State v. Jaeger
Decision Date | 19 January 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 58918,58918 |
Citation | 249 N.W.2d 688 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Fredrick Morse JAEGER, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Lawrence W. Zeringue, Burlington, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Michael W. Coriden, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Steven S. Hoth, County Atty., for appellee.
Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ.
Defendant appeals from his guilty plea conviction of unlawful use of telephone in violation of Code section 714.37 which provides:
The questions presented are--(1) Does a plea of guilty entered subsequent to defendant's demurrer waive all alleged constitutional errors in the charging statute?, and (2) Is section 714.37 unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face so as to charge no offense?
Defendant first demurred to the County Attorney's Information which charged him with unlawful use of a telephone in violation of Code section 714.37. He alleged the statute was facially both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The lower court's well-reasoned holding and order overruled defendant's demurrer. Thereafter defendant, with counsel, voluntarily and understandingly entered a plea of guilty as charged. In response to the court's interrogation defendant admitted he telephoned Lowell Bauer, a Burlington City Councilman, on April 6, 1975, at 2:20 A.M. and stated to him: The call was immediately traced as prior similar calls had caused the telephone company to make the necessary attachments to Bauer's telephone.
State v. Everhart, Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 574, 575 ( ); Zacek v. Brewer, Iowa, 241 N.W.2d 41, 50; (guilty plea was set aside because involuntary); State v. Sudduth, Iowa, 224 N.W.2d 19, 21 ( ); State v. Horstman, Iowa, 218 N.W.2d 604, 605 ( ); State v. McGee, Iowa, 211 N.W.2d 267, 268 ( ); State v. Burtlow, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 438, 439 ( ); State v. Culbert, Iowa, 188 N.W.2d 325, 326 ( ); Toogood v. Brewer, Iowa, 187 N.W.2d 748, 750 ( ); State v. Brace, Iowa, 181 N.W.2d 244, 246 ( ); State v. Jackson, Iowa, 173 N.W.2d 567, 570 ( ).
In 25 Drake L.Rev. 360, 'Guilty Pleas' (published in 1975) our opinions are carefully and thoroughly discussed and analyzed. At page 371 the writer concludes: 'When an Iowa defendant pleads guilty, he may as well forget about supposed 'irregularities' that preceded it.'
Here the challenge goes beyond a claimed irregularity. Argument is made that the 'information charges no offense' because of claimed unconstitutionality of the statute. Thus this court is faced with a question of first impression. Therefore we may consider cases from other jurisdictions.
In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2103, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, 636 (1974) the court held a defendant's claim of double jeopardy was not waived by a plea of guilty because the constitutional claim 'went to the very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him.' The court noted the right asserted was 'the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge.'
Blackledge was followed in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63, 96 S.Ct. 241, 242, 46 L.Ed.2d 195, 198 (1975) where the court stated:
Other courts have cited and adopted the Blackledge holding. See Green v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 524 F.2d 1243, 1244; United States v. Sams, 3 Cir., 521 F.2d 421, 427; United States v. Bluso, 4 Cir., 519 F.2d 473, 474; Inge v. Slayton, E.D.Va., 395 F.Supp. 560, 565, 566; State v. Cody, Mo., 525 S.W.2d 333, 335.
In People v. Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 444, 240 N.W.2d 729, 739, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 97 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed.2d 319, the court stated:
'* * *. Certainly it is true that those rights which might provide a complete defense to a criminal prosecution, those which undercut the state's interest in punishing the defendant, or the state's authority or ability to proceed with the trial may never be waived by guilty plea. * * *.'
We hold that if an indictment or county attorney's information facially shows a charge on which the State may not constitutionally prosecute, then a plea of guilty subsequent to an adverse ruling on a demurrer does not waive the claimed unconstitutionality as 'no offense is stated.'
Prefatorily several principles are applicable. Regularly enacted statutes are accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality. Every reasonable basis of support for a statute must be negated by the attacking party. Also when constitutionality is merely doubtful this court will not interfere as it must be shown that legislative enactments, clearly, palpably and without doubt infringe upon constitutional rights before an attack will be upheld. State v. Aldrich, Iowa, 231 N.W.2d 890, 894; State v. Kueny, Iowa, 215 N.W.2d 215, 216, 217 and citations.
A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and thus offends the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the states by the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment if it not only forbids conduct constitutionally subject to proscription but also sweeps within its ambit those actions ordinarily deemed to be constitutionally protected. State v. Wedelstedt, Iowa, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague, and thus offends due process, if it does not give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so he may act accordingly. A statute must give fair wearning of proscribed conduct in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227; State v. Williams, Iowa, 238 N.W.2d 302, 307; State v. Price, Iowa, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815.
Defendant specifically alleges the words 'obscene, lewd or profane' as used in section 714.37 do not have a clear and precise meaning and thus the statute is void for vagueness. He relies strongly on our holdings in State v. Kueny, Iowa, 215 N.W.2d 215 and State v. Wedelstedt, Iowa, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656. As we point out infra, his reliance is not well placed as section 714.37 is not an obscenity or lewdness statute as considered in Kueny and Wedelstedt. Section 714.37 is a statute prohibiting outrageous conduct resulting in the intrusion into people's homes by means of telecommunications. Several other states have applied this reasoning to similar statutes.
In a case involving an almost identical statute and the same issues as presented here, the court in Baker v. State, 16 Ariz.App. 463, 465, 466, 494 P.2d 68, 70, 71, said:
'The statute...
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