State v. Jacques

• Decision Date: 08 July 1910
• Citation: 76 A. 652,30 R.I. 578
• Parties: STATE v. JACQUES.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

76 A. 652

30 R.I. 578

STATE

v. JACQUES.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 8, 1910.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles F. Stearns, Judge.

Earl V. Jacques was convicted of murder, and he brings exceptions. Overruled, and case remitted for sentence.

William B. Greenough, Atty. Gen., for the State.

John T. Cooney, for defendant.

SWEETLAND, J. This is upon exceptions taken in the trial of an indictment for murder.

On the evening of January 3, A. D. 1908, in the town of Smithfield, a young woman named Mary E. Eddy was found in a dying condition on the roadway leading to her home from the Greenville Woolen Mill, where she was employed. She was picked up at about 6:30 p. m., and carried to her home. A physician, who was summoned, found a contused wound of the scalp on the left side and a fracture of the skull, a blackened condition of the eye, and scratches on the face. She was practically unconscious. She died about half past 10 the same night. When found one of Mary Eddy's stockings was down, the garter broken, and her wages had been taken away. Blood stains were found on the road, and three pieces of a club were found near by. The club was a maple stick, known as a "yarn stick," like those used in the mill, about 4 feet long, 1% to 1% inches in diameter, of which a number were lying about the mill.

About three-quarters of the employes in the mill, whose wages were over $10, received a $10 bill in their pay envelopes. The wages of Mary Eddy were $13.13. The defendant had a $10 bill changed by Myrtle Fague at the store in Greenville on Monday, January 13th, from which he paid her 50 cents. Nine dollars were found hidden under the carpet in the defendant's room. He said he got the $10 from Fred Mars. Fred Mars, or Maher, denied that he let the defendant have the money. Afterwards the defendant stated he stole the $10 bill from his father in December. In support of its claim of a confession by the respondent, the state was permitted to introduce the testimony of certain police officers of the city of Providence who had assisted the police of the town of Smithfield upon the case, and the testimony of other witnesses. These witnesses testified that the respondent, without inducement and without threats having been made to him, confessed that he had assaulted Mary E. Eddy with a club, for the purpose of robbing her, and had taken from her her wages, including a $10 bill. When arraigned in the district court upon a complaint charging him with the murder of Mary E. Eddy, the respondent pleaded guilty to the complaint.

The respondent has excepted to the action of the superior court in allowing Charles R. Brownell and Edward R. Trowbridge to sit as jurors, and has included in his bill the following exceptions: (1) "To the ruling of said justice at the trial of said cause in denying the defendant's request that Charles R. Brownell, called and examined as a juror, be removed for cause, on the ground that said juror had formed an opinion that would require evidence to remove." (2) "To the ruling of said justice at the trial of said cause in denying the defendant's request that Edward R. Trowbridge, called and examined as a juror, be removed for cause, on the ground that said juror had formed an opinion that would require evidence to remove."

In the examination on his voir dire, Charles R. Brownell stated that he knew nothing about the case from personal knowledge, and made the following replies to the following questions of the Attorney General: "Q. Can you return a fair and unprejudiced verdict on the law and the evidence submitted to you in this case? A. From what I have read, a few articles I have read in the paper, I don't know whether I could or not. Q. You have read the accounts in the paper? A. Yes, sir; two or three articles appertaining to the murder. Q. You mean to say that the reading of those articles in the paper has caused you to form such an opinion that you could not lay it aside, listen to the evidence, and return a fair verdict? A. I think so; yes, sir. I don't think I could. Q. You don't think you could return a fair verdict? A. Not from what I have read in the papers. Q. Could you not lay aside what you heard, what opinion you have formed, and take this case fresh to-day, and hear the sworn evidence of the witnesses and the law given you by the judge and on that pass a verdict? A. Yes, sir." On his cross-examination he made the following replies to the following questions by counsel for the respondent: "C. Q. 11. You really have formed an opinion? A. Well, in one way I have; yes, sir. C. Q. To banish that opinion from your mind it would require evidence, would it not? A. Yes, sir. C. Q. Have you talked over this case with anybody? A. No, sir. C. Q. You never have expressed an opinion? A. No, sir. C. Q. Did you say that it would require evidence to change your opinion? A. Yes, sir." The court then instructed him as follows: "The test is right here. You are under oath, and you realize that if you testify falsely it is perjury just as much as though you were a witness. The test is simply this: It is not whether you have formed an offhand opinion simply from reading the newspaper, such as an ordinary man would form from reading the newspaper in regard to an event in which he was not particularly Interested; the question is whether or not you can sit on it as a juror, take the case, listen to the evidence first given by the state and then for the defendant, and having heard all the evidence take the law from the court and decide the case on the evidence as you have heard it in this court and on no other consideration. Now, it is on your conscience to say whether or not you can do so. If you cannot try the case fairly between the state and the defendant in the way I have indicated, listening to all the evidence, and decide strictly on that and not on what you think, you are not qualified. If you think what you have read in the newspaper honestly would affect your verdict after you have heard the whole case, you ought not to sit; but if you can discard that you are qualified to sit. What is your position in the matter?" To this Mr. Brownell replied: "Well, I think I could, under the evidence in court."

In examination on his voir dire, Edward R. Trowbridge stated that he did not know Mary Eddy or Earl V. Jacques, and that he had no personal knowledge of the murder, and made the following replies to the following questions of the counsel in the case and the court: "Q. 4. Could you sit on this jury and return a fair and impartial verdict on the law and on the evidence submitted to you? A. Well, I should much prefer not to sit on the jury for the simple reason that I have read, of course, as others, the articles in the newspaper, and I feel that I have formed an opinion, somewhat of an opinion on the case. Q. But what you know of the case is limited to the reading of the newspaper? A. Yes. The Court: The test is right here, Mr. Trowbridge. It rests entirely with you. You know the condition of your mind. If you have read the case and have formed an opinion, a temporary opinion such as you pass on ordinary matters that do not interest you and simply on an ex parte reading in the newspaper, if that is all it amounts to, and if you are able to put that out of your mind so that you can sit on the jury, listen to the evidence presented by the state first and then the evidence presented in behalf of the defendant, and having heard both sides decide between the state and the defendant regardless of any opinion you may have formed now or at any other time—if you can do that, you are qualified to sit. If, however, your opinion formed is such that you can conscientiously say it might influence your verdict, then it is your duty to say it is. It is for you to say exactly what your mind is. A. I presume I am fair-minded enough that my...