State v. Jadowski

Decision Date10 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 03-1493-CR.,03-1493-CR.
Citation2004 WI 68,680 N.W.2d 810,272 Wis.2d 418
PartiesState of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Todd M. Jadowski, Defendant-Respondent.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by Sandra L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general.

For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Richard Hahn and Holden & Hahn, S.C., Sheboygan, and oral argument by Richard Hahn.

¶ 1. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Sheboygan County, L. Edward Stengel, Judge. Todd M. Jadowski, the defendant, faces prosecution on one count of sexual intercourse with a person who has not yet attained the age of 16 years contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02 (1999-2000).1 The circuit court granted the defendant's motion to introduce evidence of the victim's intentional misrepresentation of her age.2

¶ 2. This case comes before the court on certification by the court of appeals pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61. The court of appeals certified the following questions:

(1) Is a minor sexual assault victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age a defense to a charge brought under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2)?
(2) If not, do Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23, 939.43(2), and 948.02(2) deny an accused his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

¶ 3. We answer the questions as follows:

(1) Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 939.23 and 939.43(2) precludes a defense predicated on a child's intentional misrepresentation of her age. On the basis of the text of the statutes, the history and purpose of the statutes, and the practical requirements of law enforcement, and despite the severe penalties imposed, we conclude that no affirmative defense of the victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age exists in a prosecution under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). We decline the defendant's invitation to engraft such an affirmative defense onto § 948.02(2). Accordingly, we further conclude that the circuit court erred in ruling to admit the evidence the defendant proffered. If an accused's reasonable belief about the victim's age, based on the victim's intentional misrepresentation of age, is not a defense, then neither evidence regarding the defendant's belief about the victim's age nor evidence regarding the cause for or reasonableness of that belief is relevant.3 Therefore, evidence of the defendant's reasonable belief about the victim's age or the victim's intentional misrepresentation of her age is inadmissible in the guilt-determination phase of a criminal proceeding to support the defendant's asserted affirmative fraud defense to the crime.
(2) The statutes do not violate an accused's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

¶ 4. We therefore reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I

¶ 5. For purposes of this appeal, the facts are not in dispute. On April 15, 2002, the State filed a complaint against the 35-year-old defendant, alleging that on April 3, 2002, he had sexual intercourse with a person below the age of 16 in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). The victim was born on September 13, 1986, making her about five and a half months shy of her 16th birthday on the date of the alleged assault.

¶ 6. Prior to trial the defendant moved to admit evidence that the victim fraudulently induced him to believe she was an adult. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defendant made an offer of proof that the victim was a chronic runaway; that the victim used what appeared to be a state-issued identification card showing her to be 19 years old; that the victim told the defendant and others that she was 19 years old; that the victim appeared to be 19 years old; and that the victim maintained in the defendant's presence that she was old enough to work as an exotic dancer.

¶ 7. The circuit court ruled that evidence of the victim's fraud was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 904.04 as relevant to the "issue of intent on behalf of the alleged victim as well as the absence of mistake or accident."4

¶ 8. The State timely filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied. The State sought leave to appeal the order admitting this evidence. The court of appeals granted leave to appeal and then certified the cause to this court as an issue of first impression.

II

¶ 9. The first issue requires us to decide whether a minor sexual assault victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age is a defense to a charge brought under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). This court decides questions of statutory interpretation independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.

¶ 10. The second issue requires us to determine the constitutionality of statutes. The question of constitutionality is a question of law that we decide independently of the circuit court or court of appeals, but benefiting from their analyses.5 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional.6 A party challenging a statute's constitutionality must ordinarily demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.7

III

¶ 11. The first issue we address is whether a minor sexual assault victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age is a defense to a charge under Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). The defendant asserts that his reasonable belief about the victim's age based on the victim's fraud regarding her age should be a defense to a charge under § 948.02(2). We read Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) with § 939.23 and § 939.43(2) to preclude a defense predicated on a child's intentional misrepresentation of her age.

¶ 12. Section 948.02(2) governs second-degree sexual assault of a child and provides that "[w]hoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class BC felony." The defendant and the State agree that the State must prove only two elements for a conviction: that the accused had sexual contact or intercourse with the victim, and that the victim was under the age of sixteen.8 The defendant asserts, however, that a victim's intentional misrepresentation of her age is an affirmative defense to the crime.

¶ 13. The issue, then, is whether the statutes allow an affirmative defense predicated on the victim's intentional misrepresentation of his or her age.

¶ 14. Wisconsin Stat. § 939.23, governing criminal intent as an element for crimes, provides guidance in determining whether an accused's reasonable belief about a victim's age based on the victim's intentional misrepresentation is a defense.

¶ 15. Section 939.23 addresses criminal intent as an element of all crimes in chapters 939 to 951. When criminal intent is an element of a crime, the statute uses one of several words or phrases, such as "intentionally," "know," or "believe."9 The sexual assault offense in the case at bar (§ 948.02(2)) does not contain any of the words or phrases denoting criminal intent.

¶ 16. Even if Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) included a word of criminal intent like "intentionally" or "know," the State would not have to prove an accused's knowledge of the age of the minor. Section 939.23(6) expressly provides that criminal intent "does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime in question."10 ¶ 17. Thus the sexual assault statute in the case at bar read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 939.23(6) does not require an actor to know the victim's age and does not set forth an actor's reasonable (but erroneous) belief about the victim's age as a defense.

¶ 18. An actor's ability to raise mistake regarding his belief about the age of a minor as a defense is explicitly negated in Wis. Stat. § 939.43(2). The general rule about mistake, set forth in § 939.43(1), is that "[a]n honest error, whether of fact or of law other than criminal law, is a defense if it negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime."11 The exception to this general rule applies here: "A mistake as to the age of a minor ... is not a defense."12

¶ 19. The defendant acknowledges that Wis. Stat. §§ 948.02(2), 939.23, and 939.43(2) prohibit an actor from raising mistake about the age of the minor as a defense to the charge of sexual assault.13 The defendant reasons that although these statutes prohibit the defense of mistake, they do not prohibit an actor from raising the affirmative defense of a victim's intentional misrepresentation about her age. The defendant distinguishes the defense of mistake from the defense of fraud. He asserts that he, as a victim of fraud, is not in the same position as an accused who is mistaken about the victim's age or who commits an honest error. The defendant urges that he was not mistaken about the victim's age; he was defrauded by the victim.

¶ 20. The defendant's affirmative defense of fraud is premised in part upon Wis. Stat. § 939.45, governing privilege as a defense to prosecution for a crime. The defendant relies on § 939.45(6), the "catch-all" provision of the privilege statute. The catch-all provision states that the defense of privilege can be claimed "[w]hen for any other reason the actor's conduct is privileged by the statutory or common law of this state." The defendant does not explain, however, upon what statute or common law rule he is relying under the catch-all privilege statute.

¶ 21. The crux of the defendant's position is that this court should engraft an affirmative defense of fraud onto Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) even though the text of the statutes renders an actor mistaken as to a child's age liable for the crime.14 We are not persuaded that any reason...

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