court shall provide him with the services of a psychiatrist or psychologist to perform the examination at the expense of the state...." General Statutes § 17a-593 (e).

"After receipt of the board's report and any separate examination reports, the court shall promptly commence a hearing on the ... application for discharge.... At the hearing, the acquittee shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged." General Statutes § 17a-593 (f). A "`[p]erson who should be discharged' means an acquittee who does not have psychiatric disabilities ... to the extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others...." General Statutes § 17a-580 (11).6 "`Danger to himself or others' includes danger to the property of others." General Statutes § 17a-580 (5).

After the hearing, "[t]he court shall make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concern is the protection of society, make one of the following orders: (1) If the court finds that the acquittee is not a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the ... application for discharge be dismissed; or (2) if the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged, the court shall order the acquittee discharged from custody...." General Statutes § 17a-593 (g).

We now set forth the law pertaining to vagueness claims. "The void for vagueness doctrine is a procedural due process concept that originally was derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution."7State v. Burton, 258 Conn. 153, 158, 778 A.2d 955 (2001). "The essential purpose of the `void for vagueness' doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct.... [C]riminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 230, 71 S. Ct. 703, 95 L. Ed. 886 (1951).

We note that the statute at issue in the present case, § 17a-593, is not a criminal statute. "[T]he confinement of insanity acquittees, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, is not `punishment' for a crime. The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683-84, 578 A.2d 1025 (1990). We also note that § 17a-593 was not...

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  • State v. Dyous
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    ...v. Vasquez , 194 Conn. App. 831, 836–37, 222 A.3d 1018 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 922, 223 A.3d 61 (2020) ; State v. Jacob , 69 Conn. App. 666, 669, 798 A.2d 974 (2002). This confinement, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, does not constit......
  • State v. Deciccio
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    ...a term is not void for vagueness merely because it is not expressly defined in the relevant statutory scheme. State v. Jacob, 69 Conn. App. 666, 674, 798 A.2d 974 (2002). Thus, we must analyze the language and purpose of § 29-38 (a) to determine if it has a reasonably ascertainable, core me......
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    ...a term is not void for vagueness merely because it is not expressly defined in the relevant statutory scheme. State v. Jacob, 69 Conn.App. 666, 674, 798 A.2d 974 (2002). Thus, we must analyze the language and purpose of § 29–38(a) to determine if it has a reasonably ascertainable, core mean......
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