State v. James, 990267.

Citation2000 UT 80,13 P.3d 576
Decision Date03 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. 990267.,990267.
PartiesSTATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, v. Douglas B. JAMES, Defendant and Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen. Christine F. Soltis, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, Tony Baird, Logan, for plaintiff.

D. Bruce Oliver, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DURRANT, Justice:

¶ 1 The State petitioned for review of a court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court's denial of Douglas B. James's motion to suppress evidence. After the trial court denied James's motion to suppress, he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, the court of appeals held that a police officer violated James's Fourth Amendment rights when he opened the door of James's truck, while James was seated inside the truck, for the purpose of investigating a citizen's report of reckless driving. See State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, ¶¶ 11-14, 977 P.2d 489

. The court of appeals also held that the inevitable discovery doctrine was inapplicable. See id. at ¶¶ 15-23. We granted certiorari, see State v. James, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999), and now reverse the court of appeals.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On March 16, 1996, a citizen approached Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Jason Kendrick and reported that he had just seen a reckless driver. The citizen stated that a dark-colored pickup truck was "all over the road" and had "hit or ... almost struck" three other vehicles. The citizen was able to provide Kendrick with the truck's license number, approximate location, and direction of travel. Kendrick contacted highway patrol dispatch and confirmed that the license number matched the vehicle description provided by the citizen. Kendrick obtained the registered address of the truck's owner and drove to that address. As he neared the residence, he saw a truck matching the citizen's and dispatcher's description enter the driveway, where it stopped and remained with its brake lights on. Kendrick pulled up behind the truck with his headlights on, left his patrol car, and approached the truck's driver's-side door. During the time it took Kendrick to stop and approach, no one attempted to leave the truck.

¶ 3 Kendrick looked in the window and saw two persons, James, who was in the driver's seat, and a female in the passenger seat.1 Kendrick opened the door and asked the driver, James, to get out of the truck. Once the door was open, Kendrick saw a 12-pack of beer on the passenger-side floor of the cab, with one can opened. Kendrick and James walked to the front of the truck, where Kendrick asked to see James's driver's license. James dropped his license when he pulled it from his wallet. Kendrick noted that James smelled strongly of alcohol, his face was flaccid, his speech slurred, and his eyes were droopy and bloodshot. Kendrick also observed that James "appeared to be unstable, unable to stand straight" without keeping his feet apart or moving. Kendrick expressed concern about the possibility that James had been involved in an accident. Kendrick and James walked around the truck and scanned it for signs of damage, but found none.

¶ 4 At about this time, the female passenger left the vehicle and "was very upset ... yelling, screaming, that kind of thing." Kendrick became concerned for his safety, told James to remain where he was and returned to his patrol car to call for backup. James instead went inside his home. When the backup officer, Trooper Arlow Hancock, arrived, he and Kendrick entered the attached garage through the open garage door. They knocked on the door leading from the garage into the house and told James that if he did not come out they would come in to get him. James came out and performed a standard field sobriety test, which he failed. When James attempted to walk away again, the officers arrested him. James was taken to the Cache County jail, where he refused to take any further sobriety tests or a breathalyzer test. The State charged James with driving under the influence and having an open container of alcohol in his vehicle.

¶ 5 At trial, James moved to suppress evidence of his intoxicated condition. He asserted three Fourth Amendment grounds for suppression: (1) Kendrick initially lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his truck or detain him; (2) Kendrick opened the door to his truck without probable cause; and (3) Kendrick and Hancock lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances necessary to enter his garage without a warrant. The trial court denied James's motions. A jury convicted James of driving under the influence, but acquitted him on the open container charge.

¶ 6 On appeal, the court of appeals addressed only the argument relating to Kendrick's opening of the truck door. The court of appeals ruled that the officer's opening of the vehicle door constituted a search of the vehicle rather than an investigative detention and that the search was illegal. See James, 1999 UT App 17, ¶¶ 12-14,

977 P.2d at 489. It then discussed the "inevitable discovery" exception to the warrant requirement and concluded that the exception was inapplicable. See id. ¶¶ 15-22.

¶ 7 We granted the State's petition for certiorari. On certiorari review, the State argues that the court of appeals construed cases prohibiting police from opening a vehicle door in certain circumstances too broadly and out of context. Specifically, the State contends that where an officer has the right to order a person to temporarily leave a vehicle, the officer's mere opening of a vehicle door cannot constitute an illegal search. The State also argues that the court of appeals erred in its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). "`We review the court of appeals' decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference.'" Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997) (quoting Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)).

¶ 9 We begin our analysis with a brief statement of two fundamental and related tenets of Fourth Amendment caselaw. First, the presumptive rule relating to reasonable searches and seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)

. There are a number of "exceptions" to the presumptive rule, however. See id. The application of those exceptions is guided by the second tenet, which is that the fundamental right protected by the Fourth Amendment is a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984).

¶ 10 Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985)

; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). The so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant rule applies regardless of whether the vehicle is actually in motion at the time. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 391,

105 S.Ct. 2066. Under this exception to the warrant rule, officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion.2

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). Reasonable suspicion may be based on information provided by a citizen if that information, coupled with available corroboration, is sufficiently reliable under the totality of the circumstances. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-32, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). Owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412-15, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).3

¶ 11 The specific issue on certiorari in this case concerns the Fourth Amendment propriety of opening the driver's-side door of James's truck for the purpose of speaking to James and requesting that he step out of the vehicle. As a preliminary matter, we note that the facts of the case definitively demonstrate that Kendrick's detention of James was based on more than adequate reasonable suspicion.4 Kendrick's investigation was founded on a citizen's detailed report of a reckless driving pattern that was consistent with driving under the influence. The citizen's identification of the license plate and description of the truck were corroborated in all material respects by the highway patrol dispatch office, and, subsequently, by Kendrick's own observation. Kendrick also viewed James's pickup pulling into the driveway at the registered address. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, Kendrick had the right and the authority to temporarily detain James and investigate the report of reckless driving.5 It follows that Kendrick was legally authorized to order James to step from the cab of his truck.6See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11,

98 S.Ct. 330; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). He needed neither consent nor a warrant to make this request.

¶ 12 The court of appeals' analysis overlooks the fundamental...

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