State v. Jacobs

Decision Date25 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. 20485.,20485.
Citation70 Conn.App. 488,802 A.2d 857
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Earl JACOBS.

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802 A.2d 857
70 Conn.App. 488
STATE of Connecticut
v.
Earl JACOBS.
No. 20485.
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued January 14, 2002.
Decided June 25, 2002.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

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MIHALAKOS, BISHOP and DUPONT, Js.

Annacarina DelMastro, assistant public defender, with whom, in the brief, was Monte P. Radler, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Roslyn Fleisher, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

DUPONT, J.


The defendant, Earl Jacobs, appeals from the trial court's judgment, after a pretrial hearing, that the defendant should be involuntarily medicated to render him competent to stand trial.1 The defendant argues that the court improperly refused (1) to appoint a guardian ad litem for him prior to the hearing and (2) to grant a continuance for time to obtain the defendant's out-of-state medical and psychiatric records. The defendant also argues that even if we conclude that the court acted properly as to the denial of the appointment and the continuance, the court's judgment should be reversed because forced medication in this case would violate the defendant's rights under the first, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and because the court did not apply a strict scrutiny analysis of the evidence submitted to determine the need to medicate the defendant.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. According to the police report, at approximately 6 a.m. on April 17, 1999, Officer Scott Sudora of the Fairfield police department was informed that a male carrying a large bag was walking along the Metro North railroad tracks near a specific location. Sudora found a male in the specified location, matching the description, who was later identified as the defendant.

The railroad tracks are fenced off in many areas and posted with no trespassing signs. According to Sudora, many criminal suspects try to elude the police in this area and use the area to travel unnoticed. Sudora approached the defendant and ordered him to stop, but the defendant continued to walk and then turned toward the officer and stated: "Fuck you, you red cracker. Leave me alone."

Sudora ordered the defendant to stop a second time, but the defendant began to run up an embankment. Sudora grabbed the defendant's coat at the shoulder, and

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the defendant yelled, "I'll kill you, motherfucker." The defendant then turned away and pulled a large yellow plastic bag off his shoulder. The defendant attempted to reach into the bag, and Sudora grabbed his arm. The defendant then swung the bag at Sudora and hit him in the upper left side of his forehead with a heavy solid object contained in the bag. The defendant also reached his hand into his belt, pulled out a small object and hit Sudora in the right forearm with the object. Sudora ordered the defendant to drop the weapon, but the defendant did not comply. Sudora then sprayed the defendant in the face with mace and again ordered the defendant to drop his weapon. The defendant got up and began to run away. Sudora tackled the defendant and again sprayed him in the face with mace. The defendant swung the metal object, which was later found to be a clothes hanger shaped as a weapon, at Sudora, striking him two times in the chest area. Sudora and Detective Josh Zabin, who had responded to Sudora's call for assistance, then tackled the defendant and the defendant dropped the metal object. The officers handcuffed the defendant.

While being transported to the police headquarters and during his booking, the defendant was extremely violent and several times threatened to retrieve a pistol and shoot Sudora. A videotape of the booking process was made. The defendant refused to sign the fingerprint card and refused to sign a form after being read his Miranda2 rights. Among the defendant's belongings was a machete with a fifteen inch, sharpened blade, which the defendant had tried to pull out of the yellow bag during the struggle with Sudora.

The defendant was arrested for simple trespass in violation of General Statutes § 53a-110a, breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53a-167c, interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a and carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 532-06 (a).

On April 18, 1999, the day after the defendant's arrest, Sudora spoke with Mildred Merchant, the defendant's sister. Merchant stated that the defendant has numerous mental problems, but she was not aware of his exact diagnosis and what medications the defendant takes. Merchant stated that the defendant had received most of his treatment while previously incarcerated and that he is prone to extreme violence and would use physical violence to get something that he wanted. Merchant also stated that the defendant "must be evaluated to prevent him from hurting someone else."

The public defender's office was appointed to represent the defendant. Pursuant to the defendant's motion, on May 20, 1999, the court ordered a competency hearing in accordance with General Statutes § 54-56d (c) and (d).3 At that time,

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the defendant refused to sign consent forms that would release information pertinent to his medical history.

On June 9, 1999, the court found the defendant not competent to stand trial and remanded him to the custody of the department of mental health and addiction services for inpatient services in an attempt to restore the defendant to competency. The defendant has consistently refused to cooperate with his attorney and health care personnel.4

On July 27, 1999, the Connecticut Valley Hospital issued a competency to stand trial report, which stated: "It is the unanimous opinion of the restoration monitor and treatment team at Connecticut Valley Hospital that at the time of this evaluation, [the defendant] was not able to understand the charges pending against him, nor was he able to understand the courtroom proceedings, nor to assist in his own defense. Further, it is our opinion that there is a substantial probability that [the defendant] could be restored to competency if treated with medication." The report diagnosed the defendant as having continuous, paranoid schizophrenia.

On August 3, 1999, the state moved to have a mental health guardian appointed pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d(k)5 to determine whether it was in the defendant's medical interests to be forcibly medicated to restore his competency to stand trial. On August 4, 1999, the court granted that motion and appointed Susan E. Devine, a registered nurse with a master of science degree in nursing, as health care guardian of the defendant. Devine reviewed the defendant's medical history, records and reports, and interviewed the defendant, Merchant and members of the defendant's treatment team.

On October 18, 1999, Devine prepared a report that stated: "I recommend that it is in the actual best medical interests of [the defendant] to receive psychiatric medication (involuntary if necessary) at this time." On October 21, 1999, the defendant's attorney received Devine's report. The defendant's attorney hired a private psychiatrist, Kenneth Selig, as a consultant.

On November 17, 1999, the court signed an order permitting Selig access to the defendant's medical records. On January 18, 2000, the division of forensic services, department of mental health and addiction services, Connecticut Valley Hospital, issued a report that outlined the defendant's behavior since June 9, 1999, when he was admitted to the hospital. The report concluded that the defendant "remains not competent to stand trial. The main obstacle preventing [the defendant] from being restored to competence is his refusal to comply with the treatment team's request that he take psychotropic medication.... All less intrusive means to restore [the defendant] to competence have been tried and have not been successful in restoring the defendant." The report also outlined a

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recommended medication plan if the court ordered such a procedure. If, however, the court found that the defendant could not attain competency, the treatment team recommended that the defendant be placed in the custody of the commissioner of the department of mental health and addiction services so that they could pursue a civil commitment. See General Statutes § 54-56d (m).6

On January 25, 2000, counsel for the defendant filed a motion for protective action, which asked the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the defendant. On January 26, 2000, the court denied the motion for protective action and commenced a hearing pursuant to § 545-6d(k)(3)7 to determine whether the defendant should be forcibly medicated to attempt to restore him to competency. On January 27, 2000, counsel for the defendant orally moved for a continuance to allow the health care guardian8 an opportunity to obtain psychiatric and medical records that were believed to exist from a time the defendant had spent in Georgia. The court denied that motion and on January 27, 2000, ruled that the state had met its burden of proof pursuant to § 545-6d(k)(2)9 and ordered the defendant to be forcibly medicated to restore competency to stand trial.

A number of cases have considered whether forcible medication to restore or attain competency to stand trial would deprive a defendant of a constitutional right, usually the procedural or substantive due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. The question requires a consideration of three principles that converge and sometimes collide in the determination of the answer. These principles are that (1) an incompetent defendant cannot be put to

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