State v. Jade G.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 29,016.,No. 29,017.,29,016.,29,017.
• Citation: 2007 NMSC 010,154 P.3d 659
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. JADE G., a child, Defendant-Respondent and State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jade G., a child, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

154 P.3d 659

2007 NMSC 010

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. JADE G., a child, Defendant-Respondent and State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jade G., a child, Defendant-Petitioner.

No. 29,016.

No. 29,017.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

February 28, 2007.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Joel Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiff.

John Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Trace L. Rabern, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Defendant.

OPINION

MAES, Justice.

{1} This is the second time Child has sought review in this Court. See In re Jade G. (Jade G. I), 2001-NMCA-058, 130 N.M. 687, 30 P.3d 376, cert. quashed, 132 N.M. 484, 51 P.3d 527; State v. Jade G. (Jade G. II), 2005-NMCA-019, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-002, 137 N.M. 266, 110 P.3d 74. This appeal requires us to clarify the nature of the protections provided to juveniles by two subsections of the Children's Code Basic Rights provision, NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14 (2003). At Child's delinquency proceeding, the Children's Court suppressed statements made by Child and fingerprints taken of Child, based on the court's interpretation of Children's Code Sections 32A-2-14(F) and 32A-2-14(I). The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the suppression of Child's statements. Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶ 19, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. On the issue of Child's fingerprints, the Court remanded to the Children's Court for further factual development and to allow the parties to argue the legal questions raised by the Court of Appeals' Opinion. Id. ¶ 34. Both the State and Child sought review in this Court. We consolidated the appeals and address the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the State's interlocutory appeal; (2) whether statements made by Child, under the age of thirteen, in a noncustodial setting, are admissible in Child's delinquency proceedings; (3) whether Child's fingerprints, taken pursuant to a warrant issued by a district court judge, are admissible in Child's delinquency proceedings. We hold that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the State's interlocutory appeal pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 39-3-3(B)(2) (1972), which governs appeals from orders of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence. We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the suppression of Child's statements. With regard to the suppression of Child's fingerprints, we hold that until formal allegations of delinquency in a complaint or petition are filed against a child under thirteen, the protection of Section 32A-2-14(I) against taking fingerprints without a court order does not apply. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' remand of the issue of the admissibility of Child's fingerprints, as well as the Children's Court suppression order on this matter, and remand this case to the Children's Court for trial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE BELOW

{2} On the morning of June 14, 1999, Child shot her father. Child, who was twelve years old at the time of the shooting, asserted the shooting was accidental. Police, however, suspected that the shooting was intentional and treated their investigation of the shooting as a murder.

{3} During the course of the police investigation, Child was fingerprinted pursuant to a search warrant issued on the day of the shooting by a district court judge, not assigned to the Children's Court division. This warrant was issued before a delinquency petition was filed against Child. The search warrant sought to obtain the latent fingerprints of all individuals found at Child's residence. The affidavit in support of the search warrant listed the names of the individuals, including Child, and their dates of birth. The search warrant, however, did not explicitly mention that Child was under thirteen, nor did it reference Section 32A-2-14(I), which requires that a court order must be obtained prior to fingerprinting a child under thirteen that is alleged or adjudicated to be a delinquent child. The State intended to introduce Child's fingerprints at her delinquency proceeding to show that her fingerprints matched those found on the weapon.

{4} The State also planned to introduce as evidence several statements made by Child to her friends and relatives, both before and after the shooting. The State claimed that Child's statements demonstrated her culpability by showing inconsistencies between Child's version of the events and the physical evidence collected at the scene.

{5} A delinquency petition was filed in Children's Court on August 19, 1999, charging Child with first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. The petition was amended on September 6, 2002, to include the additional charge of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Child was arraigned, and on October 22, 2002, Child filed an amended motion to suppress statements made by Child. In support of her motion to exclude her statements, Child cited to Section 32A-2-14(F) of the Children's Code which states:

Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the allegations of the petition. There is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible.

§ 32A-2-14(F). Child argued that because she was under the age of thirteen when she made the relevant statements, those statements could not be introduced against her. The State responded that Child's statements were admissible because the statements were made in social settings to friends and family rather than to individuals in positions of authority. The Children's Court granted Child's motion to suppress, indicating its belief that Section 32A-2-14(F) prohibits the admission of any statement made by a child under the age of thirteen, regardless of the setting or to whom the statement was made.

{6} On January 13, 2003, Child filed a motion to exclude fingerprint evidence taken of Child. In Child's motion to suppress her fingerprints, Child relied on Section 32-2-14(I) within the Children's Code which states: "A child under the age of thirteen alleged or adjudicated to be a delinquent child shall not be fingerprinted or photographed for identification purposes without obtaining a court order." § 32A-2-14(I). Child argued that she should not have been subjected to fingerprinting because her fingerprints were taken pursuant to a search warrant and a search warrant is distinct from a "court order," as described within Section 32-2-14(I). The Children's Court granted Child's motion to suppress, stating that a "search warrant [is] not an `order' as contemplated under subsection (I) in that an `order' requires a motion." Jade G. II, 2005-NMCA-019, ¶ 7, 137 N.M. 128, 108 P.3d 534. The Children's Court reasoned that the ex parte procedure necessary for procuring a search warrant was not sufficient to meet the requirements of Section 32-2-14(I). See id. The Children's Court then determined that the State had ample opportunity to obtain a court order, but had failed to do so, and it was now too late for the State to request and obtain new fingerprints. Id. ¶ 38.

{7} The State appealed the suppression of Child's statements and fingerprints to the Court of Appeals. The Court affirmed the Children's Court's decision to suppress Child's statements, concluding that the Children's Code "plainly forbids admission of the statements of Child." Id. ¶ 18. With regard to Child's fingerprints, the Court began its discussion by stating that a "search warrant ... is a form of a court order," but then asserted that this conclusion did not answer the underlying question of whether the Legislature intended Section 32A-2-14(I) to apply to the facts of this case. Id. ¶ 23. Instead of determining whether a `court order' within the meaning of the statute includes a search warrant authorized by a district court judge, the Court stated that in order to determine whether Child's fingerprints are admissible, it was necessary to first determine the meaning of the phrase "alleged .. . to be a delinquent child" found in Section 32A-2-14(I). Id. ¶ 24. Rather than resolving this matter, however, the Court remanded the issue to the Children's Court, indicating that the parties should be given the opportunity to present any additional facts or legal arguments relevant to deciphering the meaning of this statutory provision.

{8} Both the State and Child sought review in this Court. On certiorari, the State raises three issues: that the Court of Appeals was in error when it affirmed the suppression of Child's statements, in referring a question of statutory construction to the Children's Court, and in raising issues not presented by the parties on appeal. Child raises two issues: that the Court of Appeals lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal, and that the Court of Appeals improperly reversed the Children's Court's decision to exclude Child's fingerprints. The appeals of the State and Child have been consolidated for the purposes of this Opinion.

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction

{9} The State filed its appeal pursuant to N.M. Const. Art. VI § 2; NMSA 1978 § 32A-1-17(A) (1999); and NMSA 1978 § 39-3-3(B)(2) (1972), if this case was characterized as a criminal case; and under NMSA 1978 § 39-3-7 (1966) if the case was characterized as a special proceeding in district court. Section 39-3-7 governs appeals from special statutory proceedings in district court, including interlocutory appeals of orders or decisions that practically dispose of the merits of the action. Child argues that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal challenging the suppression of Child's statements and fingerprints. Child asserts that the State, in its original interlocutory appeal...