State v. Jakes
| Decision Date | 10 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 5158,Appellate Case No. 2011-198747 |
| Parties | The State, Respondent, v. David Jakes, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Appeal From Colleton County
Perry M. Buckner, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Julie Kate Keeney, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
David Jakes appeals his convictions for assault and battery, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to excuse Juror 102 and to replace this juror with an alternate. Finding no error, we affirm.
On the evening of June 3, 2010, a Husband and Wife drove through Colleton County on I-95, as the family moved to Florida; Wife's mother (Mother-in-law) accompanied the couple, but drove behind them in another vehicle pulling a U-Haul trailer. When Mother-in-law's truck overheated, both vehicles exited the interstate and stopped where the off-ramp intersected a country road. Once alongside that road's shoulder and in anticipation of the tow truck's arrival, Husband relocated the trailer to his operable vehicle. While Husband was reconnecting the trailer, he was somewhat out-of-view; Wife and Mother-in-law, however, stood and were more visible to passing traffic.
While the family waited for the tow truck, Antwan McMillan, who was driving by in another vehicle, as well as his passenger, Appellant David Jakes, noticed the stranded motorists. McMillan said the family was an "easy lick" and thereafter stopped his vehicle near the two standing women. Jakes, whose face was largely concealed, jumped out of the backseat of McMillan's vehicle, brandished a stolen firearm, and yelled at the women to "Get up, pretty lady." Husband, who was carrying a handgun pursuant to a concealed weapons permit, appeared from behind his vehicle, drew his firearm, and ordered Jakes multiple times to "[g]et back in your car and leave us alone." When Jakes did not retreat and instead aimed his weapon, Husband discharged his compact pistol, striking Jakes multiple times; a weapon was also indiscriminately discharged by McMillan from his car. The injured Jakes crawled back to McMillan's waiting vehicle, which then sped away. Husband, Wife, and Mother-in-law were physically uninjured.
A Colleton County grand jury indicted Jakes for three counts of attempted murder, three counts of attempted armed robbery, and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, for his conduct toward the stranded motorists.1 During the subsequent trial's voir dire, the trial judge asked, inter alia, whether any potential juror: (1) was a member of a law enforcement agency; (2) was related to, or had a close relationship with, any of the named witnesses; or (3) was biased, prejudiced, or otherwise unable to give either party a fair trial. Based upon the responses to these questions, the trial judge excused a few panel members and the parties next selected a jury from the remaining panel members. Jakesutilized three of his five allocated strikes and his co-defendant, McMillan, utilized four of his five allocated strikes. Among the seated jurors was Juror 102 (Juror).
The trial judge subsequently called in the empaneled jury, gave initial instructions, and allowed trial to begin. After three witnesses testified, however, the trial judge informed counsel for both parties, in camera, about a note he received from Juror expressing concern about her own qualification due to her husband's status as a Colleton County reserve deputy. The trial judge then called in Juror and confirmed Juror's husband was a reserve deputy and that Juror had not discussed the case with her husband. The trial judge also asked Juror if her husband's status affected her ability to give either party a fair and impartial trial. Juror responded, "No, it wouldn't" and the trial judge allowed Juror to return to the jury room.
Subsequently, the trial judge continued to discuss the course of events with counsel. While defense counsel made no objections to the trial judge's questioning of Juror or to making Juror's note an exhibit, defense counsel objected to Juror's continued service. Defense counsel also noted that the juror information sheet, which the Clerk's Office prepared, listed Juror's husband's occupation as "Environmental Health Management, but never said anything about any reserve deputy status." Defense counsel argued that had Juror's husband's full employment status been known, he would have utilized Jakes' strikes differently.
An off-the-record conference then followed, during which a key realization developed. Specifically, Juror did fully disclose her husband's employment on her juror questionnaire as including both "Environmental Health Management" and "reserve deputy." However, "the Clerk's Office didn't transmit everything" that Juror filled out on her juror questionnaire when the Clerk's Office provided counsel with the juror information sheet. Thus, the pertinent information existed within the compiled juror questionnaires that defense counsel could have obtained from the Clerk's Office upon request, but this information did not exist within "the typed[-]up list which the lawyers" received from the Clerk's Office (juror information sheet).
The trial judge subsequently declined to excuse Juror due to this "Scri[ve]ner's error," despite defense counsel's prior unawareness of the juror information sheet's deficiencies. The trial judge also referenced the fact that defense counsel did not request any voir dire question about spousal employment and that a compilation of information from the completed juror questionnaires was available, upon request, from the Clerk's Office.
Thereafter, trial resumed and the jury ultimately found Jakes guilty of three counts of assault and battery in the first degree (a lesser-included offense of attempted murder), three counts of attempted armed robbery, and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Based upon these convictions, the trial judge sentenced Jakes to thirty-five years' incarceration. This appeal followed.
Did the trial court err by not excusing Juror where: Juror's husband was a reserve deputy; Juror disclosed her husband's status on her juror questionnaire; the juror information list provided to counsel by the Clerk's Office did not list husband's status as a law enforcement officer; neither party requested the court to ask during voir dire whether any juror's spouse was in law enforcement; Juror disclosed her husband's status after trial began; Juror confirmed she could be fair and impartial; Defense counsel requested seating an alternate juror; and Defense counsel could have, through the exercise of due diligence, learned of Juror's husband's employment status?
"A decision on whether to dismiss a juror and replace her with an alternate is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Bell, 374 S.C. 136, 147, 646 S.E.2d 888, 894 (Ct. App. 2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law." State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006).
The trial judge's refusal to excuse Juror and to substitute her with an alternate was not an abuse of discretion because: (A) Juror was impartial, despite her husband's reserve deputy status; (B) Juror did not conceal her spouse's employment; and (C) Jakes' counsel, through the exercise of due diligence, could have learned of Juror's husband's employment status.
Section 14-7-1020 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2012) requires a trial judge, upon motion of either party, to determine whether a juror is indifferent:
The court shall, on motion of either party in the suit, examine on oath any person who is called as a juror to know whether he is related to either party, has any interest in the cause, has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein . . . If it appears to the court that the juror is not indifferent in the cause, he must be placed aside . . . and another must be called.
S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1020; accord State v. Cochran, 369 S.C. 308, 321, 631 S.E.2d 294, 301 (2006) (citing section 14-7-1020). While such determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial judge, "[t]here is no rule of the common law, nor is there a statute disqualifying a juror on account of his relationship to a witness, either by affinity or consanguinity, within any degree." State v. Burgess, 391 S.C. 15, 18, 703 S.E.2d 512, 514 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Hilton, 87 S.C. 434, 439, 69 S.E. 1077, 1078 (1911)); accord State v. Mercer, 381 S.C. 149, 158, 672 S.E.2d 556, 560-61 (2009).
Accordingly, the mere fact that a juror's spouse is a law enforcement officer, who is not involved in the case, does not, in and of itself, render a juror biased and, thus, unable to serve on a jury; rather, the crux of that determination is whether it "appears to the court that the juror is not indifferent in the cause." See § 14-7-1020 (); id. (). Moreover, even jurors related by affinity or consanguinity to an actual testifying witness or those who closely knew the putative victim of a crime are not, absent an inability to maintain impartiality, unqualified. See State v. Wells, 249 S.C. 249, 259-60, 153...
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