State v. James

• Decision Date: 11 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. 514PA11-2,514PA11-2
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Harry Sharod JAMES
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

371 N.C. 77

813 S.E.2d 195

STATE of North Carolina

v.Harry Sharod JAMES

No. 514PA11-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed 11 May 2018

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Sandra Wallace-Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant-appellee.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by David W. Andrews, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant-appellee.

Juvenile Law Center, by Marsha L. Levick, pro hac vice, and Office of the Juvenile Defender, by Eric J. Zogry, for Juvenile Law Center, Campaign for Fair Sentencing of Youth, and Juvenile Sentencing Project, amici curiae.

Mark Dorosin, Elizabeth Haddix, Pittsboro, Jennifer Watson Marsh, Brent Ducharme, and Allen Buansi for Senators Angela Bryant and Erica Smith-Ingram, Representatives Kelly Alexander, Larry Bell, Jean Farmer-Butterfield, Rosa Gill, George Graham, Mickey Michaux, Amos Quick III, Evelyn Terry, and Shelly Willingham, and Professor Theodore M. Shaw; and Youth Justice Project of the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, by K. Ricky Watson, Jr. and Peggy Nicholson, for Great Expectations, amici curiae.

ERVIN, Justice.

This case involves the validity of the procedures prescribed in N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A to 15A-1340.19D for the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder in light of Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and its progeny and other constitutional provisions. On 19 June 2006, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder on the basis of incidents that occurred on 12 May 2006, when defendant was sixteen years old. On 10 June 2010, a jury returned verdicts convicting defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder on the basis of both malice, premeditation and deliberation and the felony murder rule. In light of the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgments sentencing defendant to a term of sixty-four to eighty-six months imprisonment based upon his conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon and to a concurrent term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, a sentence that was, at that time, mandatory for juvenile defendants convicted of first-degree murder. See N.C.G.S. 14-17 (2009) (providing that "any person who commits [murder in the first degree] shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. [§] 15A-2000, except that any such person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the murder shall be punished with imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole"). Defendant noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which filed an opinion on 18 October 2011 finding no error in the proceedings that led to the entry of the trial court's judgments. State v. James , 216 N.C. App. 417, 716 S.E.2d 876, 2011 WL 4917045 (2011) (unpublished).

On 22 November 2011, defendant filed a petition seeking discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' decision by this Court. During the pendency of defendant's discretionary review petition, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of committing criminal homicides violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments and mandated that sentencing judges consider such offenders' "youth and attendant characteristics" before imposing "the harshest possible penalty" for juveniles. Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 483, 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471, 2475, 183 L.Ed.2d at 424, 426, 430. On 25 June 2012, the day upon which Miller was decided, defendant sought leave to amend his discretionary review petition for the purpose of bringing Miller to our attention. On 12 July 2012, the Governor signed legislation "to amend the state sentencing laws to comply with the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama ," (all capital and no italicized letters in the original), providing that defendants convicted of first-degree murder for an offense committed when they were under the age of eighteen "shall be sentenced in accordance with this Article," with this legislation being applicable to any resentencing hearings held for juveniles "sentenced to life imprisonment without parole prior to the effective date of this act." Act of July 3, 2012, ch. 148, secs. 1, 3, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2012) 713, 713-14. On 23 August 2012, this Court entered an order allowing defendant's discretionary review petition "for the limited purpose of remanding to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to Article 93 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes of North Carolina."¹

The case in which defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder came on for resentencing before the trial court at the 5 December 2014 criminal session of the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 12 December 2014, the trial court entered an order determining, among other things, that:

The Court [ ] has considered the age of the [d]efendant at the time of the murder, his level of maturity or immaturity, his ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of his conduct, his intellectual capacity, his one prior record of juvenile misconduct (which this Court discounts and does not consider to be pivotal against the [d]efendant, but only helpful as to the light the juvenile investigation sheds upon [d]efendant's unstable home environment), his mental health, any family or peer pressure exerted upon defendant, the likelihood that he would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement, the evidence offered by [d]efendant's witnesses as to brain development in juveniles and adolescents, and all of the probative evidence offered by both parties as well as the record in this case. The Court has considered [d]efendant's statement to the police and his contention that it was his co-defendant Adrian Morene who planned and directed the commission of the crimes against Mr. Jenkins, [and] the Court does note that in some of the details and contentions the statement is self-serving and contradicted by physical evidence in the case. In the exercise of its informed discretion, the Court determines that based upon all the circumstances of the offense and the particular circumstances of the [d]efendant that the mitigating factors found above, taken either individually or collectively, are insufficient to warrant imposition of a sentence of less than life without parole.

As a result, the trial court ordered that "[d]efendant be imprisoned to Life Imprisonment without Parole." Defendant noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court's resentencing judgment.

In seeking relief from the trial court's resentencing judgment before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court had, by resentencing him pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1340.19A to 15A-1340.19D (the Act), violated the state and federal constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws, that the relevant statutory provisions subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and deprived him of his rights to a trial by jury and to not be deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that "the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its decision to impose a sentence of life without parole." State v. James , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 786 S.E.2d 73, 77-79, 82 (2016). In a unanimous opinion filed on 3 May 2016, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act while reversing the trial court's resentencing order and remanding it for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals began by rejecting defendant's ex post facto argument and his contention that he "should have been resentenced ‘consistent with sentencing alternatives available as of the date of the commission of the offense[,]’ specifically, ‘within the range for the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.’ " Id. at ––––, 786 S.E.2d at 77-78 (alteration in original). In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals noted that the relevant statutory provision "does not impose a different or greater punishment than was permitted when the crime was committed; nor d[id] it disadvantage defendant in any way." Id. at ––––, 786 S.E.2d at 78. On the contrary, the new legislation merely afforded the trial court the option of imposing a lesser sentence than had been available at the time that judgment was originally entered against defendant. Id. at ––––, 786 S.E.2d at 78. In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that "there is no indication that the legislatures in [the] states [in which juvenile defendants had been resentenced based upon convictions for lesser offenses in the aftermath of Miller ] enacted new sentencing guidelines ... after the mandatory sentences provided in their respective statutes were determined [to be] unconstitutional." Id. at ––––, 786 S.E.2d at 78 (first citing State v. Roberts , 340 So.2d 263 (La. 1976) ); then citing Jackson v. Norris , 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906 (2013) ; and then citing Commonwealth v. Brown , 466 Mass. 676, 1 N.E.3d 259 (2013). In this state, however, the General Assembly "acted quickly in response to Miller and passed the Act, establishing new sentencing guidelines in N.C.[G.S.] § 15A-1340.19A et seq. for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder" and making it "clear that [the statute] was to apply retroactively." Id. at ––––, 786 S.E.2d at 78. As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that "there is no violation of the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws" in this instance. Id. at ––––, ...